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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Establishing the Problem 
Psychological contracts have been defined as “an individual’s system of beliefs, based on 
commitments expressed or implied, regarding an exchange agreement with another.” (Rousseau, 
2011, p. 191).  At this stage of the development of the psychological contracts literature, it has 
been generally accepted that when individuals perceive that organizations breach (or fail to 
fulfill) promises, employees tend to display more negative attitudes and behaviors, undermining 
organizational effectiveness.  Several reviews and meta-analyses in important academic journals 
and handbooks (e.g. Bal, De Lange, Jansen, & Van Der Velde, 2008; Conway & Briner, 2005; 
Rousseau, 2011; Taylor & Tekleab, 2004; Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007) as well as 
in important practitioner-oriented outlets (e.g. Harvard Business Review, People Management) 
have shown the effects of managing psychological contracts in organizations, while others have 
expanded the literature by linking psychological contracts to other important fields in the 
organizational sciences such as leadership (e.g. Bordia, Restubog, Bordia, & Tang, 2010; 
Epitropaki, 2013; Henderson, Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2008; McDermott, Conway, 
Rousseau, & Flood, 2013; Restubog, Bordia, Tang, & Krebs, 2010), human resource 
management (Chien & Lin, 2013; Guzzo & Noonan, 1994; Suazo, Martínez, & Sandoval, 2009), 
or organizational change (Chaudhry, Coyle-Shapiro, & Wayne, 2011; Chaudhry & Song, 2014; 
Freese, Schalk, & Croon, 2011; van den Heuvel, Demerouti, & Bakker, 2014).   
A recent issue that has called the attention of psychological contract researchers is how 
social contexts can determine the development and fulfillment of psychological contracts (Dabos 
& Rousseau, 2013; De Vos & Tekleab, 2014; Ho, 2005; Ho & Levesque, 2005; Ho, Rousseau, & 
Levesque, 2006; O’Leary-Kelly, Henderson, Anand, & Ashforth, 2014).  Theories describing the 
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social processes that govern team-level interactions and social influence are key to understand 
why individuals perceive whether their contracts have been fulfilled or breached.  Perceptions of 
the contract fulfillment, and even the perceptions of why individuals breach their promises, could 
be better explained if we consider social phenomena and continuous interactions among 
employees.  For instance, in a seminal article, De Vos and Tekleab (2014) suggested that 
perceptions of psychological contract fulfillment (PCF) can be shared among individuals of a 
team, facilitating the emergence of a team-level state of PCF.   
More recently, Laulié and Tekleab (2016) further expanded this idea in a theoretical 
paper, arguing for the existence of two distinct team-level PCF-type constructs: shared team PCF 
and shared individual PCF1.  The two constructs may represent shared perceptions of fulfillment 
of psychological contracts, although they may differ in the entity(ies) referred when individuals 
evaluate fulfillment of organizational promise-based obligations.  In short, shared team PCF 
represents the team members' perceptions about the fulfillment of promises made to the team as 
a whole, whereas shared individual PCF represents the convergence of individual perceptions 
about the extent to which organizations fulfill individual-level psychological contracts. 
Despite the fact that these efforts have contributed to extending the psychological 
contract literature to higher levels of analysis, several questions remain unanswered as to the 
empirical evidence supporting this theory.  First, regarding construct validity, the field still needs 
more evidence about whether shared PCFs are valid and useful constructs in the organizational 
sciences. For example, we still do not know whether shared PCFs are different from other 
apparently related constructs such as POS climate or Justice Climate or how these variables may 
be correlated.  Second, in regards to homology issues (Chen, Bliese, & Mathieu, 2005; 
                                                 
1 When talking about the two constructs at the same time, I will refer them as “shared PCFs”. 
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Kozlowski & Klein, 2000), we still do not know whether previously identified relationships 
between individual PCF and other variables are similar or equivalent at higher levels of analysis.  
Third, shared PCFs still need a better description of their emergence processes.  Factors affecting 
the emergence of shared PCFs should not only be discussed at a theoretical level, but also at the 
empirical level.  Having more clarity about the conditions under which shared PCFs are more 
likely to be observed can be useful for organizations and its leaders if they want to better 
understand how to manage PCF at the team level.  Fourth, although previous research has shown 
that PCF at the team level could affect important team-level outcomes such as team performance 
and average team commitment (De Vos & Tekleab, 2014) we still do not know whether shared 
PCFs are important predictors of other relevant outcomes such as unit-level OCBs or collective 
turnover. Moreover, if that is the case, we still require a better understanding of the mechanisms 
that shared PCFs use to affect team-level outcomes.  In this dissertation, I intend to address these 
questions by providing empirical evidence about employees' shared perceptions of the extent to 
which organizations fulfill its psychological contracts. 
1.2. Purpose of the Study and Research Objectives 
Although a growing line of research has started to empirically assess the existence of 
PCF at the team level of analysis (e.g. De Vos & Tekleab, 2014), several questions remain 
unanswered as the literature is still in its infancy.  The main purpose of this dissertation is to 
contribute to the organizational sciences by building theory about PCF at the team level and by 
providing empirical evidence to solve several research questions.  In particular, the formal 
objectives of the study are:  
 Research objective #1: Empirically assess whether PCF at the team level can be 
conceptualized in two different constructs: a) Shared Team PCF, and b) Shared 
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Individual PCF.  In the following chapters, I theoretically describe the difference 
between the two constructs and empirically test this similarity/difference.  Following 
recommendations by van Mierlo, Vermunt, and Rutte (2009), I test the distinction 
between and the baseline psychometric quality of the constructs. 
 Research objective #2: Explore the relationship that shared PCFs have with other social 
exchange indicators at the team level (i.e. Justice Climate, POS Climate).  In order to 
provide evidence for discriminant validity of the key constructs, I evaluate whether 
shared PCFs are different from other recently developed social exchange indicators at the 
team-level.  Also, I study the directionality of the relationship among these constructs. 
 Research objective #3: Explore antecedents of the emergence of shared PCFs.  
Following propositions developed in Laulié and Tekleab (2016), I empirically assess 
whether some team-level variables facilitate or undermine the emergence of shared team 
PCF and shared individual PCF.  This study explores whether team size, team 
interdependence, and LMX differentiation influence indicators of emergence. 
 Research objective #4: Empirically evaluate the relationship between shared PCFs and 
relevant team-level outcomes.  In addition to study whether Shared Team/Individual PCF 
affects team performance, I will test whether shared PCFs affect other important 
dependent variables such as a) Team-level OCB, b) Organizational Engagement, and c) 
Collective turnover intention. 
 Research objective #5: Explore the mechanisms that explain why shared PCFs affect 
team-level outcomes.  In particular, I suggest that team-level PCF can affect team 
processes and team motivation (Chen & Kanfer, 2006; Park, Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 
2013), which in turn facilitate higher team performance and other outcomes.  I plan to 
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operationalize team motivation through team potency, team external collective fit, and 
team affective tone. 
 Research objective #6: Study the cross-level moderating effects of shared PCFs on PCF-
outcome relationships at the individual level.  Following the idea that social 
environments can provide important social cues to individuals (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978), I argue that shared PCFs can alter individual-level reactions to PCF.  Then, I will 
evaluate whether shared individual PCF and shared team PCF can attenuate or exacerbate 
the relationship between individual-level perceptions of PCF and important individual-
level outcomes. 
 Research objective #7: Study homology relationships at individual level: I explore 
whether different propositions of team-level relationships are also held at individual 
levels of analysis.  Following general recommendations about homology tests by Chen et 
al. (2005), I explore whether relationships between PCF and other variables hold at 
different levels of analysis (i.e. individual vs team).  
1.3. Significance of the Study 
Although the PCF literature is extensive (Rousseau, 2011; Sherman & Morley, 2015), we 
know relatively little about what PCF represents at higher levels of analysis.  This dissertation 
contributes to the literature of psychological contracts at higher levels of analysis, which is 
relevant for several reasons.  First, shared perceptions of fulfillment of psychological contracts 
can be viewed as a mechanism to study how companies are at managing the employment 
relationship with their teams and employees, which is at the root of human resource management 
and organizational behavior.  Employees may decide which company to work for or how much 
effort to put based on their general perceptions about the organization as an exchange partner.  
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This is especially relevant in times when employees increasingly evaluate organizations based on 
their perceptions of how they treat employees. In general, practitioners have general 
representations of good or bad companies, and even the media create rankings of best employers 
(e.g. Forbes' Top 10 companies to work for).  Employees evaluate employers based not only on 
the promised benefits they offer, but also on the degree of fulfillment or breach of those 
promises.  Thus, team-level PCF constructs may measure the collective perception of incumbents 
about how organizations honor psychological contracts of teams and employees.  
Second, organizations are better understood when relationships among variables and their 
social processes are studied at different levels of analysis (Chen et al., 2005; Hackman, 2003; 
Porter & Schneider, 2014; Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011).  Individuals perform in networks 
of a plethora of interactions which may, in turn, create emergent social phenomena affecting 
important outcomes.  Thus, it is relevant to clarify how PCF can shape the performance and 
collective behaviors and attitudes of teams.  Similarly, the determinants and outcomes of 
individual PCF versus team-level PCF constructs could dramatically vary, creating a need to 
manage both individual-level and team-level psychological contracts at the same time. 
Finally, shared PCFs could be linked to several related variables in the organizational 
sciences. Scholars have theorized that several social exchange indicators can be conceptualized 
at team levels of analysis (cf. Bashshur, Hernández, & González-Romá, 2011; Colquitt, Noe, & 
Jackson, 2002; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008).  For example, other team-level 
climate constructs such as justice climate and POS climate have been demonstrated to be 
powerful antecedents of team performance (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2002; González‐Romá, Fortes‐
Ferreira, & Peiro, 2009).  As an indicator of social exchanges, PCF could also be conceptualized 
at the team level. Thus, more research is needed to understand how shared individual PCF and 
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shared team PCF can explain variance above and beyond other related constructs.  Links to other 
literatures such as leadership, climate and cultures, or HR topics could also be formed in the 
future.  All these links could be better traced if we have a better understanding of the emergence, 
antecedents, and outcomes of these key constructs. 
1.4. Organization of the Study 
This dissertation will have the following structure.  In chapter 2, I provide a review of the 
literature on psychological contract research at individual and team-levels of analysis.  This 
review will emphasize the social nature of the development of psychological contracts and 
psychological contract fulfillment.  Chapter 3 introduces shared individual PCF and shared team 
PCF, discussing similarities and differences, and describing emergence processes at a theoretical 
level.  Then I discuss theoretical arguments to predict and test several Hypotheses.  Chapter 4 
describes the methodology of the main study, including a description of measures and data 
collection strategies.  In this chapter, I also describe the analytic approaches to test each of the 
specific Hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes the main results of the hypothesis testing procedures 
and Chapter 6 discusses the results, evaluate its implications, and propose future lines of 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Overview 
The psychological contract term was first introduced by Argyris and Levinson over 50 
years ago (Argyris, 1960; Levinson, Price, Munden, Mandl, & Solley, 1962).  Since then, the 
field has been boosted, revitalized, and criticized (e.g. Cullinane & Dundon, 2006; Guest, 1998; 
Rousseau, 1989, 1998; Tomprou, Rousseau, & Hansen, 2015).  Several articles have described 
the nature and evolution of the field (e.g. Conway & Briner, 2005; Roehling, 1997; D. M. 
Rousseau, 1995, 2011; Taylor & Tekleab, 2004) and some meta-analyses have summarized the 
effects of PCF in important individual-level outcomes (Bal et al., 2008; Li, Rousseau, & Silla-
Guerola, 2006; Topa Cantisano, Morales Dominguez, & Depolo, 2008; Zhao et al., 2007).  My 
intention in this chapter is not to paraphrase or repeat all these previous efforts reviewing the 
literature, but to set the context to introduce two novel team-level PCF constructs and suggest 
relevant propositions about their effects in organizations.  
This chapter is divided into two main sections. First, I summarize the literature on 
psychological contracts at the individual level of analysis. This section includes discussions of 
main definitions and key concepts, main theoretical frameworks used to explain effects of 
psychological contracts, and main antecedents and outcomes.  The purpose of this section is to 
familiarize the reader with the literature. Second, I describe the literature about the social (and 
multi-level) component of psychological contracts.  In particular, I describe the role of social 
influence in the development of perceptions of PCF and then I account for research on 
psychological contracts that have considered multi-level models.   
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2.2. Research on Psychological Contracts at the Individual Level 
2.2.1. Defining the Psychological Contract 
As described by Roehling (1997) and Conway and Briner (2005), the psychological 
contract term has been used to denote different phenomena over time.  In early days, March and 
Simon (1958) started acknowledging that employers and employees exchange contributions for 
inducements which are defined both explicitly and implicitly in a workplace.  But, Argyris 
(1960) was the first to propose the term “psychological work contract”, referring to a 
relationship where organizations respect employees’ expression and fulfillment of needs 
(develop and grow) while employees respect the right of an organization to maintain high and 
efficient production.  Around the same time, Levinson et al. (1962, p. 21) defined psychological 
contracts between employees and employers as “a series of mutual expectations […] that govern 
their relationship to each other.” Levinson et al. suggested that these expectations create 
perceived obligations from employees and employers although they were mainly driven by 
unconscious motives and basic needs.  Later, Schein (1965) described the psychological contract 
as a phenomenon between two parties, where each party had a variety of expectations of the 
other party.  Schein argued that these expectations operate as powerful determinants of behavior, 
although they depend on the degree of matching between expectations of employees and 
employers, and on the goods being exchanged.  Other early writing and research also contributed 
to developing the psychological contract construct (e.g. Gibson, 1966; Holtz, 1978; Kotter, 1973; 
Portwood & Miller, 1976).  But although all these authors contributed enormously to a general 
understanding of the concept, Rousseau (1989)’s article has been generally considered as one of 
the most important breakthroughs in the literature. 
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Rousseau (1989, p. 123) initially defined psychological contracts as “an individual’s 
beliefs regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that focal 
person and another party.”  In this article, there are several novel features of the construct that 
can be distinguished from previous conceptualizations.  First, Rousseau emphasizes that in 
psychological contracts there is a belief that a promise has been made.  This aspect of the 
definition contrasts with early conceptualizations that were centered on the idea of expectations 
(this issue is also discussed in the next section). Second, her conceptualization emphasizes the 
idea that a psychological contract is an individual-level phenomenon, suggesting that 
psychological contracts are developed within individuals and that the parties of a contract do not 
need to agree in the terms of contracts.  This idea is opposite to the concept of implied contracts, 
which represent a type of agreement of mutual obligations existing at a dyadic or relational level.  
Third, earlier conceptualizations emphasized that unconscious or deeper psychological needs 
were the main drivers of individuals’ expectations, whereas Rousseau argued that psychological 
contracts are formed by individuals’ perceptions of verbal or written promises or by the detection 
of consistent and repeated patterns of behavior from their employers, which is a more conscious 
and cognitive approach (Rousseau, 2011) in comparison to the needs-approach.  Fourth, 
Rousseau was the first to propose the idea of psychological contracts “violations” (PCV) as the 
main mechanism to explain the relationship between the psychological contract and important 
individual-level outcomes.  PCV was a useful construct for subsequent research by providing 
more clarity about the effects of the complex phenomenon of psychological contracts in 
organizational settings. 
Since Rousseau's (1989) seminal article, the field has expanded enormously, especially in 
terms of empirical studies. Currently, Google Scholar provides a result of more than 39 thousand 
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references with the term “psychological contract” (search made on August 1st, 2016) and several 
meta-analyses have summarized multiple studies (Bal et al., 2008; Li et al., 2006; Topa 
Cantisano et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2007), suggesting that the field is in a mature state.  Although 
Rousseau’s study did not eliminate all the questions about definitions of the psychological 
contract construct (For a summary of definitions, see Conway and Briner (2005)), it sets the 
ground for contemporary research.  For the purposes of this dissertation, and to be consistent to 
recent progress of the psychological contract literature, I will use Rousseau’s (2011, p. 191) 
definition of psychological contracts as “an individual’s system of beliefs, based on 
commitments expressed or implied, regarding an exchange agreement with another.”   
In terms of the prevalence of the construct in research and practice, several studies have 
demonstrated that perceptions of psychological contract breach (PCB) seem to be the norm 
rather than the exception in contemporary organizations (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Others 
have addressed important practical questions such as factors that affect psychological contract 
preferences in employees of different career stages (e.g. De Hauw & De Vos, 2010; Low, 
Bordia, & Bordia, 2016), or how employers are actively managing the psychological contract 
(e.g. Guest & Conway, 2002).  However, the explicit use of the psychological contract construct 
has been more popular among researchers than among practitioners (Conway & Briner, 2005).  
Much more efforts are needed to close the gap between scientists and practitioners in this field.  
Next, I describe key concepts and distinctions in the literature. 
2.2.2. Key Concepts in the Psychological Contract Literature 
2.2.2.1. Promises, Obligations, and Expectations.  Inherent in the definition of 
psychological contracts is the distinction among key concepts such as promises, expectations, 
and obligations.  Initial definitions of psychological contracts were based on “expectations”, 
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which can be understood as the anticipations about what should happen (or not) in the future 
based on specific beliefs, values, desires, or even imagination (cf. Conway & Briner, 2005; 
Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993; Taylor & Tekleab, 2004).  Expectations may or may not 
originate from concrete promises or commitments made by the employer.  In contrast, the field 
has more generally accepted that the terms of a psychological contract are more likely formed by 
actions displayed by the organization, which are better described as promises or commitments 
that are generally interpreted as obligations. However, whether expectations or obligations, they 
should be based on concrete promises in order to be considered part of the psychological contract 
(Conway & Briner, 2005).  
Although some researchers initially questioned the practical implications of this 
distinction, evidence suggests that the effects of measures capturing promise-based obligations 
could have differential effects on attitudinal and behavioral outcomes than more general 
expectation terms (Chaudhry & Tekleab, 2013; Roehling, 2008; Taylor & Tekleab, 2004).   
Rousseau (2011) recommended the use of the terms “obligations and promise fulfillment” rather 
than “expectations”, because general evidence suggests that obligations explain more variance 
than expectations.  In this dissertation, I follow Rousseau's recommendation and focus on 
expressed or implied "promises" when conceptualizing and measuring psychological contract 
constructs.  
2.2.2.2. Parties of the Psychological Contract.  Psychological contracts assume that 
there are two parties in an exchange agreement.  The issue about the agreement of obligations 
between employees and employers have been defined as mutuality – “the degree to which the 
two parties agree on their interpretations of promises and commitments each party has made and 
accepted” (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004, p. 53).  In general, where mutuality exists about the 
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employer obligations, more positive outcomes and higher contract fulfillment has been reported.  
Despite the importance of mutuality, only a handful of studies have explored the “organization 
side” of the psychological contract in the past.   
In one of the few exceptions, Tekleab and Taylor (2003), using a sample of 130 
employee-manager dyads, found evidence that both employees and managers perceive violations 
of the contract from the other party.  They also found that employees and managers tend to 
disagree on their perceptions of employees' obligations and violations, but not on the 
organization's obligations and violations of the contract.  In that study, the perceptions of 
violations from the point of view of employees and employers were both related to important 
employee outcomes such as job satisfaction and turnover intentions.  Similarly, Lester, Turnley, 
Bloodgood, and Bolino (2002), in a study of 134 supervisor-subordinate dyads, also found that 
supervisors rate employees' fulfillment of psychological contracts as higher than employees 
themselves. 
The study of the “organization side” of psychological contracts is particularly challenging 
as it assumes that organizations could have their own psychological contracts.  This assumption 
has been questioned by several authors who argue that organizations cannot "perceive" or have 
cognitions in the same way than individuals have (Conway & Briner, 2005; Rousseau, 1989).  
However, individuals do identify actions taken by the organization through an overall evaluation 
of behaviors displayed by several organizational agents (i.e. managers, directors, HR 
representatives, etc.).  This process has been known as "anthropomorphizing" the organization 
and it is important as individuals form psychological and implicit contracts with organizations as 
the counterpart of the contract.   
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Although the assertion that organizations have their own psychological contract is 
debatable and that there has been low agreement about who represents the employer in general, 
individuals experience the organization as another valid party in an exchange relationship.  
Despite the importance of the study of the organization side, in this dissertation I focus on the 
employee side, as much more literature is available in order to expand the psychological contract 
construct to the team level. 
Similarly, another key distinction has been drawn in the literature that also defines 
"sides" (or parties) of the psychological contract. This idea is that at the individual level, 
employees perceive promises and commitment not only from the organization, but also from 
themselves.  This is a different conceptualization that involves "two sides of the psychological 
contract".  Although most researchers have tried to capture only employees' perceptions of the 
degree to which organizations fulfill their promises (e.g. Robinson & Morrison, 2000), others 
have also tried to emphasize that employees also can fulfill or breach the promises they make to 
the organization (e.g. Tekleab & Taylor, 2003).  In this dissertation, I focus on the employees' 
perceptions of fulfillment of promises made by the organization rather than on the employees' 
obligations to the organization.  In order to develop a theory about PCF at the team level, it is 
important to base it on literature that has been extensively developed and accepted.  As theories 
about the perceptions of fulfillment of commitments made by employees have been more scarce, 
they are not going to be discussed in this dissertation. 
2.2.2.3. Psychological Contract Fulfillment, Breach, and Violation.  Some of the most 
important concepts in the psychological contract literature are psychological contract breach 
(PCB), psychological contract fulfillment (PCF), and psychological contract violation (PCV).  
PCB has been defined as "the employee's perception regarding the extent to which the 
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organization has failed to fulfill its promises or obligations" (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).  As 
suggested by this definition, the opposite of breach is fulfillment such that researchers have used 
PCB and PCF to refer to two ends of the same spectrum (establishing a breach-fulfillment 
continuum).  PCB occurs with relatively frequently in organizations (Robinson & Rousseau, 
1994) and has been used by researchers as a useful mediator linking psychological contract terms 
to individual outcomes.  For its conceptual flexibility and prevalence, PCB/PCF has become an 
important variable explaining the effects of psychological contracts in organizations.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I use the term PCF to refer to the PCB-PCF continuum. 
An important theme regarding breach and fulfillment has to do with its operationalization 
and measurement.  As initially suggested by Lambert, Edwards, and Cable (2003), there is little 
convergence on how to measure fulfillment in the psychological contract field.  Lambert (2011) 
defined three essentially different approaches of measurement.  The first approach, called the 
"non directional" approach, considers breach and fulfillment as two opposite poles in a 
continuum.  An example of this approach is the measurement instrument used by Kickul, Lester, 
and Finkl (2002).  In that case, researchers asked participants to rate how well the organization 
has fulfilled their promises using a list of 26 possible obligations (e.g. salary, job security, 
meaningful work, etc.) with a scale ranging from "Not at all fulfilled" to "Very fulfilled".   
The second approach, called the "directional" approach, positions fulfillment as a 
midpoint between breach due to deficiency of delivered commitments and over fulfillment due to 
excess of delivered commitments.  Typically, researchers subtract what was promised from what 
was delivered, producing an algebraic difference score.  For example, Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 
(2000) initially asked respondents to indicate to what extent their organization has an obligation 
to provide different inducements using a scale from "not at all" to "a very great extent".  
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Subsequently, the authors asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they think the 
organization had provided the list of obligations.  In that case, negative scores represented 
breach, and positive scores represented over fulfillment.  Although this approach accounts for the 
phenomenon of over fulfillment, the use of difference scores suffers from several analytic 
limitations (see Edwards, 1995, 2002). 
The third approach, called the "expanded" view, acknowledges that fulfillment can vary 
from low to high (the line that occurs when promised and delivered equal each other at different 
levels) and that several outcomes may depend on this level of fulfillment.  This can be better 
understood by imagining that promises and receipts are axes of a two-dimensional space, where 
fulfillment is represented by a line where promises and receipts are equal, breach is represented 
by the area where promises are greater than receipts, and over fulfillment is represented by the 
area where receipts are greater than promises.  An example of this approach can be found in 
Lambert et al. (2003).  Using a two-wave sample of 213 student employees in a variety of 
settings, the authors found that the relationship between breach-fulfillment and satisfaction vary 
according to the type of inducement and level of fulfillment.  For pay and recognition, 
satisfaction increased as delivered levels exceeded promised levels, whereas for task variety, 
satisfaction increased but only to the point that individuals were not having too many tasks to 
perform, suggesting that over-fulfillment could have a negative effect on satisfaction. In the 
same study, employees reported lower levels of satisfaction when both promised and received 
inducements were low rather than high. This was consistent with the argument that the effects of 
fulfillment may vary depending on the promise-receipt level. 
The extent to which these measurement strategies are capturing the same phenomena is 
an issue that has not been fully tested yet.  All these strategies show different conceptualizations 
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of PCF and suggest that the phenomenon of psychological contracts is more complicated than 
originally thought.  For example, the phenomenon of over fulfillment can also be considered as a 
special type of breach—where individuals may perceive this difference as breach due to an over 
provision of inducements.  Overall, however, I concur with Rousseau (2011) that appropriate 
operationalizations of psychological contracts and their perceptions of fulfillment should depend 
on the research questions (I will return to this point in chapter 4).   
The distinction between PCF and PCV has also been complex.  Until Morrison and 
Robinson (1997)'s theoretical model of PCV development, researchers used the terms PCF and 
PCV indistinctively (Conway & Briner, 2005).  In a seminal theoretical article, Morrison and 
Robinson proposed a process model distinguishing PCF and PCV, with contract fulfillment 
acting as a more cognitive mediator between the employee's perception of unmet promises and 
perceptions of violation.  Interestingly, whereas the early work of Rousseau focused on 
antecedents and consequences of contract violation defined as "a failure to comply with the 
terms of a contract", (Rousseau, 1995, p. 112), Morrison and Robinson used PCV as "an 
affective and emotional experience of disappointment, frustration, anger, and resentment that 
may emanate from an employee's interpretation of a contract breach and its accompanying 
circumstances" (Morrison & Robinson, 1997, p. 242).  In Morrison and Robinson's model, PCF 
is considered a more cognitive evaluation of perceived discrepancy between promises and 
deliverables, whereas PCV focuses on the emotional response to the perception of breach.   
Although Rousseau (1995)'s and Morrison and Robinson (1997)'s models involved 
different conceptualizations of PCV, evidence has consistently shown that PCF and PCV are two 
distinct but highly related constructs (Rousseau, 2011).  More concretely, (Zhao et al., 2007) 
showed that the meta-analytic correlation between the two variables is moderate (ρ = 0.52) and 
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that breach and affect can both predict important individual outcomes (Zhao et al., 2007).  Also, 
breach of contracts does not always result in contract violation.  Variables such as national 
culture, the use of remedial actions, or the use of social accounts (explanations, justifications) 
may help employees to better cope with their emotional responses to breaches, buffering or 
exacerbating the PCF-PCV relationship (Rousseau, 2011).   
In this dissertation, I acknowledge the large amount of evidence suggesting that PCF and 
PCV are related but distinct constructs, but I also focus on PCF in order to expand the literature 
to the team-level.  The main reason for centering on PCF is that there is a much larger amount of 
articles and theories focusing on PCF rather than PCV (cf. Conway & Briner, 2005; Zhao et al., 
2007) which provides a much richer theoretical background to expand the literature. 
2.2.2.4. Types of Psychological Contracts.  The psychological contract literature has 
traditionally described the terms of psychological contracts through a distinction of types of 
contracts: transactional and relational contracts.  Transactional contracts are governed by quid 
pro quo norms, based mainly on economic currency, and involve specific exchanges, of narrow 
scope, over a limited period of time (cf. Conway & Briner, 2005; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; 
Thompson & Bunderson, 2003; Zhao et al., 2007).  Relational contracts, on the other hand, are 
governed by the development of a relationship between organizations and employees, based 
mainly on socio-emotional currency, and involve broader and open-ended exchanges, with an 
intrinsic and subjective focus (cf. Conway & Briner, 2005; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; 
Thompson & Bunderson, 2003; Zhao et al., 2007).  Rousseau's (2000) Psychological Contract 
Inventory (PCI) also included a third type of psychological contract (referred to as "balanced") to 
describe elements that are both transactional and relational.  Research in multiple countries has 
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consistently demonstrated three factors in contract dimensions (e.g. Chaudhry et al., 2011; Dabos 
& Rousseau, 2004; Hui, Lee, & Rousseau, 2004; Rousseau, 2000).   
This distinction has been useful in the literature as several researchers have found 
differential effects of psychological contracts depending on the type of contract.  For example, 
Lambert et al. (2003) in a study of 231 employees in multiple industries showed that the 
difference between promised and delivered inducements such as pay and recognition 
(transactional) had a linear relationship with job satisfaction, whereas the effect of promised-
delivered disparity of inducements such as variety or skill development (balanced) on job 
satisfaction is best represented by a curvilinear relationship.  In a similar study of 342 full-time 
temporary workers, Montes and Irving (2008) showed that trust is a more crucial mediator 
between promise-receipt differences and job satisfaction for relational, rather than transactional 
contracts.  In recent meta-analyses, relational contract breaches have been shown to have larger 
effect sizes than transactional breaches on important outcomes such as job satisfaction, turnover 
intentions, and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) although the effect size of breaches 
on organizational commitment was larger for transactional breaches (Zhao et al., 2007).  For in-
role performance, relational and transactional contracts seem to have similar effects.  Citing an 
unpublished meta-analysis by Li et al. (2006), Rousseau (2011) argued that the effects of 
transactional obligations are less stable and usually covary with relational terms.   
In addition, other authors have recently argued for a fourth type of PC type.  Bunderson 
(2001) suggested that individuals also develop ideological psychological contracts with 
organizations, and Thompson and Bunderson (2003) theorized that an ideological component 
would be sufficiently different from transactional and relational contracts.  Some evidence show 
that the effects of ideological contracts are important in the organizational sciences, and, in some 
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cases these effects could be even stronger than those of transactional and relational exchanges 
(e.g. Bingham, Oldroyd, Thompson, Bednar, & Bunderson, 2013; Martin, Laulié, & Lelchook, 
2016).  
The distinction about types of psychological contracts (transactional, relational, balanced, 
ideological) has been generally based on psychological contract measures that ask employees 
about the extent to which employers have made several promises using a list of typical 
exchanged currencies.  For example, the PCI asks individuals whether they feel their 
organizations have promised "training for my current job" (transactional currency) or "concern 
for my personal welfare" (relational currency), among other multiple content items.  Other 
measures have also used similar lists of psychological contract contents to measure 
psychological contract fulfillment (for a detailed description of measures in the field, see 
Conway & Briner, 2005).  In contrast, other measures have taken a more global perspective, 
directly asking individuals about overall perceptions of psychological contract fulfillment (e.g. 
Robinson & Morrison, 2000).  As I will discuss in chapter 4, in this dissertation I will be using a 
more global approach, mainly because a global perspective allows me to capture perceptions of 
fulfillment of several individuals in a team.  In a similar way, avoiding sources of variance such 
as the value that different individuals put in different contents of psychological contracts.  This is 
especially important considering that teams within an organization may also vary in terms of the 
value they put to different contents and types of psychological contracts, creating an additional 
challenge when comparing teams. 
2.2.2.5. Summary. In this subsection, I have briefly reviewed some of the most 
important concepts of the psychological contract literature.  On one side, I have explained the 
role of expectations, obligations, promises, PCF, PCB, PCV, and types and contents of 
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psychological contracts, and summarized some important debates within this field.  While some 
distinctions have been extensively explored in the literature (e.g. the role of PCF in the 
literature), others still remain barely tested (e.g. the role of fulfillment of promises from 
employees).  Furthermore, this section also suggests that there are areas within the psychological 
contract literature that have been more generally accepted than others.  Most importantly, this 
review of key concepts has been useful to declare important decisions to align the development 
of psychological contract constructs at the team level to areas of the literature with richer and 
more valid theories, and to delimit the scope of interest in this dissertation.  This focus is helpful 
to build and test more solid theoretical propositions at the team level (in chapter 3).   
2.2.3. Psychological Contract Fulfillment Outcomes 
Because the concepts of psychological contracts and PCF are inherently related, the 
antecedents and outcomes of both concepts have been theoretically confounded in the past.  In 
the following sub-sections, I focus on describing documented antecedents and outcomes of PCF 
(PCB) as this is the main interest of this dissertation.  A summary of these relationships is 
depicted in Figure 12.   
In terms of outcomes, four meta-analyses summarizing the effects of PCF (PCB) across 
several studies (Bal et al., 2008; Li et al., 2006; Topa Cantisano et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2007) 
have been published.  Probably the most known and cited meta-analysis is Zhao et al (2007).  In 
this study, the authors found support for significant relationships between PCB and violation (ρ = 
0.52), mistrust (ρ = 0.65), organizational commitment (ρ = -0.38), job satisfaction (ρ = -0.54), 
turnover intentions (ρ = 0.42), OCB (ρ = -0.14), and in-role performance (ρ = -0.24), although 
                                                 
2 For a better description of antecedents and outcomes of psychological contract, other reviews are 
available in the literature (e.g. Conway & Briner, 2005; Rousseau, 1995, 2011; Taylor & Tekleab, 2004) 
in addition to recent theoretical models describing how the psychological contract evolves and change in 
time (e.g. Bankins, 2015; Sherman & Morley, 2015; Tomprou et al., 2015). 
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they couldn't find support for actual turnover.  Similar results have been found in other meta-
analyses. 
FIGURE 1: Antecedents and Outcomes of PCF (PCB) 
 
More recently, other individual articles have expanded the knowledge of additional 
relevant outcomes affected by PCF.  An example is the relationship between PCB and more 
negative outcomes such as workplace deviance and counterproductive behaviors (CWB) (Chao, 
Cheung, & Wu, 2011; Jensen, Opland, & Ryan, 2010; Restubog, Zagenczyk, Bordia, Bordia, & 
Chapman, 2015; Restubog, Zagenczyk, Bordia, & Tang, 2013).  Other single studies have also 
found relationships between PCF (PCB) and daily emotions and moods (Conway & Briner, 
2002), cynicism (Johnson & O'Leary-Kelly, 2003), and organizational identification (Epitropaki, 
2013).  
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In general, the explanations of why PCF can affect all these important employee 
outcomes have heavily relied on Social Exchange Theory (SET) (Blau, 1964).  SET proposes 
that social relations are composed by social exchanges such that when individuals receive 
benefits from another party, they tend to feel obliged to reciprocate in the future.  This is based 
on social norms of reciprocity which can make individuals i) to help those who have helped 
them, and ii) to avoid causing harm to those who have helped them (Conway & Briner, 2005).  
SET predicts that if organizations help individuals through the fulfillment of psychological 
contracts, employees should see the organization in more positive ways, developing trust in the 
organization, and being more motivated to return the favor through contributing to organizational 
goals and feeling obliged to display positive behaviors toward the organization and its agents.   
SET has been empirically corroborated in the realm of psychological contracts.  For 
example, in a study of 84 manager-employee dyads, Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2002) found 
that employers' perceptions of obligations to the employee at time 1 were positively related to 
employees' levels of fulfillment at time 2 in the same obligations.  Similarly, Robinson, Kraatz, 
and Rousseau (1994) showed that perceptions of violation (although using a fulfillment scale) at 
time 1 make individuals to decrease their own obligations to the employer at time 2.  Like the 
psychological contract, SET deals with exchange of resources (Taylor & Tekleab, 2004) as 
employees and organizations agree on mutually giving favors and positive desirable outcomes to 
the other party.  As such, PCF has been considered to be an important social exchange indicator 
in the past (e.g. Colquitt, Baer, Long, & Halvorsen-Ganepola, 2014).  Thus, SET may explain 
why the fulfillment of promises (a desirable thing for employees) affects employees’ willingness 
to behave in positive ways in the eyes of the organization (with higher performance, higher 
contextual behaviors, etc.). 
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Other explanations have also been used to describe why psychological contracts can drive 
individuals' behavior, although they have not been as popular as SET.  For example, one of these 
ideas is that commitments made to another party can work as goals that affect motivation.  
Following principles of goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 2002), some authors have 
suggested that perceptions of obligations can help individuals to maintain a course of action in 
the presence of distractions, to better create strategies to fulfill promises, and to focus on 
avoiding the negative consequences of failing to keep promises (Conway & Briner, 2005; 
Rousseau, 1995, 2011).  Similarly, the lack of fulfillment of promises deprives employees of 
inducements that could affect satisfaction and motivation in the workplace.  For example, a 
broken promise of a pay rise (or a promotion) can disappoint employees and create frustration, 
taking away motivational factors in the workplace.   
In summary, the main reasons of why PCF leads to outcomes are mainly based on social 
exchange theory and motivation.  Individuals perceiving fulfillment of promises develop trust in 
the organization and demonstrate that they want to continue having positive exchanges with 
higher performance, better attitudes, and lower turnover intentions.  In contrast, when promises 
are breached, individuals try to rebalance unequal exchanges by reducing their contributions to 
the organization.  Also, it has been argued that the breach of contracts can impede employees' 
progress toward the achievement of personal goals, which may deprive them with resources and 
motivation necessary to contribute to organizational objectives. 
2.2.4. Psychological Contract Fulfillment Antecedents 
A decade ago, Conway and Briner (2005) argued that research investigating the 
antecedents of PCF was limited.  This trend has started to change in recent years, as scattered 
studies have shown several antecedents of PCF.  In order to organize this section based on a 
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stronger theoretical background, I will use the typology of antecedents of PCF developed by 
Morrison and Robinson (1997) that suggests that there are certain conditions that will eventually 
give rise to perceptions of breach: Reneging, Incongruence, and Vigilance3. 
“Reneging” happens when an employer breaks a promise because of inability or 
unwillingness to keep commitments.  Reneging a promise can lead to breach of the 
psychological contract due to an open decision from the employer to not fulfill its obligations.  
Indeed, Robinson and Morrison (2000) found evidence for a direct relationship between 
organizational performance and PCF.  The authors argued that under conditions of low 
organizational performance, organizations would not be able to keep all the promises they make 
due to an inability to honor previous commitments.  Similarly, they argued that when employees 
have low performance, organizations would not be forced to keep promises, which was 
supported by a significant relationship between individual performance and PCF.  Thus, this 
group of antecedents uses the argument that organizations are less likely to fulfill promises under 
certain conditions or contexts. 
A second group of antecedents of PCF are related to the concept of "incongruence".  This 
is when employees and the organization have different understandings about promises, which 
leads to perceptions of unmet promises due to a discrepancy of obligations and standards of 
behavior between employees and employers.  This is similar to the idea of mutuality, developed 
by Dabos and Rousseau (2004).  For example, several studies have found support for the role of 
formal socialization processes in the change of perceived obligations and PCF/PCB (Robinson & 
                                                 
3 I decided to use this theoretical framework instead of Rousseau (1995, chapter 5) "sources of 
experienced violation" which classifies sources of psychological contract violations into three categories 
(Inadvertent, disruption, and reneging). In comparison to Rousseau's model, Morrison and Robinson 
model has a greater development of the psychological process of perception of unmet promises, includes 
the breach-violation distinction, and identify several moderators to the breach-violation relationship 
(Taylor & Tekleab, 2004).  
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Morrison, 2000; Tekleab, 2003).  During socialization processes, individuals engage in complex 
cognitive processes to form psychological contracts with organizations (De Vos, Buyens, & 
Schalk, 2003) such that a mutual understanding of obligations can be reached, affecting the later 
individual's perceptions of fulfillment of promises.  For example, Morrison and Robinson (2000) 
found evidence that perceptions of breach are less likely to the extent that employees have 
experienced a formalized socialization process.  Similarly, other researchers have suggested that 
the effective communication of HR practices may lead to higher perceptions of PCF (Guest & 
Conway, 2002; Guzzo & Noonan, 1994; Robinson & Morrison, 2000).  For example, Guest and 
Conway (2002) obtained evidence that if communication from the employer is rated as effective 
in job-related and recruitment-related activities, less psychological breach is reported.  These 
authors argued that a lack of communication “is likely to lead to incongruence between employer 
and employee perceptions of obligations” (p. 25).  More recently, Epitropaki (2013) suggested 
that certain types of leadership could decrease the likelihood of incongruence occurrence.  In 
particular, she suggested that transformational leadership can encourage open communication, 
which is helpful to discuss reciprocal obligations and openly address discrepancies when 
different parties have different understandings of obligations. 
“Vigilance" has been defined as "the extent to which the employee monitors how well the 
organization has been fulfilling the terms of his or her psychological contracts" (Morrison & 
Robinson, 1997, p. 238).  Researchers have argued that the more vigilant employees are, the 
higher the likelihood that they are going to find breaches of contract terms.  The “vigilance” 
argument has been used to explain antecedents of PCF across a wide range of types of variables.  
First, some authors have shown that some personality dimensions, ideologies, or more stable 
characteristics of individuals could lead to detect more or less contract breach (Bunderson, 2001; 
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Edwards, Kathleen, McKinley, & Moon, 2003; Jafri, 2014; Raja, Johns, & Ntalianis, 2004). For 
example, Raja et al. (2004) studied the relationship between different facets of personality and 
PCF, and suggested that certain traits can make individuals to monitor their psychological 
contracts more actively.  Second, other authors have used the vigilance argument to describe why 
employees are more likely to detect breach in certain specific situations.  For example, Robinson 
and Morrison (2000) showed that PCB is higher for employees perceiving alternative 
employment opportunities in other organizations.  They argued that individuals are more likely 
to monitor their contracts when they see they have other employment opportunities that 
potentially could offer better conditions. Similarly, Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Griep, and 
Hofmans (2016) found that PCB is also more likely to occur when employees are in more 
negative affective states.  Thus, different types of variables could increase the individuals' 
vigilance of the fulfillment of contracts. 
It has been argued that some variables could affect vigilance and bias individual 
cognitive evaluations of PCF by modifying the context where individuals perform.  This 
theoretical framework has been dubbed "the environmental responsiveness model" (Rosen, 
Chang, Johnson, & Levy, 2009).  For example, the existence of general perceptions of 
organizational injustice (Huei-Fang, 2010; Rosen et al., 2009), low perceived organizational 
support (Aselage & Eisenberger, 2003; Dulac, Coyle-Shapiro, Henderson, & Wayne, 2008; 
Tekleab, Takeuchi, & Taylor, 2005), or low leader-member exchange (Dulac et al., 2008; 
Tekleab & Taylor, 2003) could make individuals to more negatively evaluate contract 
fulfillment.  In other words, individuals naturally tend to evaluate low PCF when evaluations of 
other aspects of the organization are also low.  The main argument of this theoretical framework 
is that negative evaluations of the social context in organizations create an environment of 
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uncertainty and divergent understandings of the commitments of each party. In another example, 
Lester et al (2007) argued that social accounts provided by leaders (explanations for job-related 
decisions) are a form of interactional justice, and that they may affect the perception of 
credibility and legitimacy of supervisors when they evaluate PCF. 
Other variables have been studied as antecedents of PCF but that do not necessarily 
match within the previous typology.  For example, leaders are important actors in the fulfillment 
of psychological contracts, however, the study of leadership as antecedents of PCF is also 
difficult to categorize within Morrison and Robinson (1997)'s model because they not only act as 
organizational agents but also as independent employees.  In particular, Bordia et al. (2010) 
explored the motivations of organizational agents to fulfill promises.  They found that 
supervisors' PCB indirectly lead to subordinates' PCB.  They argued that when supervisors have 
fulfilled contracts they will be more motivated to display OCBs toward other organizational 
members, increasing the willingness to contribute to the organizational goals by keeping 
promises to other employees.  In contrast, when their contracts are breached leaders have no 
intention to put efforts in fulfilling organizational promises to their subordinates.  These leaders’ 
behaviors are based on self-interest and reciprocation to organization’s failure to fulfill promises, 
and not necessarily reflect the organizational willingness to fulfill promises to the leader’s 
subordinates.  
In summary, using different theoretical arguments, several types of antecedents of PCF 
have been studied in the past.  Although a decade ago, Conway and Briner (2005) suggested that 
the study of antecedents of PCF was limited, that trend has started to change more recently.  A 
very interesting issue is that the majority of antecedents of PCF have been studied at the 
individual level of analysis, although several researchers have suggested that team-level (e.g. 
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leadership) or organizational-level (e.g. HR practices) variables are important determinants of 
PCF.  This suggests that perceptions of fulfillment of psychological contracts could be better 
studied from a multi-level perspective.   
2.2.5. Moderators of the Antecedent-PCF and PCF-Outcome Relationship 
Several constructs have also been studied as moderators of both the Antecedent-PCF 
relationship and the PCF-Outcome relationship.  The study of moderators has been more 
idiosyncratic as researchers have not followed a single theoretical framework in order to discover 
important moderating effects.  However, there are both meta-analysis and single studies that 
show strong moderating effects on the PCF-Outcome relationship.  For example, both Zhao et al. 
(2007) and Li et al., (2007) tested for differential effects of PCB on outcomes depending on the 
type of contract (transactional vs. relational).  Relational breaches tend to have stronger effects 
than transactional breach for job satisfaction, turnover intentions, and OCBs, but not for in-role 
performance (equal effect) or organizational commitment (stronger for transactional breach).  
The reason for this difference has not been completely understood (Rousseau, 2011; Zhao et al., 
2007).  However, it has been proposed that transactional contracts (such as pay or benefits) may 
be more legally binding and less likely to breach, which can limit variance in empirical studies.  
In a different meta-analysis, age was studied as a moderator by Bal et al. (2008).  Bal et al. 
(2008) found that the correlations between breach and trust and between breach and commitment 
were stronger for younger workers. They argued that as individuals grow older they become 
better at regulating their emotions, responding less stronger to breach of the psychological 
contract.   
Other single studies have also shown several types of moderators.  For instance, some 
studies have shown that psychological individual differences such as exchange ideology (Coyle-
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Shapiro & Neuman, 2004), reciprocation wariness (Karagonlar, Eisenberger, & Aselage, 2016), 
equity sensitivity (Kickul & Lester, 2001; Restubog, Bordia, & Bordia, 2009), and emotional 
regulation (Bal, Chiaburu, & Diaz, 2011; Restubog et al., 2015) could be important moderators 
of PCF-outcome relationships.  More stable variables such as national culture have also been 
described to be important moderators (Rousseau, 1995).  Moreover, other researchers have found 
evidence for differential effects of terms of the contract (Lambert et al., 2003) and the 
importance of the promise (Restubog et al., 2013).  Finally, researchers have suggested that 
relationship quality (such as LMX) can also work as a moderator of the breach-outcome 
relationship (Restubog et al., 2010), although in some contexts this variable has also been 
described to work as an antecedent of PCF/PCB (Dulac et al., 2008; Tekleab & Taylor, 2003).  
As suggested by these multiple studies, there is a plethora of moderators of the PCF-outcome 
relationship.  The mechanisms or explanations of these moderator effects have been 
heterogeneous.  But although the account of all these moderators is important to describe the 
literature, it is even more important to note that there have been no studies (to my knowledge) 
conceptualizing and analyzing cross-level moderators at the team or organizational levels.  This 
is especially remarkable considering that higher level variables can serve as important contextual 
forces shaping interpretations of organizational phenomena (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) and that 
the psychological contract literature has generally accepted that higher level constructs (e.g. HR 
practices or leadership) are important in shaping the psychological contract and its effects.   
Finally, the study of moderators of the relationship between antecedents and PCF has 
been extremely limited.  The vast majority of studies of moderators have been in the PCF-
Outcomes side of Figure 1.  For example, in one of the few exceptions, Hermida and Luchman 
(2013) found evidence that individuals with internal locus of causality tend to attribute potential 
31 
 
discrepancies to their own misunderstanding, reducing their perceptions of PCF.  However, 
research on this type of moderators has been almost non-existent, regardless the theoretical or 
operational level of the moderator variable. 
2.2.6. Final Remarks 
The literature on psychological contracts is extensive and has evolved significantly since 
its origins in the 1960s.  At this point, we have a better understanding about the phenomenon of 
psychological contracts, a much richer body of theories describing nuances in the development 
of PCF, and strong pieces of evidence to understand the antecedents, outcomes, and moderators 
of PCF.  However, the field of psychological contracts has heavily relied on research designs at 
individual levels of analysis, even though several theories have suggested that team-level or 
organizational-level variables could have an important role in the effects and management of 
PCF.  For the same reason, next I turn to the description of social factors determining individual 
PCF.  This research line can set the ground for extending theory of PCF at higher levels of 
analysis. 
2.3. The Social Context in the Development of PCF 
2.3.1. Social Influence in PCF research 
In a theoretical article, Ho (2005) developed a dyadic model of social influence on 
evaluations of PCF.  Ho expanded psychological contract theory by proposing that individuals 
evaluate their own PCF perceptions using social referents, who influence individuals' 
perceptions.  This social process occurs through two main mechanisms: cohesion and 
equivalence.  In the social process of cohesion, coworkers influence individuals' (or Ego's4) PCF 
via close proximity and the development of cooperative and positive relationships.  Using this 
                                                 
4 Ho (2005) used the term “Ego” (Latin for “I”), borrowed from philosophy, to refer to a person who 
develops perceptions of PCF and that is influenced by other individuals (or Alter Ego). 
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mechanism, individuals influence each other because the development of strong and close ties is 
helpful to get valuable information to reduce uncertainty in the workplace.  Thus, individuals 
rely on the opinion and the observation of others' PCF as they are valuable pieces of information 
to evaluate their own PCF.  In the social process of structural equivalence, Ego's PCF can also be 
affected via structurally equivalent individuals (Burt, 1982) in the social structure.  These 
individuals occupy similar positions in a social network, and they tend to see each other as 
substitutes, "with similar roles, experiences, and information (Sailer, 1978)" Ho (2005, p. 117) 
such that they may experience feelings of competition among each other.  Their similarity in 
position tend to make individuals to pay heed to others' perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in 
order to evaluate the adequacy of their own perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors.  These 
mechanisms of social influence suggest that evaluations of PCF are not exclusively rooted in 
cognitive processes, but also in complex social phenomena. 
Ho also proposed that the process of social influence from referents will depend on two 
moderators.  First, the domain of the promise (job related vs. organization wide) might determine 
whether individuals are more likely to be influenced by individuals with cohesion or structural 
equivalent ties.  She argued, based on results of Shah (1998), that individuals may use cohesive 
referents more frequently for the evaluation of fulfillment of organization-wide promises, 
whereas they might use structural equivalent referents in order to evaluate the fulfillment of job-
related promises.  Second, Ho (2005, p. 121) suggested that for contestable promises (defined as 
"benefits that are scarce in some absolute or socially imposed sense and the fulfillment of which 
confers certain status or advantage over others") the evaluation of Ego's PCF should be 
negatively related to the evaluation of others' PCF, whereas the relationship should be positive 
for noncontestable promises.  She argued that for contestable promises, it is natural for 
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individuals to try to know their relative standing compared to other eligible members, which may 
exacerbate comparison and contrast to others' PCF.  In the case of noncontestable promises, the 
fact that they do not provide any relative advantage, power, or status make individuals to see 
other's PCF in positive ways because they signal how good the organization is at fulfilling 
promises and serve as a cue to evaluate their own PCF. 
The first moderation effect was empirically confirmed later in a study of 99 employees of 
a single firm in a computer-related industry (Ho & Levesque, 2005).  In this article, the authors 
showed that employees rely on others as social referents and that perceptions of fulfillment of 
organization-wide (job-related) promises tend to be similar among employees with relational 
(positional) similarity.  More importantly, the authors found evidence supporting that employees 
rely on multiplex others when they evaluate PCF of job-related promises (hypothesis 3).  These 
results are important for the purposes of this dissertation, as they suggest that i) perceptions of 
PCF could be affected by other referents, and that ii) these perceptions are formed by multiple 
interactions among several individuals within an organization. 
The social nature of psychological contracts has also been described in other recent 
empirical articles.  In a study of 96 full-time faculty, Dabos and Rousseau (2013) found that 
informal social networks influence how employees understand their psychological contracts.  
Individuals with high social status tend to perceive that organizations have promised the 
inducement of resources which employees compete for.  In contrast, individuals with low social 
status tend to highly rate noncompetitive resources as part of their psychological contracts.  
Bingham et al. (2013), on the other hand, suggested that employees' fulfillment of own 
psychological contracts may have effects in their social status.  In two two-wave studies (53 
employees of a footwear manufacturer, and 51 members of a college fraternity), the authors 
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provided evidence that individuals who fulfill their part of their psychological contracts 
obligations are seen as more influential and friendly than individuals with low employee PCF.  
These effects were stronger for ideological rather than transactional and relational terms.  All 
these efforts suggest that perceptions of psychological contracts are more socially engrained than 
previously thought and that a consideration of the social context is an important component of 
the development of mental schemata of promised-based obligations and PCF.   
2.3.2. Research on PCF in Team Contexts 
Although the PC literature has not vastly explored the existence and importance of PCF 
at the team-level of analysis, previous studies have developed multi-level models including 
cross-level effects at PCF.  In a study of 864 employees and 162 work units in manufacturing 
and service companies, Epitropaki (2013) proposed that group-level transformational leadership, 
group-level transactional leadership, and procedural justice climate were the antecedents of 
individual-level PCF.  She argued that team leadership could create a context that facilitates 
good understandings of mutual promises and that justice climate could positively bias general 
evaluations of PCF.  Hence, she tested a cross-level direct effect of leadership and justice climate 
on individual PCF.  What is important about this article is the fact that she empirically tested 
team-level phenomena in individuals' PCF perceptions, showing that social factors (not 
exclusively based on cognitions and rationale) are an important antecedent.   
In another important example Henderson et al. (2008), using a sample of 278 individuals 
nested in 31 metal fabricating work groups in 4 locations, suggested that perceptions of PCF 
were importantly determined by group-level variables, specifically relative LMX (RLMX) and 
group-level variability of LMX (LMX differentiation).  They argued that in groups with high 
variability of LMX, high RLMX could have a greater impact on PCF evaluations.  This 
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proposition was confirmed with empirical data.  In summary, these articles provided useful 
information to evaluate whether PCF can be determined by phenomena occurring at the team 
level of analysis.  
Despite these pieces of evidence, organizational research methods stipulate that a higher-
level variable cannot explain variability at a lower-level (Hofmann, 2002; Preacher, Zyphur, & 
Zhang, 2010).  To explain this issue more clearly, I use the words of Preacher et al. (2010): 
“Variables assessed at Level 2 have only Between components of variance. Variables 
assessed at Level 1 typically have both Between and Within components, although in 
some cases a Level-1 variable may have only a Within component if it has no between-
group variation. If a variable has both Between and Within variance components, the 
Between component is necessarily uncorrelated with the Within component of that 
variable and the Within components of all other variables in the model. Similarly, the 
Within component of a variable is necessarily uncorrelated with the Between component 
of that variable and the Between components of all other variables in the model. We refer 
to effects of Between components (or variables) on other Between components (or 
variables) as Between effects and to effects of Within components (or variables) on other 
Within components (or variables) as Within effects. Because Between and Within 
components are uncorrelated, it is not possible for a Between component to affect a 
Within component or vice versa.” (Preacher et al., 2010, p. 210). 
Then, the articles by Henderson et al. (2008) and Epitropaki (2013) may be important to provide 
preliminary evidence for the existence of PCF at the team level as the predictors of PCF at the 
individual level were team level variables, and, by definition, the outcome variable (PCF) needs 
to be at the team level as well. Thus, multi-level models studying PCF at individual levels of 
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analysis are likely to be testing the effects of team-level variance, that is, testing the relationship 
of team average PCF, which may be a potential operationalization of PCF at the team level.  For 
example, Epitropaki (2013) tested a 2-1-1 mediation effect (predictor variable at the between-
group level, and both mediator and dependent variable at the within-group level), where group-
level transformational leadership, group-level transactional leadership, and procedural justice 
climate were the antecedents of individual-level PCB (mediator) and individual-level 
organizational identification (dependent variable).  This mediation is "inherently at the between-
group level of analysis." (Preacher et al., 2010, p. 222), suggesting that group-average PCB was 
significantly related to team-level antecedents (transformational and transactional leadership and 
justice climate) and group-average organizational identification.  Although this study was cross-
sectional and did not provide details about potential emerging properties of group-average PCB, 
it suggests that there is variance at the team level that could be important for team processes and 
ultimately, team performance.  
The existence of significant higher-level variance of PCF is more clearly shown by 
Henderson et al. (2008). These authors found that location membership explained significant 
between-group variance of PCF.  This serves as an important piece of preliminary evidence to 
argue for the existence of PCF at the team level.  In that article, Henderson et al. not only showed 
that PCF can be explained by group membership, but also showed that the team-level variance of 
PCF can be significantly predicted by other team-level factors.  Then, although the focus of 
Henderson et al.'s study focused on PCF at the individual level, they informed this important 
piece of evidence that is useful to speculate about PCF at the team level. 
In a similar vein, Aas (2010), although lacking any type of theoretical development about 
PCF at the team level, conducted a multi-level analysis (separating the individual and group 
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variance) of perceived provision of inducements from employers in 42 groups in a Norwegian 
hospital setting.  Interestingly, she found that “support for career” at the group level was 
significantly related to team performance. These results, however, should be used carefully due 
to the fact that no strong theory guided this study. 
Other unpublished studies have also tried to explore the idea of psychological contract 
fulfillment in teams, although with a different focus.  For example, in a conference poster, Bull, 
Jackson, and Venkataramani (2007) proposed the construct Group PCF to denote the individual-
level assessment of how the group fulfills obligations to its own individual group members.  In a 
study of 304 undergraduate students, Bull et al. (2007) found that Group PCF was positively 
related to Individual PCF, OCBs, and Satisfaction with the group.  However, in contrast to the 
main constructs of this dissertation, Group PCF is a phenomenon that occurs at the individual 
level of analysis (individual's perception about a characteristic of a group) about the social 
exchange of groups with their own members.   
2.3.3. Final Remarks 
A recent interest in social contexts as determinants of individual perceptions of PCF 
provides the foundation for proposing that we should expand our knowledge about how PCF 
works in teams.  In this section, I reviewed theories and studies describing social influence 
processes and multi-level conceptualizations of how PCF in teams operates.  Because team 
members can influence each other to drive PCF (as suggested by research of Ho and colleagues) 
and because team-level variables can affect within-team average PCF (as suggested by the work 
of Epitropaki and Henderson and colleagues), it is relevant to continue the study of PCF in teams 
and its effects on team-level outcomes.  Therefore, the current dissertation focuses on this 
important issue. In the next chapter, I will extend this research by providing theoretical 
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justifications for the emergence and nomological network of PCF at the team level.  A summary 
of the suggested hypotheses and tested model is in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2: Proposed Model 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1. Conceptualization of Shared Individual PCF and Shared Team PCF 
Early conceptualizations of PCF at the team level can be traced to De Vos and Tekleab 
(2014) in a preliminary study about a new construct that at that time they called "Team PCF 
climate".  In this study, the authors argued that individuals shape their perceptions of PCF due to 
continual interactions with other team members.  The main premise of that article is that 
continual and mutual processes of influence among team members (Ho, 2005) and social 
information processing (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) can facilitate the convergence of perceptions 
of PCF within teams, making team members to end up having similar evaluations of how the 
organization fulfilled individual promises.  Using a sample of 81 teams and 609 employees of 
Belgian federal institutions, and using a direct consensus measurement approach (Chan, 1998), 
the authors found strong evidence suggesting that PCF emerges in teams as a shared experience.  
Specifically, these authors found that PCF was significantly predicted by team membership 
(almost 5% of the variance was due to group membership, ICC1=.12, ICC2=.50, median 
rwg=.92).  This evidence demonstrated that PCF does not only have within-team variability but 
also between-team variability, suggesting that there is an emergent team state of shared PCF that 
can co-exist with individual-level perceptions of PCF. 
Building on that seminal article and on previous theories of social influence in the 
development of PCF, Laulié and Tekleab (2016) recently proposed a theoretical multi-level 
model of PCF where they not only provided a more detailed conceptualization of PCF constructs 
but they also developed several propositions to be explored in the future.  In particular, Laulié 
and Tekleab (2016) argued for the existence of two team-level PCF constructs, in addition to the 
proposition of variables facilitating the emergence of these constructs, potential antecedents, and 
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outcomes at the team level of analysis. As suggested in previous chapters, in this dissertation I 
will be building on that theoretical article to empirically test some of those propositions.  
Similar to De Vos and Tekleab (2014), Laulié and Tekleab (2016) also proposed that 
individual's evaluations of PCF can be influenced by other team members, which, through 
multiple interactions and continual processes of mutual influence, can create in time an emergent 
state of shared individual PCF evaluations.  Laulié and Tekleab (2016) dubbed this construct 
"shared individual PCF" and they formally defined it as the "convergence of team members’ 
perception of the degree to which employers fulfill their own, individual psychological 
contracts." (p. 7)  Thus, this construct is based on the within-team process of convergence of 
perceptions of individual-level PCF.   
In contrast, based on the conceptual idea that organizations engage in exchanges not only 
with individuals but also with other emergent entities such as teams (Bashshur et al., 2011; 
Gong, Chang, & Cheung, 2010; González‐Romá et al., 2009) and that organizational agents 
frequently develop relationships with employees as a group (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2008), 
Laulié and Tekleab (2016) conceptualized "shared team PCF" as the perception of fulfillment of 
team members about promises made to the team.  This construct is based on promise-based 
obligations made to teams as a unit in return for some form of reciprocity-behavior by the team 
as a unit.  These promises may involve the provision of, for example, key information to the 
team, enough resources (human, technological, infrastructure) necessary for team-level 
outcomes, team training, or team autonomy.  Formally speaking, they defined shared team PCF 
as the "convergence of team members' perception of the degree of fulfillment of the obligations 
that an organization promised to the team." (p. 5). 
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Both constructs are related to evaluations of PCF and in both constructs team members 
end up sharing a common perception about a specific organizational phenomenon, but they are 
different in that shared individual PCF is an aggregation of the members’ perception of own 
PCF, whereas shared team PCF is the aggregation of the members’ perception of team’s PCF.  
The evaluations of PCF are based on different referents (individuals vs. teams) that may perceive 
different obligations from the organization toward themselves.  As individuals need to evaluate a 
different phenomenon if they are asked about their perceptions of PCF (different referent), they 
should be able to differentiate the perceptions of fulfillment of themselves from the perceptions 
of fulfillment of the promises made to the teams where they perform.  Just as some promises may 
be made to single individuals, others could be made to the team as a whole. For example, a 
promise related to payment levels could have been made to a certain individual within a team 
and be interpreted as a promise to that individual, whereas the hiring of a new team member to 
support team performance could be interpreted as a promise to the team as a whole.   
Similarly, based on Laulié and Tekleab (2016)'s multi-level theory of PCF, I expect to 
find evidence for discriminant validity at the team-level of analysis, showing that the two 
constructs are different from each other.  This involves a) finding evidence that supports 
aggregation for both constructs (Chen, Mathieu, & Bliese, 2004), and b) finding evidence for the 
existence of two distinct latent constructs using factor analysis at both individual and team levels 
(Pornprasertmanit, Lee, & Preacher, 2014).  
Hypothesis 1a:  Shared individual PCF is distinguishable from shared team PCF, forming 
two different constructs. 
Although I expect to find evidence for discriminant validity, as suggested in Hypothesis 
1a, the two constructs should also be correlated.  Laulié and Tekleab (2016) suggested two 
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explanations for this potential relationship.  First, perceptions of individual PCF can bias 
cognitive evaluations of fulfillment of promises to the team.  Individuals with low PCF are more 
likely to notice breaches to the team.  A similar phenomenon can occur in the other direction, as 
fulfillment of team promises can make individuals notice more breaches to themselves.  In 
addition, as suggested by collective identity theory (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996), individuals may identify themselves with the groups they belong, extending 
their own identities to include the team and feel breaches to the team as breaches to themselves.  
Second, social processes can also explain this relationship.  Previous research has shown that 
PCF is partly determined by the observation of previous exchanges where the organization has 
been involved (Rousseau, 2011).  As individuals observe the fulfillment of promises to other 
team mates and share experiences of breach or fulfillment within the team, they also are more 
likely to evaluate how organizations are at keeping promises in general.  Moreover, as 
individuals in the same team share common individual experiences of fulfillment or breach and 
talk and discuss points of view about those experiences, a generalized group affective tone can 
make team members evaluate team-related promises in more similar ways.  These arguments 
support the following Hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1b:  At the team level, shared individual PCF and shared team PCF are 
positively related. 
3.2. Relationship between Team-Level PCF Constructs and Related Constructs 
In order to improve construct validity of the two proposed constructs, I will also study the 
relationships that they have with some related constructs.  Studying the extent to which shared 
team PCF and shared individual PCF are similar or different than other already tested team-level 
constructs is highly important to avoid putting "old wine in a new barrel" (Macey & Schneider, 
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2008) and give parsimony to the explanations of the world that the organizational sciences 
provide to other researchers and practitioners (Bacharach, 1989). 
When theorizing about the constructs of shared individual PCF and shared team PCF, 
Laulié and Tekleab (2016) also discussed the difference between these constructs and other 
related constructs.  In particular, they provided theoretical arguments that shared PCFs should be 
different than other constructs previously defined at team levels of analysis (i.e. Justice Climate 
and POS Climate).  Moreover, they proposed that both Justice Climate and POS Climate can 
work as team-level antecedents of shared PCFs.  In this section, I summarize Laulié and Tekleab 
(2016) arguments and propose concrete propositions that will be empirically tested. 
3.2.1. Justice Climate and Shared PCFs 
The relationship between justice perceptions and PCF perceptions at individual level of 
analysis has been a subject of controversy in the past (Conway & Briner, 2005).  Although some 
authors have questioned that these two constructs capture different phenomena or not, theoretical 
and empirical evidence has demonstrated that these constructs are in fact different from each 
other and that individuals are able to distinguish between the two.  Formally speaking, justice 
perceptions have generally captured the extent to which the organization or its agents distribute 
resources, apply fair process to allocate these resources, and/or fairly treat employees (e.g. 
Colquitt, 2001).  In contrast, and as discussed in previous chapters, PCF perceptions capture the 
extent to which the organization fulfilled its promised obligations.  As Rosen et al. (2009, p. 204) 
highlight, “While there may be instances when organizations promise that decision making 
procedures will be fair…, these aspects of employment are more closely aligned with employees’ 
general expectations of how they will be treated by their organizations, as opposed to implied or 
explicit promises made to employees. (Emphasis added)”.  Recalling the distinction between 
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general expectations and promises (section 2.2.2.1), it can be noted that the scope of evaluations 
of the two constructs is different.  Moreover, several empirical articles have also shown the 
divergent validity of these constructs (Kickul, Neuman, Parker, & Finkl, 2001; Rosen et al., 
2009; Tekleab et al., 2005).   
At the team level, I also expect that shared PCFs are different from justice climate.  
Considering that justice climate has been defined as "a distinct group-level cognition about how 
a work group as a whole is treated" (Naumann & Bennett, 2000, p. 882), I suggest that three 
main reasons support the idea that I should find that these constructs are different.  First, as 
justice perceptions may be psychologically formed from general expectations about the treatment 
displayed by the organization (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015), and that shared PCFs are based on 
perceived obligations based on implicit or explicit promises, I pose that these constructs refer to 
different phenomena.  This should be reflected at the team level too.   
Second, this distinction is even clearer when specific dimensions of justice (distributive, 
procedural, interpersonal, informational) are considered (detailed descriptions of the 
multidimensional nature of justice climate can be found in Liao and Rupp (2005); Rupp, 
Bashshur, and Liao (2007).  As an example, interpersonal justice does not necessarily be 
promised by organizational agents to employees, however, employees develop perceptions of 
interpersonal justice regardless fair treatment has been promised or not.   
Third, justice climate has shown isomorphic relationships with antecedents and outcomes 
at individual and collective levels (cf. Rupp et al., 2007).  As justice has been theorized as 
"contextual information" to form PCF perceptions (Rosen et al., 2009), I also expect an 
isomorphic relationship between justice climate and shared PCFs.  Moreover, I argue that justice 
climate can be an antecedent of shared PCFs.  Some authors have proposed that collective 
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properties or emergent states of teams could boost "enabling processes" (e.g. Ployhart & 
Moliterno, 2011), such that social phenomena can facilitate the emergence and level of other 
team-level constructs.  Following Laulié and Tekleab (2016), I suggest that when a low justice 
climate is formed in a team, a team process of social vigilance can be activated, enabling the 
emergence and increasing the level of shared PCFs.   
As organizational distribution of resources, and the processes and interactions involved 
are deemed unfair by most team members, a general environment of uncertainty in teams can be 
created (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos, 2001).  A low justice climate can make team 
members to invest more resources to monitor processes closer, monitor information sharing 
closer, and in general enhance social vigilance so as to reduce the generalized anxiety that 
uncertainty entails.  Consequently, team members are more likely to report a lower level of 
shared PCFs as social vigilance is generally activated due to a low justice climate.  On the other 
hand, in teams with high justice climate, individuals not only share perceptions of positive justice 
but they also reinforce those perceptions through continual social interactions (Roberson & 
Colquitt, 2005).  This could create an environment that decrease social vigilance to some extent 
and, moreover, that could even encourage giving the organization the benefit of the doubt when 
minor discrepancies are detected (Epitropaki, 2013; Tekleab et al., 2005). All these arguments 
suggest that justice climate could predict shared PCFs.   
There could be arguments, however, for a relationship in the opposite direction.  In the 
past, some researchers have implied that the fulfillment of contracts can be perceived as a justice 
event such that PCF may lead to justice (e.g. Rousseau, 1995).  Evidence has generally rejected 
this hypothesis at individual levels of analysis (Rosen et al., 2009; Tekleab et al., 2005), and I 
expect his relationship to hold at the team-level as well.   
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Hypothesis 2a: Justice Climate positively predicts shared individual PCF. 
Hypothesis 2b: Justice Climate positively predicts shared team PCF. 
3.2.2. POS Climate and Shared PCFs 
At the individual level, there is also abundant theoretical and empirical evidence (e.g. 
Aselage & Eisenberger, 2003; Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005; Tekleab et al., 2005) that POS 
and PCF are different from each other, although related.  Theoretically, whereas POS focuses on 
the level of support provided by the organization to individuals, PCF captures whether promised 
obligations are fulfilled by the organization (Aselage & Eisenberger, 2003).  The concept of 
promises, which is key to the psychological contract, goes beyond general perceptions of support 
from the employer. 
At the team level, I also expect that POS climate and shared PCFs are related but 
different.  POS climate can be defined as a “team members’ shared perceptions of how the 
organization values the contributions of the team members, provides support to the team 
members, shows interest in team members, and takes team members’ needs into account” 
(Bashshur et al., 2011, p. 559).  I acknowledge that POS and PCF share a common theoretical 
base in Social Exchange Theory, and they focus on evaluations of inducements provided by the 
organization, but POS refer to phenomena that do not necessarily is included in the 
psychological contract.  For example, a high POS climate may form among team members as 
they evaluate how the organization supports the team in unexpected situations, or how they 
proactively provide more ad-hoc resources to the team to boost team performance. All these 
forms of support may or may not have been previously promised by the employer.  From a 
conceptual point of view, as the constructs refer to different phenomena, I expect to find 
evidence for discriminant validity between POS Climate and shared PCFs. 
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Moreover, shared perceptions of how the organization supports the team can bias 
evaluations of how team members evaluate shared PCFs.  As team members assess the 
exchanges with the organization in positive ways, represented in high POS climate, they will be 
less likely to actively scan for psychological contract breaches (Rousseau, 1995; Taylor & 
Tekleab, 2004). This is even more likely to occur as the support provided by the organization 
targets the whole team and its team members, biasing the perception that individuals develop 
about the fulfillment of promises made to the team as a whole (shared team PCF).  Similarly, a 
high POS climate can affect the level of shared individual PCF too.  As a generalized high POS 
climate develops in teams, this can suppress monitoring processes about individual PCF.  
Previous research has shown that individuals evaluate their own perceptions of PCF based on 
processes of social influence among coworkers (Ho, 2005; Ho & Levesque, 2005).  As other 
team members do not commit in strong monitoring of contracts due to a high POS Climate, this 
reinforce a process of convergence of positive evaluations of individual PCF.  Thus, POS climate 
could affect individual PCF through a generalized positive evaluation of PCF among team 
members, facilitating the emergence of shared individual PCF.  Then, a positive POS climate 
weakens the intention to monitor discrepancies about the fulfillment of individual contracts. 
Hypothesis 3a: POS Climate positively predicts shared individual PCF. 
Hypothesis 3b: POS Climate positively predicts shared team PCF. 
3.3. Antecedents of the Emergence of Shared Individual PCF and Shared Team PCF 
3.3.1. Team Size 
Team size is generally considered as the number of employees working in the same team 
and it has been theorized to be an important determinant of team-level constructs (e.g. Boehm et 
al., 2014; Colquitt et al., 2002).  Team size generally defines how team members interact with 
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each other, how people participate in discussions (Hare, 1981; Wheelan, 2009; Zhang, Waldman, 
& Wang, 2012), and how proximal team members are with each other (Klein, Conn, Smith, & 
Sorra, 2001).  All these factors may in turn affect the emergence process of team-level 
constructs.  When teams are large, “problems of communication and lack of social integration” 
(Smith et al., 1994, p. 422) may hinder the development of common perceptions of team 
emergent states.  For instance, in large teams people are less likely to talk to everybody in the 
team, which may hinder the development of shared perceptions of PCF.  In contrast, in small 
teams, there are more opportunities for individuals to interact and communicate with other team 
members, creating a social context that facilitates the emergence of shared PCF constructs in a 
lower amount of time. 
In addition, small teams may create opportunities for organizational agents and leaders to 
communicate directly to the whole team (even at the same time), supporting the formation of 
common expectations about promises made to the team.  Communicating more directly to small 
teams may enhance the convergence of metal schemata about psychological contracts, which in 
turn may reduce incongruence of promises and thus, a shared understanding of promises.  In 
contrast, it is more difficult for leaders to effectively make equal promises to all team members 
when the team is bigger, such that the evaluation of PCF is less likely to be homogeneous among 
team members.  Moreover, in larger teams, members have fewer opportunities to communicate 
with leaders in order to clarify obligations, and also lower opportunities to actively address 
discrepancies when they occur. 
Hypothesis 4a:  Smaller team size facilitates the emergence of shared individual PCF. 
Hypothesis 4b:  Smaller team size facilitates the emergence of shared team PCF. 
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3.3.2. Team Interdependence 
Defined as the "extent to which team members cooperate and work interactively to 
complete tasks" (Stewart & Barrick, 2000, p. 137), team interdependence has been considered an 
important facilitator of discussion, conversations, and interactions in general among team 
members, all of which are mechanisms for the emergence of team-level constructs.  
Interdependence facilitates idea sharing and event interpretations so as to develop common 
understandings of the experiences lived by team members (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; 
Roberson, 2006; Roberson & Williamson, 2012).  Other researchers have found that under high 
levels of interdependence, team members tend to agree more on their evaluations of team-level 
constructs and its effects tend to be stronger (e.g. Chen, Kirkman, Kanfer, Allen, & Rosen, 2007; 
Roberson, 2006).  In the realm of psychological contracts, I argue that team interdependence 
provides opportunities for team members to talk about what has been promised by the 
organization (to teams and individuals).  In the case of promises to the team, team members have 
more opportunities to develop a common understanding of the promises made to the team, and 
can share the good (or bad) news with others once the organization fulfilled (or fail to fulfill) a 
promise. In the case of promises to individuals, team members have more opportunities to 
influence each other in their own evaluations of PCF.  Thus, when teams work more 
interdependently, more homogeneous perceptions of shared PCFs can be formed. 
Hypothesis 5a:  High team interdependence facilitates the emergence of shared individual 
PCF. 
Hypothesis 5b:  High team interdependence facilitates the emergence of shared team 
PCF. 
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3.3.3. LMX differentiation 
The leader-member exchange (LMX) literature has traditionally focused at the dyad-level 
of analysis, although recent research has started to develop LMX at the team level, mainly in the 
form of LMX differentiation (Gooty & Yammarino, 2013; Henderson, Liden, Glibkowski, & 
Chaudhry, 2009; Li & Liao, 2014; Zhang et al., 2012).  LMX differentiation has been previously 
defined as "a process by which a leader, through engaging in different types of exchange patterns 
with subordinates, forms different quality exchange relationships (ranging from low to high) 
with them" (Henderson et al., 2009, p. 519), and its typical operationalization is the within-team 
standard deviation of individual LMX (e.g. Li & Liao, 2014; Zhang et al., 2012).  LMX theory 
assumes that leaders have limited resources to develop high quality relationships with all of their 
subordinates, such that they are likely to engage in high-quality exchanges with some 
individuals, and in not so high-quality exchanges with others (Bauer & Green, 1996; Graen & 
Uhl-Bien, 1995; Liden & Maslyn, 1998; Scandura & Graen, 1984; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 
1996).  However, teams should have different degrees of LMX differentiation, as different team 
leaders develop different degrees of variation of relationships with team members. 
Different degrees of exchange quality should affect perceptions of PCF within teams.  
Individuals with high LMX are more likely to positively evaluate the fulfillment of individual 
and team promises, and individuals with low LMX should negatively do so (e.g. Dulac et al., 
2008; Tekleab & Taylor, 2003).  The more variability within teams, it is more likely to find 
variability in PCF evaluations.  This differential treatment should bias the individual evaluations 
of not only individual PCF but also team PCF, hampering the development of shared perceptions 
of these constructs.  Moreover, individuals observing differentiated LMX with other team 
members should confirm previous evaluations and thus exacerbate differentiation of PCF.  
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Hence, I expect a negative relationship between LMX differentiation and indicators of 
emergence of shared individual PCF and shared team PCF.   
Hypothesis 6a: LMX differentiation will undermine the emergence of shared individual 
PCF. 
Hypothesis 6b: LMX differentiation will undermine the emergence of shared team PCF. 
3.4. Outcomes of Shared Individual PCF and Shared Team PCF 
The previous theoretical development of shared individual PCF and shared team PCF 
becomes important in case these novel constructs can predict relevant outcomes, above and 
beyond the known effects of PCF at individual levels.  If shared PCFs are found to be 
significantly related to team outcomes, organizations will be advised to not only manage 
psychological contracts in a dyadic relationship, but also keep track of the social processes that 
facilitate the formation of these team-level shared constructs.  In this section, I argue that shared 
PCFs can have important effects on team-level outcomes.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will study 4 types of team outcomes in order to 
evaluate the effects of shared team PCF and shared individual PCF in teams.  First, I will 
examine the relationship between shared PCFs and team performance, as this is one of the most 
important constructs in the evaluation of team effectiveness (Mathieu et al., 2008).  Second, I 
will study team-level contextual performance.  Understood as a set of interpersonal behaviors 
that support the social context in which work is accomplished (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993, 
1997), contextual behaviors, although exhibited by individuals, are mostly meaningful in their 
effects at the unit level (Organ, 1988; Podsakoff, Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Maynes, & Spoelma, 
2014; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009).  Third, as shared PCFs are likely to have 
effects on the willingness of individuals to continue social exchanges in the future, I will study 
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collective turnover intentions as a reflection of the average willingness to leave the organization 
of team members (Abelson, 1993; Felps et al., 2009).  This outcome is also relevant as research 
has suggested that breached contracts should trigger exit responses (Rousseau, 1995).  Finally, 
due to a growing interest in work engagement as an important work attitude (Byrne, Peters, & 
Weston, 2016; Christian, Garza, & Slaughter, 2011), I will study team work engagement as a 
potential outcome of shared PCFs.  Team work engagement has been considered as a collective 
construct with functional equivalence to individual engagement (Tims, Bakker, Derks, & van 
Rhenen, 2013; Torrente, Salanova, Llorens, & Schaufeli, 2012).  In this way, I will be testing the 
effects of shared PCFs on several types of outcomes ranging from team in-role behaviors, team 
contextual behaviors, shared behavioral intentions, and shared attitudes.  
On one side, I argue that shared team PCF can promote collective behaviors and attitudes 
by influencing the team as a whole.  Researchers have suggested that teams can act as 
autonomous entities, engaging in distinguishable exchanges with organizations (Bashshur et al., 
2011; Gong et al., 2010; González‐Romá et al., 2009).  When a team develops positive collective 
perceptions about the convenience of reciprocating the fulfillment of promises made to the team, 
more positive team-level responses are likely to develop, including higher team performance and 
team-level attitudes toward the organization.   
Social exchange theory (SET) has been mainly utilized in the organizational sciences to 
explain individual-level phenomena, although Blau (1964)'s theory ultimately intends to 
understand social structures and emergent properties of collectivities.  In the second half of his 
book, Blau (1964) discusses multiple exchanges that individuals face with their employers but 
also with the groups where they belong, providing a complex multi-level theory of multiple 
social exchanges.  SET argues that individuals contribute to organizational goals when they 
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perceive positive dyadic social exchanges with their employer and that then they develop desires 
to continue engaging in those positive exchanges.  But Blau (1964) also suggested that this desire 
for contribution is reinforced when social norms that strengthen individual behavior are 
developed in their groups.  In that way, the pressure to contribute to team actions does not come 
exclusively from what organizational agents do to encourage employees to contribute to 
organizational goals, but also from the collectivity of team members and the social norms that it 
develops which shape individual behavior.  Thus, when promises to the team are fulfilled, and 
when those perceptions are shared among team members (forming shared team PCF), the team 
as a whole will more likely support the organization because in that way team members will be 
following social norms to contribute to the collective team desire to continue positive exchanges 
with the organization.  Social norms may steer behaviors as individuals can receive social 
approval in exchange for conformity and contributions to let the team engage in convenient 
exchanges with the organization.  That could be reflected in concrete individual behaviors 
supporting team goals (even at the expense of individual goals), in shared better attitudes 
towards work and the organization, in a better coordination of team members’ efforts, and in 
lower levels of turnover intentions. 
In addition, in high shared team PCF, individuals will more likely contribute to fulfill the 
team’ side of the contract, activating strong team goals, and making individuals more likely to 
support higher level endeavors and coordinate efforts to pursue superior rewards (Blau, 1964; 
Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009; DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & 
Wiechmann, 2004).  In contrast, when the organization breaches promises to the team, all team 
members are affected, rather than a specific individual.  This could make the team as a whole to 
negatively react to the unfulfilled promise-based obligation by withholding their contributions to 
54 
 
the organization and developing worse attitudes, which may facilitate a collective negative 
response.  This is congruent with prior research suggesting that collective behaviors could result 
from all team members being exposed to similar organizational phenomena (e.g. Morgeson & 
Hofmann, 1999). 
Similarly, shared individual PCF should also be related to team outcomes.  As individuals 
start to positively respond to high individual PCF with higher levels of performance, lower 
turnover intentions, and better attitudes, what they observe from their social context can also 
reinforce those positive responses.  As several individuals in a team start to display positive 
behaviors and verbalize positive attitudes due to high PCF, this creates an environment where 
members are mutually encouraged to imitate these behaviors, reinforcing the emergence of team 
in-role performance (Mathieu et al., 2008), team contextual performance (Ehrhart & Naumann, 
2004; Podsakoff et al., 2014), team work engagement (Tims et al., 2013; Torrente et al., 2012), 
and/or collective turnover intentions (Bartunek, Huang, & Walsh, 2008; Hausknecht & Trevor, 
2011; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013).  This is in line with the climate literature that proposes that 
positive outcomes at the workgroup level occur when perceptions of the work environment are 
similar among members of a team (e.g. Ostroff, Shin, & Kinicki, 2005).  Teammates with similar 
perceptions about how the organization fulfills individual promise-based obligations feel less 
uncertainty and can better evaluate future possibilities of actions and, consequently, coordinate 
collective efforts in more efficient ways.  In comparison to high shared individual PCF, low 
shared individual PCF environments are characterized by a common experience of breach of 
psychological contracts among teammates which promote communications that socially justify 
and reinforce the desire to withdraw effort and consequently, undermine important team 
outcomes. 
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Hypothesis 7a:  Shared individual PCF will predict team-level outcomes (team 
performance, team-level OCB, average turnover intentions, team engagement). 
Hypothesis 7b:  Shared team PCF will predict team-level outcomes (team performance, 
team-level OCB, average turnover intentions, team engagement). 
3.5. Motivation as a Mediator between Shared PCFs and Outcomes 
In the previous section, I argue for a relationship between shared PCFs and team 
outcomes, mainly using arguments brought from social exchange theory and the development of 
social norms in teams.  Extending our understanding of the mechanisms of shared PCFs, in this 
section I also explore an alternative explanation of why these relationships occur.  In particular, I 
argue that shared PCFs can be affecting team processes and team motivation (Park et al., 2013), 
which in turn facilitate better team outcomes.   
Perceptions of PCF inform actors about the convenience of continuing social exchanges, 
but they also convey other type of important information that guide future behavior and its form, 
direction, intensity, and duration.  As suggested by Conway and Briner (2005), breach may 
deprive employees’ inducements, affecting work satisfaction and general motivation, and may 
impede an employee’s progress toward personal goals (Conway & Briner, 2002), which has an 
important effect on self-regulation and emotion.  For example, if an individual does not receive 
the training that the organization promised, he or she may not only perform worse due to a lack 
of knowledge or skills coming from training, but also from a lack of motivation due to having to 
redesign plans to adjust to new conditions and due to the frustration and other bad feelings that 
the breach creates.  Comparable to individuals, teams also define their behaviors through the 
generation and the pursuit of task goals (O’Leary-Kelly, Martocchio, & Frink, 1994) that could 
be affected by shared team PCF and shared individual PCF. 
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As suggested by the team effectiveness literature, teams engage in transition and action 
processes (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001) that generally may correspond to motivation 
processes at the individual level (Chen & Kanfer, 2006).  For instance, goal-setting processes at 
individual levels appear to be similar to transition team processes which include defining the 
team mission, specifying and prioritizing team goals, and formulating plans to achieve those 
goals.  Similarly, goal striving at individual levels appear to be similar to team action processes 
including monitoring progress of team goals, backing up team members in need for assistance, 
and coordinating tasks to improve outcome efficiency and to avoid duplication of efforts.  Thus, 
team motivation could be theorized as a higher-level construct with its unique structure.  
Accordingly, team motivation has been defined as “the collective system by which team 
members coordinate the direction, intensity, and persistence of their efforts” (Chen & Kanfer, 
2006, p. 233).   
When shared team PCF is high, the team as a whole can develop a higher level of team 
motivation since the fulfillment of promises to the team can be seen as a factor affecting the team 
functioning, operations, and/or identity.  On one side, shared team PCF can minimize the need 
for teams to engage in unnecessary transition and action processes, as it may create more 
certainty that previous courses of action are still appropriate.  Moreover, teams that perceive that 
they need to fulfill promises back to their organization can become more motivated in order to 
reach those promises.  As teams perceive high shared team PCF, they will most likely try to 
reciprocate the organization and fulfill their part of the contract, striving to reach certain goals 
that are perceived as part of what the team need to deliver.  Then, trying to fulfill a commitment 
made by the team can create a team-level goal, making team members to actively support those 
goals.  In contrast, when promises to the team are breached, team members may need to re-
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evaluate situations, re-define courses of actions, and overcome (at the same time) the 
disappointment and frustration of having fewer organizational inducements than expected.  Low 
shared team PCF can also decrease team motivation as the team as a whole could question its 
general value within the organization and its general capacity to reach team goals.  Thus, I will 
argue that shared team PCF can work as an “ambient” input of team motivation, understood as a 
“team-oriented stimuli that pervades the team as a whole” and that affects team motivation (Chen 
& Kanfer, 2006, p. 243).   
Shared individual PCF could also be directly related to team motivation.  Similar to our 
theory of shared PCFs, team motivation has also been conceptualized as a multi-level 
phenomenon in and of teams (Chen & Kanfer, 2006).  That is, team motivation can be 
understood as the study of how the team as a collective entity, develop collective motivational 
states that affect collective outcomes (i.e. motivation of teams), and also as the study of 
individuals developing motivational states and exerting different degrees of effort as they work 
within team environments (i.e. motivation in teams).  Individuals’ motivation can be affected by 
perceptions of PCF, but can also be reinforced when they experience other team members 
demonstrating similar PCF and similar levels of motivation.  As individuals perceive low PCF, it 
is likely that individual motivation decreases (Conway & Briner, 2005).  Low levels of 
motivation are likely to be demonstrated in teams as individuals usually voice their breach 
experiences, generating negative affective contagion effects among others teammates 
(sometimes, unintentionally).  This may decrease the motivation levels of individuals who, 
besides dealing with their own perceptions of low PCF, observe a shared perception of PCF of 
other individuals in their team.  This may reinforce a shared motivational state within the team, 
as team members are likely to be more motivated in environments where other people are 
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motivated.  For the arguments above, I generally propose that shared PCFs should be positively 
related to team motivation. 
On the other side, team motivation has been studied over several content areas (Park et 
al., 2013).  For example, researchers have proposed that team-level constructs (such as team 
potency, etc.) can be important reflections of team motivation.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I operationalize team motivation using three well-known motivational states: team 
potency, team external collective fit, and team affective tone.  I decided to use these particular 
motivational states for the several reasons.  
First, team potency is one of the most popular team motivational states (Chen & Bliese, 
2002; Chen & Kanfer, 2006) and has been defined as a “shared belief [of the team] in its conjoint 
capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of goal 
attainment (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006, p. 90).  Shared PCFs should be related to team potency in 
particular because the breach of contracts can be directly related to future capabilities to reach 
goals since promises usually involve the provision of important organizational inducements 
necessary to perform (e.g. autonomy, support, clear goals, etc.) or inducements that naturally 
build potency perceptions (e.g. feedback, training, mastery experiences, etc.).  Then, it is likely 
that in time, shared PCFs drive shared perceptions of team potency. 
Second, team collective external fit can be understood as the alignment between some 
team characteristics and the external environment (DeRue & Hollenbeck, 2007) and has been 
formally defined as the “team members’ shared assessment of compatibility … [of the team] 
with the requirements of the task environment” (Kristof‐Brown, Seong, Degeest, Park, & Hong, 
2014).  Taking a demand-ability approach, this team-level variable reflects the subjective 
perception of fit between team abilities and team demands and can boost a willingness to exert 
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extra efforts in the workplace (Seong & Choi, 2014).  As organizations fulfill or break promises 
to teams and individuals, team members normally seek explanations for that fulfillment/breach 
(Lester et al., 2002), which may include that the team may have the required abilities to cover the 
demands and goals that the organization requests to the team.  If a team constantly experience 
breach of contracts, its team members may start to question the general value of the team for the 
organization as a potential explanation of the breach.  This may be supported by recent research 
suggesting that individuals engage in sense making processes to derive meaning and 
explanations from breaches (Bankins, 2015) and that perceptions of fulfillment could be 
associated with perceptions of "prototypicality" in organizations (Bingham et al., 2013).  Thus, 
shared team PCF and shared individual PCF can serve as cues to infer perceptions of team 
collective external fit in a broader organizational context.   
Third, team affective tone (or affective climate) has been conceptualized as an emergent 
state reflecting the homogeneous affective reactions that team members experience at work 
(Barsade & Knight, 2015; Collins, Lawrence, Troth, & Jordan, 2013; George, 1995) and has 
been consider an important variable shaping team motivation (Park et al., 2013).  As the 
experience of breach of psychological contracts of individuals and teams are likely to create 
individual affective responses (Conway & Briner, 2002; Zhao et al., 2007) that can be spread 
among team members through contagion and imitation (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1994), I expect that shared PCFs are related to team affective tone, too.  The previous 
reasons sustain the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8a: Shared individual PCF will predict team motivational states (team 
potency, team external collective fit, team affective tone). 
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Hypothesis 8b: Shared team PCF will predict team motivational states (team potency, 
team external collective fit, team affective tone). 
Implicit in Hypotheses 8a and 8b is the view that team motivation could mediate the 
relationship between shared PCFs and team-level outcomes.  This assertion can be theoretically 
supported by the growing literature on the effects of team motivation.  The relationship between 
team motivational states and team outcomes has been more extensively developed in the team 
effectiveness literature (Park et al., 2013).  For example, research consistently shows that team 
potency is positively related to team performance (Gully, Incalcaterra, Joshi, & Beaubien, 2002; 
Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 2009), and other attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Scott W Lester, 
Meglino, & Korsgaard, 2002).  Similarly, collective fit has been shown to affect team 
performance and other important team outcomes (Kristof‐Brown et al., 2014; Seong & Choi, 
2014; Seong, Kristof-Brown, Park, Hong, & Shin, 2012).  Also, an extensive literature has 
confirmed positive relationships between team affective tone and team outcomes (e.g. Barsade & 
Knight, 2015; Collins et al., 2013).  Extending these arguments, I expect that the effects of team 
PCF construct on team-level outcomes are partially mediated by team motivational states (team 
potency, team external collective fit, team affective tone). 
Hypothesis 9a: Team motivation states will mediate the relationship between shared 
individual PCF and team outcomes. 
Hypothesis 9b: Team motivation states will mediate the relationship between shared team 
PCF and team outcomes. 
3.6. Cross-level Moderating Effects of Shared PCFs 
As reviewed in previous chapters, processes of social influence have been found to be 
important determinants of individual PCF.  Recent studies have shown that individuals obtain 
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valuable information from other referents that they use to evaluate their own PCFs (cf. Dabos & 
Rousseau, 2013; Ho, 2005; Ho & Levesque, 2005).  This idea has been rooted in social 
information processing (SIP) theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), which generally proposes that 
individuals take cues from their social environments to better interpret reality and decide what 
are the appropriate behaviors they should display in particular situations.  In other words, 
individuals confirm their perceptions and consequent behavior intentions from information taken 
from the environment.  Following SIP theory and theory of social influence in PCF theory, I 
argue that both shared team PCF and shared individual PCF can serve as important contextual 
variables modifying the individual-level relationships between PCF and outcome variables. 
This cross-level moderation effect should apply for both shared individual PCF and 
shared team PCF.  First, in teams with low shared team PCF, there is a generalized perception 
among team members that the organization has not fulfilled its previous commitments with the 
team.  This can affect the individual-level PCF-outcome relationship in several ways. On the one 
side, individuals could start monitoring their individual contracts more closely, being more aware 
about what is given and received, and questioning the convenience of future exchanges with the 
organization, which can trigger more conservative behavioral reactions as the perception of 
convenience of fulfillment of psychological contracts can be damaged.  Then, a negative 
environment created by low shared team PCF can create strong signals to individuals that 
neutralize the expected positive effect of fulfillment of individual contracts.  Moreover, the 
negative perception of fulfillment of promises made to team can hamper behavioral responses of 
individuals who may even have positive evaluations of fulfillment of their own contracts.  
Second, shared individual PCF can act as a source of confirmation of individual 
perceptions of PCF.  Individual attitudinal and behavioral responses to PCF can be exacerbated 
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when other team members are having the same perceptions of PCF and are reacting similarly to 
positive or negative organizational treatment.  For example, when breach is perceived by an 
individual, he or she may want to discuss this perception with other team members. If other team 
members also experience breach, this situation could exacerbate negative individual effects 
because individuals confirm and obtain self-assurance of their initial perceptions.  Thus, it is 
expected that when shared individual PCF is high, the individual response to individual PCF 
should be stronger as employees perceive that positive reciprocation to the organization is 
appropriate and consistent with the behaviors of other team members (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).   
Hypothesis 10a:  Shared individual PCF will moderate the relationship between 
individual PCF and individual outcomes (in-role performance, OCBs, turnover intentions, 
engagement). 
Hypothesis 10b:  Shared team PCF will moderate the relationship between individual 
PCF and individual outcomes (in-role performance, OCBs, turnover intentions, 
engagement). 
3.7. Homology Relationships 
An implicit research question from the model in figure 2 and the discussion in previous 
sections is to what extent the relationships among PCF, motivation, and outcomes are similar 
across levels of analysis (at both team and individual levels).  To solve this type of questions, 
researchers have encouraged research on homology models.  Theories of homology involve 
testing whether there are similar relationships between constructs across levels of analysis (cf. 
Chen et al., 2005; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  This similarity can be described in different levels 
or different questions (Widaman, 2000). Are significance patterns different or equal across levels 
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of analysis?  Also, if there is a difference in terms of the strength of the relationships among 
these variables, how can we describe that difference?   
The first question about homology has been defined as configural similarity; a situation 
that occurs "when parameter estimates show similar patterns of significance across different 
samples or levels." (Chen et al., 2005, p. 385).  In general, I expect configural similarity between 
PCF, motivation, and outcomes (for both shared individual PCF and shared team PCF) in line 
with the theoretical arguments I provided in previous sections.  However, here I expand these 
arguments and propose arguments to predict scalar similarity, or models where "parameter 
estimates in one level are a multiplicative function of the corresponding parameter estimate 
obtained in another level" (Chen et al., 2005, p. 385).  In particular, I advocate for stronger 
effects (although in the same direction) of shared PCFs in most of the previously proposed 
relationships.  
In general, preliminary evidence for a stronger effect at higher levels of analysis can be 
found in the team motivation literature.  For instance, the meta-analytic effect sizes of the 
relationships between efficacy and performance are stronger at the team level (ρ = .39) than at 
individual level (ρ = .20) (Gully et al., 2002).  Gully et al. (2002', p. 821) argued that shared 
perceptions of efficacy "are powerful levers for lifting or lowering the goals, efforts, and 
persistence of team members" and that when perceptions of efficacy are not shared in a team, 
then the construct is more relevant at the individual rather than at the team level, because team 
performance would be less driven by interactive dynamics in a team and more driven by 
individuals.  Other motivational states (e.g. empowerment, support for innovation) have also 
displayed stronger effects on outcomes at the team level (e.g. Chen, Farh, Campbell-Bush, Wu, 
& Wu, 2013; Chen et al., 2007), suggesting that team motivation may be a more powerful driver 
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of important team level outcomes.  This may confirm the Aristotelian view that "the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts" and that the relationship between motivational states in teams 
and high performance is stronger for teams than for individuals.  In that line of thought, I also 
expect that the relationship between PCF constructs and motivation is stronger at the team level.  
When team members share perceptions of how the organization fulfill promises, this may create 
a strong ambient factor to affect team motivation, in contrast to individual PCF that may 
determine motivation but with a weaker effect as individual motivation may also depend on other 
extraneous factors (e.g. work-life conflict, individual differences).  Then, relationships at the 
team-levels of analysis should be stronger than relationships at individual levels.   
Hypothesis 11a: The relationships between PCF, motivation, and outcomes at team levels 
of analysis are stronger than at individual levels of analysis. 
Moreover, so far I have predicted that I should observe similar relationships for both 
shared individual PCF and shared team PCF, without distinguishing whether some variables 
could be related to unique antecedents or outcomes, nor distinguishing the strengths of those 
relationships.  Here, I also anticipate that shared team PCF could have even stronger effects on 
team motivation and team outcomes than shared individual PCF.  This phenomenon could be 
explained mainly from an analytical point of view.  As suggested in previous sections, shared 
team PCF is a concept that refers to the team, in contrast to shared individual PCF which is the 
aggregation of individual level PCF.  Because of that reason, measures of shared team PCF 
should use a referent-shift model (Chan, 1998) asking questions about "the team" and not about 
individuals, this should increase the likelihood for finding higher team-level reliability (ICC2) 
and lower variance among team members.  This can be explained as with shared team PCF, 
individuals respond questions about the same target (the team), potentially reducing the 
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variability of responses.  On the other side, shared individual PCF, although based on convergent 
perceptions, is based on individual perceptions of fulfillment of psychological contracts, which 
may add more variability to responses due to other individual factors.  Thus, an improvement in 
reliability may be associated with a decrease in standard errors, which may strengthen team-level 
relationships.  In summary, I propose the following: 
Hypothesis 11b: Shared team PCF has a stronger effect on team motivation and team 
outcomes than shared individual PCF. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
4.1. Data Collection Setting 
To test the different Hypotheses described in chapter 3, I collected quantitative data using 
multiple online surveys. The data were collected in 2016 and 2017 from team members and team 
leaders in a company that mainly operates in Chile within the textile industry. The company 
manufactures and sells several clothing brands for different customer' styles and ages using 
numerous stores throughout Chile. Teams within this company perform diverse types of 
functions including sales, marketing and commerce, manufacturing, inventory and distribution, 
and administrative and professional services. Of the 71 potential teams, 45 teams where mainly 
working on sales (stores), 10 teams where mainly working on manufacturing and supply chain 
management, and 16 teams where mainly doing administrative and professional services. The 
average team size (per company records at time 1) was 6.2 for stores, 7.7 for 
manufacturing/supply-chain-management teams, and 7.1 for administrative/professional teams.  
44 teams where distributed in different locations whereas the remaining 27 teams where located 
in the company’s headquarters (one of the stores was in the same location than the headquarters). 
Interviews with HR professionals of this company reveal that the studied teams are composed by 
more than two individuals, possess common goals, and exhibit interdependence, so that they 
could be considered teams.  
4.2. Procedures 
Through email communication, full-time employees in 71 teams were invited to respond 
three online surveys and were informed that they had one week to respond each survey. Part-time 
employees were not invited to participate as they do not normally have enough time working for 
the company to be considered stable employees. Three-months elapsed between measurements. 
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At time 1, the survey contained the following variables: justice climate, POS climate, team 
interdependence, LMX, individual PCF, and team PCF.  In addition, they were asked about some 
control variables (age, tenure with company, time within team, experience, gender).  At time 2, 
team members responded to another survey, including justice climate, POS climate, individual 
PCF, team PCF, self-efficacy and team potency, person-organization fit and collective fit, and 
affect.  At time 3, team members responded to the final survey that contained the following 
variables: engagement, turnover intentions, and contextual performance. At time 3, supervisors 
also responded to a survey with the following scales: team performance, team OCBs, and 
individual performance of each team member. 
The surveys were distributed in Spanish. To improve semantic equivalence of items, I 
applied a translation and back-translation method using two independent translators. First, the 
principal investigator (bilingual) translated the original items to Spanish (Chile). Later, an 
independent professional translator converted the items back to English. Significant differences 
were later solved by agreement between the two translators (approximately 29% of items). 
Finally, the translated items were pretested in a small sample of 19 Chilean individuals to ensure 
that the questions make sense and are understandable (feedback was provided directly to the 
main researcher by telephone communication).  
The number of respondents at each time period were 378 (T1), 371 (T2), and 390 (T3) 
individuals. Also, at time 3, 69 out of 71 team leaders responded some portion of the survey. 
Later, I eliminated respondents with too many missing data (13 individuals at time 1, 8 
individuals at time 2, 6 individuals at time 3) or those who failed an attention check item (63 
individuals at time 2, 35 individuals at time 3). Also, I eliminated teams with less than 3 team 
members (11 individuals at time 1, 23 individuals at time 2, 5 individuals at time 3). The final 
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sample sizes at time 1, 2 and 3 were 354 (63 teams), 277 (59 teams), and 338 (68 teams), 
respectively. The average team sizes were 5.6 at time 1, 4.7 at time 2, and 5.0 at time 35. The 
average age of respondents at all time periods was 33.97, 83.3% were women, and had worked in 
their current jobs for about 4.15 years. All teams had at least 50% of its members with valid 
responses. 
4.3. Measures 
Next, I present the operationalization and relevant psychometric properties of all the 
variables used in this study. Table 1 shows a summary of aggregation indexes for all team-level 
variables used in this dissertation. This table shows a) median and mean rwg indices: Rwg is one 
of the most common indexes of inter-rater agreement (IRA), and it represents a proportional 
reduction of error variance within a team in comparison to a theoretical state where all team 
members respond a scale completely at random (Bliese, 2000); b) ICC1 and ICC2, which are 
some of the most important indexes of interrater reliability (IRR) and IRA. These indexes are 
calculated from a one-way random effects ANOVA where team membership is the independent 
variable and shared PCFs constructs were the dependent variables. And, c) the F test for the one-
way random effects ANOVA, which assess whether team membership significantly explains a 
portion of the variability of individual scores of PCF. Also, Appendix 1 shows all the items and 
instructions that were used in this dissertation.  
4.3.1. Shared PCFs 
Individual PCF.  To measure individual-level PCF, I used a global measure of PCF 
(Zhao et al., 2007) asking individuals to assess overall perceptions of fulfillment of 
organizational promises.  One of the few developed measures of this type is the 5-item 
                                                 
5 These numbers correspond to the response size per team. The actual average team sizes, per company 
records, were 6.7 at time 1, 6.2 at time 2, and 6.4 at time 3. 
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instrument created by Robinson and Morrison (2000).  All items were rated on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). A sample item is “Almost all of the promises 
made to me by my employer have been kept so far”. Individuals responded these items at time 2 
and the obtained Cronbach's alpha was .85.  
 
TABLE 1: Summary of Aggregation Indexes of Team-level Variables 
Variables 
Interrater 
Agreement (IRA) 
Interrater agreement and 
reliability (IRA+IRR) 
Rwg (j) 
(Median) 
Rwg (j) 
(Mean) ICC(1) ICC(2) F test 
Justice Climate (T1) 0.57 0.50  0.28 0.68 3.16*** 
POS Climate (T1) 0.80 0.65  0.22 0.62 2.60*** 
Interdependence (T1) 0.42 0.40  0.01 0.07 1.08 
Shared Individual PCF (T2) 0.82 0.69  0.29 0.66 3.00*** 
Shared Team PCF (T2) 0.87 0.77  0.39 0.75 4.01*** 
Team Potency (T2) 0.95 0.87  0.03 0.13 1.14 
Team Affect C-T (T2) 0.82 0.68  0.13 0.41 1.69** 
Team Affect D-E (T2) 0.89 0.73  0.09 0.33 1.49* 
Collective Fit (T2) 0.91 0.80  0.23 0.59 2.41*** 
Team Engagement (T3) 0.98 0.95  0.15 0.47 1.88*** 
Average Turnover Intent (T3) 0.54 0.51  0.06 0.24 1.32† 
Note. For Time 1, df (between) = 62, df (within) = 291; For Time 2, df (between) = 58,  
df (within) = 218; For Time 3, df (between) = 67, df (within) = 271. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
 
Shared Individual PCF.  This variable was operationalized as the within-team mean of 
individual PCF.  As this variable assesses the extent to which individuals in the same team 
converge in their perceptions of PCF, I used a direct-consensus approach of composition (Chan, 
1998) as it is the most appropriate and theoretically-driven strategy to capture this construct, 
where the "meaning of higher level construct is in the consensus among lower level units" (Chan, 
1998, p. 236).  This approach requires to show within-group agreement indexes (e.g. rwg's) in 
order to validate aggregation of scores.  Previous studies of shared individual PCF (i.e. De Vos 
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& Tekleab, 2014) have used composite measures, asking individuals to evaluate whether the 
employer has fulfilled their promises within a range of content items (e.g. autonomy, salary, 
etc.), and then calculating the mean from those content items.  Instead, I used a global measure 
because of its simplicity and its potential to make better comparisons between this construct, 
individual PCF, and shared team PCF. The aggregation indexes for this team-level variable are 
reported in section 5.1 as part of the tests of hypothesis 1a. The coefficient alpha for the within-
team aggregated items of individual PCF (shared individual PCF) was .92. 
Shared Team PCF.  I measured this variable at time 2 using a global scale of shared 
team PCF, with team members evaluating the degree to which they think the organization has 
generally fulfilled its promises to the team.  Consequently, I used a referent-shift approach, using 
the team (not the individual) as the referent of all the items.  In particular, I used an adapted 
version of Robinson and Morrison (2000).  An example item is "Almost all of the promises made 
to my team by my employer have been kept so far".  The Cronbach's alpha coefficient at the 
individual level was .85 whereas at the aggregated level alpha was .91. Similar to shared 
individual PCF, the aggregation indexes for this team-level variable are reported in section 5.1. 
4.3.2. Independent Variables 
Justice Climate.  Justice climate was assessed using a 4-item measure of procedural 
justice climate adapted from Colquitt et al. (2002) and used by Ehrhart (2004). I included 
procedural justice climate and not other justice dimensions (distributive, interpersonal, 
informational) mainly because this is the most widely studied dimension of justice at the team 
level (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2002; Ehrhart, 2004; Naumann & Bennett, 2000) and more information 
is available in the literature.  Individuals are asked about their perceptions of the extent to which 
the procedures used to determine the rewards in their teams are consistently applied, free of bias, 
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ethical, and with an opportunity to express their views and feelings. Respondents rated each of 
the items on a 7-point scale (1 = to a very small extent to 7 = to a great extent). The Cronbach's 
alpha coefficient at the individual level was .92. Responses of team member’ scores were 
averaged to obtain a single score per team (aggregated Cronbach's α = .96; F (62,291) = 3.16, p < 
.001; ICC1 = .28; ICC2 = .68; Median rwg = .57; Mean rwg = .50). The aggregation indexes are 
comparable to other studies of justice climate (Ehrhart, 2004; Roberson, 2006), and support the 
idea that the within-team means are appropriate measures of a team-level construct. 
POS Climate.  POS climate was measured using a 4-item instrument developed by 
González‐Romá et al. (2009) using a Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree).  An example item is "You can tell that the company is interested in the members of the 
team."  The obtained Cronbach's alpha at the individual level was .90. At the team level, POS 
climate scores were averaged for every team (aggregated Cronbach's α = .91; F (62,291) = 2.60, 
p < .001; ICC1 = .22; ICC2 = .62; Median rwg = .80; Mean rwg = .65). The aggregation indexes, 
support that the within-team mean is a good measure of POS Climate. 
Interdependence.  This variable was assessed with a 3-item task interdependence 
instrument developed by Wageman, Hackman, and Lehman (2005) using a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  An example item is "Members of this team depend 
heavily on one another to get the team’s work done".  At individual level, the obtained 
Cronbach's α was .27. At the team level, the obtained aggregated Cronbach’s alpha was .15 (F 
(62,291) = 1.08, p = .34; ICC1 = .01; ICC2 = .07; Median rwg = .42; Mean rwg = .40). Because 
both the reliability and the aggregation indexes for this variable were very poor, team 
interdependence was excluded from future analyses.  
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LMX differentiation.  Following recent research on LMX at the team level, LMX 
differentiation was captured as the within-team standard deviation of LMX scores.  I measured 
LMX using an 8-item instrument developed by Bauer and Green (1996) based on the classic 
LMX-7 (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) but separating double-barrel items. An example item is "I 
would characterize the working relationship I have with my manager as extremely effective".  I 
used a Likert-type scale of 7 options (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  The coefficient 
alpha for LMX was .96. Also, as suggested by Chan (1998), dispersion models should 
demonstrate absence of multimodality within teams. An inspection of the graphs of distribution 
of LMX within teams resulted in no apparent significant signs of multimodality. Thus, the 
within-team standard deviation of LMX scores is an appropriate measure of LMX 
differentiation. 
Team size. Team size was captured using company records. I used team size at time 2 as 
it was the time that reflected the construct in the best way according to the company’s natural 
fluctuations of demands. As a control, I also included a single item asking team members "How 
many members (including yourself) does your team have?".  Incongruences were solved by 
telephone communication between the main researcher and the team leaders. 
4.3.3. Mediators 
Team Potency and Self Efficacy.  I measured efficacy at individual and team levels 
using an 8-item instrument developed by Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, and Shea (1993) using a 
Likert-type scale of 7 options (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  The scale was adapted 
so as to separately use individual and teams as referents (16 items total).  An example item of 
individual self-efficacy is "I believe I can be very productive" in contrast to the same item 
referring to team potency "My team believes it can be very productive."  The coefficient alpha 
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for self-efficacy at time 2 was .80. For team potency, Cronbach's α was .89 at the individual level 
and .84 when items were aggregated (F(58, 218) = 1.14, p = .25; ICC1 = .03; ICC2 = .13; 
Median rwg = .95; Mean rwg = .87). Although the ICC1 and ICC2 indexes for team potency were 
small, the within-team agreement indexes (rwg) were very high, suggesting very strong agreement 
(LeBreton & Senter, 2007) and providing evidence for aggregation. This difference may be due 
to extremely low between-team variance in perceptions of team potency, as suggested by 
LeBreton, Burgess, Kaiser, Atchley, and James (2003). The implications of this phenomenon 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.  
Affect and Team Affective Tone.  Affect was measured based on the mood circumplex 
model (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000) following guidelines by Gamero, González‐Romá, and Peiró 
(2008).  Individuals were asked to indicate "to what degree your job has made you feel like each 
of the adjectives listed below in the past few weeks".  Respondents answered 6 adjectives in a 
calmness-tension (CT) dimension (e.g. tense, calm, relaxed) and 6 adjectives in a depression-
enthusiasm (DE) dimension (e.g. cheerful, pessimistic, gloomy), using a 7-point scale (1. Not at 
all, 7: Very much).  At the individual level, the coefficients alpha were .80 for the CT dimension 
and .84 for the DE dimension. At the team level, I calculated the within-team mean of affect for 
the two sub-dimensions of affect. For the calmness-tension dimension, aggregated Cronbach's α 
= .84; F(58,218) = 1.69, p < .01; ICC1 = .13; ICC2 = .41; Median rwg = .82; Mean rwg = .68. For 
the depression-enthusiasm dimension, aggregated Cronbach's α = .87; F(58,218) = 1.49, p < .05; 
ICC1 = .09; ICC2 = .33; Median rwg = .89; Mean rwg = .73. The aggregation indexes suggest that 
the within-team means were appropriate measures of team affective tone. 
Person-Organization Fit and Team Collective External Fit.  Team members reported 
their perceptions of fit using two instruments with a 7-point Likert scale.  For person-
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organization fit, I used a 3-item measure developed by Cable and DeRue (2002).  An example 
item is "The match is very good between the demands of my job and my personal skills". The 
coefficient alpha for person-organization fit was .92. For team collective external fit, I used an 
instrument developed by Kristof‐Brown et al. (2014).  An example item is "The match is very 
good between the demands of our team’s task and our skills". The coefficient alpha for collective 
external fit was .94.  At the team-level, I calculated the average perception of collective external 
fit of all the members per team (aggregated Cronbach's α = .96; F(58,218) = 2.41, p < .001; ICC1 
= .23; ICC2 = .59; Median rwg = .91; Mean rwg = .80). The aggregation indexes support that the 
within-team means were appropriate measures of team collective external fit. 
4.3.4. Dependent Variables 
Team Engagement.  To measure engagement, I used the Job Engagement Scale (JES) 
developed by Rich, Lepine, and Crawford (2010).  This instrument distinguishes 3 dimensions in 
job engagement (physical, emotional, cognitive) and has been recently recommended for 
research purposes over other instruments (Byrne et al., 2016).  From the original instrument 
consisting of 18 items, I consolidated redundant items (e.g. "I devote a lot of energy to my job" 
vs. "I exert a lot of energy on my job"), leaving a final 12-item measure. Participants responded 
to the items using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  The 
Cronbach's alpha at individual level was .88, showing good reliability.  At the team level, team 
engagement has been more commonly measured using a direct consensus approach from the 
Utrech Work Engagement Scale UWES (e.g. Tims et al., 2013; Torrente et al., 2012).  However, 
as the UWES is strongly correlated to other attitudes (Byrne et al., 2016; Christian et al., 2011), I 
used the 12-items JES using a direct consensus approach (aggregated Cronbach's α = .90 ; 
F(58,218) = 1.88, p < .001; ICC1 = .15; ICC2 = .47; Median rwg = .98; Mean rwg = .95). The 
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aggregation indexes support that the within-team means were appropriate measures of Team 
Engagement. 
Turnover Intentions.  Team members reported their turnover intentions using a 2-item 
scale developed by Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, and Klesh (1983) using a 7-point Likert scale 
(1: strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree). A sample item is “I often seriously think about 
quitting”. The obtained coefficient alpha for turnover intentions was .80.  At the team level, I 
calculated the average turnover intentions (an additive model in Chan, 1998). 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors.  OCBs were measured using several 
instruments.  At the individual level, I used a measure of contextual performance used by 
Mohammed, Mathieu, and Bartlett (2002) through self-reported scores from team members. A 
sample items is “While performing my job, how likely is it that I would…Volunteer to help out 
when others were busy”. The coefficient alpha for individual contextual performance was .89. At 
the team level, I used an adapted version of Lee and Allen (2002)'s scale of OCBs.  Team leaders 
indicated how strongly they agree or disagree with 16 items about people in their teams using a 
7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  An example item is "People in 
this team… help others who have been absent".  The coefficient alpha for this team-level 
variable was .92. This measure follows a referent-shift approach but doesn't need proof of 
aggregation as it is only one person (supervisor) who acts as a key informant of team-level 
OCBs.  Other measures of OCBs at the team level using referent shift approaches have normally 
used leaders as single informants (Podsakoff et al., 2014). 
Performance.  Supervisors measured individual and team performance separately.  First, 
they assessed team performance using a 7-point Likert scale developed by Zellmer-Bruhn and 
Gibson (2006). An example item is "This team accomplishes its objectives".  The obtained 
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coefficient alpha was .92. Second, Supervisors assessed each team member’s performance with a 
scale developed by Mero, Guidice, and Werner (2014) using a 7-point Likert scale (1: Very 
ineffective, 7: Very effective).  An example item is "Performing technical aspects of the job". 
The obtained coefficient alpha for individual performance was .94. 
4.4. Analysis 
Prior to data analysis, I screened the data to check for problems related to missing values, 
outliers, and normality. Then, I computed several variables including total scores per scales, 
within-team mean of items and scores, and standard deviation within teams. To test Hypothesis 1 
(a and b), I followed van Mierlo et al. (2009)'s guidelines for distinguishing team-level 
constructs using different composition models.   
To test Hypotheses 2 to 9, I first conducted confirmatory factor analyses at individual and 
team levels of analyses to assess the measurement models. Because Hypotheses 2 to 9 predict 
relationships at the team level of analysis, I used multiple regressions at the team level using the 
free software R. Multicollinearity was assessed by examining tolerance and variance inflation 
factor (VIF) levels. VIF levels higher than 10 are signs of collinearity problems. Also, as teams 
with higher response size provide better estimations of team-level constructs (Bliese, 1998; Chen 
et al., 2005), I used a weighting procedure to account for potential size-effects. In all the 
regressions, I used the response size at the time of the predictor as the weight of the regression.  
For Hypotheses 10 (a and b), I used random coefficient modeling (RCM) (Aguinis, 
Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013; Hofmann, 1997, 2002; Preacher et al., 2010; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002).  First, I estimated a null model in which I evaluated whether team membership 
significantly predicted different dependent variables.  Second, I conducted several tests of 
differential slopes, where I evaluated whether there was significant evidence that the slopes of 
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individual level variables vary across teams. Third, several models were compared against the 
null model in order to test whether the inclusion of antecedents and interaction terms predicted 
different dependent variables. Finally, I tested the effect of interaction terms with raw data and 
group-mean centering, and created graphs to better observe the cross-level interaction effects.  
To evaluate Hypotheses 11a and 11b, I used the framework and statistical procedures 
recommended by Chen et al. (2005) for testing configural and scalar similarity.  For configural 
similarity, I observed the significance levels of parameter estimates at each level, and then I 
compared whether there were significant relationships at both levels or not (that is, comparing 
the “hit rate” of significance).  As suggested by these authors, one might like to increase the 
cutoff alpha at the team-level relationships in order to account for lower power at the team level.   
For scalar similarity, I tested whether parameter estimates at the individual level are a 
multiplicative function of the parameter estimates of the same relationship but at the team level 
(Chen et al., 2005). Particularly, I tested the significance of the difference between coefficients at 
the team and individual levels. This test can be produced by testing an individual level model 
using RCM where the dependent variable is constrained to be a function of the relationship at the 
team level. That is: 
(Y – A * X1) = B0 + B1 * X1 + e    (1) 
, where A is the parameter yielded in a regression of X predicting Y at the team level. In 
the equation (1), B1 represents the difference of coefficients at the team and individual levels. A 
negative B1 coefficient means that the relationship between X1 and Y is stronger at the team 
level, whereas a positive coefficient B1 suggests that the relationship is stronger at the individual 
level. A significant coefficient B1 means that the difference is significantly different from zero.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
Tables 2a and 2b show the means, standard deviations, reliability, and bivariate 
correlations at individual and team levels of all the scales used in this dissertation.  
 
TABLE 2a: Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities at Individual Level 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Individual PCF  5.19 1.26 (.85)         
2. Self-Efficacy 6.21 0.67 .14* (.80)        
3. Affect CT 3.22 1.09 -.43** -.04 (.80)       
4. Affect DE 5.70 1.04 .50** .18** -.55** (.84)      
5. PO Fit 6.06 0.99 .22** .42** -.16* .27** (.92)     
6. In-role Performance 5.62 0.70 .23** 0.03 -.17* .10 .02 (.94)    
7. Contextual Performance 6.23 0.56 .20** .32** -.19** .28** .22** 0.13 (.89)   
8. Turnover Intentions 2.35 1.38 -.32** -.00 .25** -.34** -.26** -.18* -.23** (.80)  
9. Engagement 6.20 0.33 0.059 0.13 -.23** .26** .17* -0.05 .32** -.18* (.88) 
Note. N = 209 (Listwise). Diagonal describes the Cronbach’s Alpha. ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. 
 
5.1. Construct Validity of Shared Individual PCF and Shared Team PCF 
To examine the construct validity of the key PCF constructs and to assess whether there 
is evidence for one or two different constructs (Hypothesis 1a), I used van Mierlo et al. (2009)’s 
procedure to compose group-level constructs. The procedure suggests 5 steps, which address the 
distinction between composed group constructs and their baseline psychometric quality. For the 
first step, I conducted a factor analysis at the between-groups (BG) level of the constructs—
shared team PCF and shared individual PCF at time 1. As recommended by Van Mierlo et al., I 
conducted a principal component analysis (PCA) using oblique rotation and the results showed 2 
dimensions; however, one of the dimensions reflected all reversed items.  
To better explore whether the reversed items were affecting the results, I conducted 
further analyses. First, I conducted a PCA (with oblique rotation) on each construct, separately, 
using their respective 5 items. As the literature has shown that selecting eigenvalues greater or  
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TABLE 2b: Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities at Team Level 
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equal to 1 in factor analysis normally overestimate the resulting factors (Lance, Butts, & 
Michels, 2006), the number of factors should be decided based on a combination of pieces of 
information such as the variance explained by every potential component, the observation of 
scree plots, and the factor loading in the pattern matrix. After evaluating all these elements, I 
concluded that each independent PCA yielded a 1-factor solution. Second, I conducted PCA 
(with oblique rotation) with the 10 items (5 of shared individual PCF and 5 of shared team PCF) 
but instead of using eigenvalues to define the number of factors, I forced the system to yield 2 
factors. As expected, the first two factors were the only factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 
(first factor eigenvalue = 7.33, second factor eigenvalue = 1.55, third factor eigenvalue = 0.32). 
However, the second factor was composed of the 4 reversed items. This suggests that the data 
does not show a clear distinction of the two hypothesized factors. 
Because it has been previously documented that reversed items may alter dimensionality 
in scale development (e.g. Herche & Engelland, 1996), I also conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis at the between-group level to study the dimensionality of the PCF items by adding a 
“reversed coding” latent factor, or by freeing the correlation of error terms of reversed items. 
Table 3 shows the results of different alternative models.  
In model 1, I tested a 2-factor model using the 10 items of PCF (5 items of individual 
PCF and 5 items of team PCF). This model showed poor fit (χ2=180.28, df=34, p < .001, 
RMSEA = .301, NNFI = .85, CFI=.89, SRMR=.158). I found comparable results for Model 2, 
which tested one factor. This model showed poor fit to the data as well (χ2=248.15, df=35, p < 
.001, RMSEA = .378, NNFI = .79, CFI=.84, SRMR=.151). Moreover, the χ2 difference test 
shows that model 2 was significantly worse than model 1. The factor loadings for the reversed 
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items were very low for both models (below .50), indicating that reversed items may be causing 
the lack of fit. This result was congruent with the results of the initial principal factor analysis.  
 
TABLE 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Between-Group) of Shared PCFs 
MODELS χ2 df RMSEA NNFI CFI SRMR Δχ2 Δdf 
Model 1: 2 Factors: 5items 
SIPCF, 5items STPCF 
180.28*** 34 0.301 0.851 0.887 0.158 - - 
Model 2: 1 Factor: 10 items 248.15*** 35 0.378 0.789 0.836 0.151 67.87*** 
(2 vs 1) 
1 
Model 3: 3 Factors: Direct 
Consensus, Referent 
Shift, Reversed 
65.135*** 30 0.145 0.959 0.973 0.095 115.15*** 
(3 vs 1) 
4 
Model 4: 2 Factors: let correlate 
(All reversed error 
terms)  
63.46*** 28 0.15 0.960 0.970 0.089 - - 
Model 5: 1 Factor: let correlate 
(All reversed error 
terms)  
122.90*** 29 0.24 0.890 0.930 0.053 59.44*** 
(5 vs 4) 
1 
Note. Nteams = 59. SIPCF: Shared Individual PCF, STPCF: Shared Team PCF.  
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10  
 
In model 3, I tested a model adding a third latent factor of reversed items (reversed items 
were indicators of two factors: the reversed items factor and the respective PCF factor). The 
reversed-items latent factor was uncorrelated to the two main PCF latent variables.  This 
procedure has been previously used in the organizational science to test dimensionality of other 
constructs with reversed items (e.g. Magazine, Williams, & Williams, 1996). The fit indexes of 
this model were significantly better (χ2=65.14, df=28, p < .001, RMSEA = .145, NNFI = .96, 
CFI=.97, SRMR=.095). In this model, the factor loadings were all significant although they were 
stronger for the reversed item factor (loadings were between .50 and .77 for reversed items and 
between .38 and .67 for Shared PCFs), suggesting a strong reversed item effect. The χ2 
difference test shows that model 3 was significantly better than model 1. As an equivalent 
approach, I tested a “correlated uniqueness” model (model 4). In this model, there is no reversed 
item factor, but reversed measures have correlated errors or uniquenesses (Marsh & Bailey, 
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1991). Model 4 tested a model where all the uniquenesses of reversed items correlate among 
each other. This model also represented the data better than model 1 (χ2=63.46, df=28, p < .001, 
RMSEA = .15, NNFI = .96, CFI=.97, SRMR=.089). Since models 3 and 4 are not hierarchically 
nested, and thus not directly comparable, a χ2 difference test is not appropriate. For that reason, I 
compared the AIC values of the two models but they were very similar (although slightly better 
for model 3). The AIC difference was 0.94 which is below the common rule of thumb, that states 
two models are indistinguishable if the AIC difference is less than 2. This suggests that both 
models 3 and 4 are equally good models. Finally, in model 5, I tested a 1 factor model, letting the 
uniquenesses of the reversed items to correlate. This model showed worse fit than model 4 
(χ2=122.90, df=29, p < .001, RMSEA = .24, NNFI = .89, CFI=.93, SRMR=.053), suggesting that 
the two team-level constructs are different latent variables.  
More importantly, it can be concluded from the previous CFAs that when models 1 vs 
model 2, and model 4 vs model 5 are compared, the Δχ2 (df=1) between the models was 
significant in both cases (Δχ21vs2 = 115.15, p < .001; Δχ25vs4 = 59.44, p < .001), suggesting that 
the better fit is mostly explained by the factor structure rather than by the strategy to model 
reversed items. Thus, the data supports the idea that a two-factor model is significantly better 
than a one-factor model. Nevertheless, it is relevant to mention that the latent correlation (ɸ) 
between the two constructs was 0.94. This value was very high and suggests that there is little 
advantage in modeling the two constructs as different constructs at the team level. That is, even 
though the constructs are better modeled as two different constructs, in practice, they should 
yield very similar results. This high latent correlation suggests that the obtained nomological 
network should be similar with either construct.  
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As a post-hoc analysis, I repeated the above factor analyses by omitting the reversed 
items of individual and team PCF from the analysis (i.e. using 3 items of shared individual PCF 
and 3 items of shared team PCF). The factor analysis (using PCA, with oblique rotation) showed 
that the 6 items formed one single factor. Furthermore, I run another factor analysis but forcing 
two dimensions. The results showed that the eigenvalue difference between the first and second 
components was very high (5.54 vs 0.27), suggesting that the second component was not 
meaningful. Moreover, the factor loadings of all the items were higher for the first component. 
This confirms the previous results.  
To better explore this relationship, I further examined the next steps of van Mierlo et al. 
(2009) framework. In step 2, I assessed the correlations between the items of shared individual 
PCF and shared team PCF scales at individual, within-groups, and between-groups. Results are 
shown in Table 4. As can be noted, the correlations among items are medium to high in most 
cases, which is not surprising considering the almost identical wording of items, and the fact that 
the two measures were collected in the same survey (i.e. correlations may be affected by 
common method). The percentage of shared variance between shared individual PCF (direct-
consensus) and shared team PCF (referent-shift) is 70.56% at the individual level (r = .84, p < 
0.01), 56.25% at the within-group level (r = .75, p < 0.01), and 88.36% at the between group 
level (r = .94, p < 0.01). According to van Mierlo et al.’s guidelines, the correlations at 
individual and within-group indicate “substantial overlap” (.70 < r < .85), whereas the between-
group correlation might indicate a lack of discriminant validity (r ≥ .85).  This implies that even 
though individuals may differentiate their perceptions of PCF and that of their team members, at 
the aggregated team level, referent shift and direct-consensus items no longer represent two 
different constructs.  
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TABLE 4: Correlations Between Items and Scales Within and Between Groups 
Items Individual 
Within-
Group 
Between-
Group 
PCF.Individual 1 x PCF.Team 1 .76 .70 .86 
PCF.Individual 2 x PCF.Team 2 .76 .67 .89 
PCF.Individual 3 x PCF.Team 3 .81 .71 .92 
PCF.Individual 4 x PCF.Team 4 .62 .55 .72 
PCF.Individual 5 x PCF.Team 5 .67 .59 .77 
Scale Average .84 .75 .94 
N 277 277 59 
Note. All correlations are significant. 
In steps 3 and 4, the variance within and between groups is assessed in order to examine 
whether the two constructs produce agreement among group members and are reliable at the 
team level. Accordingly, I calculated Rwg's as a measure of agreement and ICC(1) and ICC(2) as 
measures of reliability and agreement (for more details about how to compute these indexes, 
review Bliese, 2000). All results are summarized in Table 5. First, I evaluated Rwg indexes. 
LeBreton and Senter (2007) have suggested that different ranges of Rwg’s indicate different 
agreement levels. According to their suggestions for interpretation of Rwg’s, I mainly found 
“Strong agreement” in shared individual PCF (Median Rwg = .82; Mean Rwg = .69) and in 
shared team PCF (Median Rwg = .87; Mean Rwg = .77). This shows that in general, there is a 
reasonable amount of agreement of PCF scores within teams, regardless the use of direct 
consensus or referent shift composition models. It is also important to consider that the Rwg’s 
reported may be attenuated as this index depend on sample size (Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992; 
Lindell, Brandt, & Whitney, 1999).  Specifically, the general recommendations is that 10 team 
members is sufficient to more accurately estimate Rwg’s; in contrast, my sample has teams with 
an average of around 5 members. 
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Second, I evaluated interrater reliability (IRR) of the key constructs. First, the F tests 
were significant for the two constructs at time 2 (last column in Table 5), suggesting that there is 
team-level phenomenon that influences individual and team perceptions of PCF. Second, I 
calculated ICC1, which can be interpreted as a measure of effect size of the extent to which 
individuals’ variance is affected by team membership. The values reported in Table 5 may be 
considered as a “large effect” (LeBreton & Senter, 2007; Murphy & Myors, 1998). An ICC1 of 
.29 (as in shared individual PCF) suggests that a maximum of 29 percent of the lower-level 
variance can be accounted by other team level factors.  
TABLE 5: Aggregation Indexes for Shared Individual PCF and Shared Team PCF 
Variables 
  IRA IRA+IRR 
Rwg 
(Median) 
Rwg 
(Mean) ICC(1) ICC(2) F test 
Shared Individual PCF (T2) 0.82 0.69 0.29 0.66 3.00*** 
Shared Team PCF (T2)   0.87 0.77 0.39 0.75 4.01*** 
Note. For F test, df (between) = 58, df (within) = 218. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
 
The results for ICC2, which is an estimate of the reliability of the team means, show that 
the team-level reliability of shared individual PCF and shared team PCF were .66 and .75, 
respectively. Although it has been recommended that ICC2 should be greater than .70 (which 
suggests that 70% of the variance in team members is systematic, rather than error variance) 
(LeBreton & Senter, 2007), prior research have used lower levels of ICC2s (values ranging from 
the .40s to .60s) to justify aggregation (e.g. Gong, Kim, Lee, & Zhu, 2013; Kirkman, Chen, Farh, 
Chen, & Lowe, 2009; Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002) as it is widely accepted that 
ICC2s are not necessary for identifying group-level effects (Bliese, Maltarich, & Hendricks, 
2017). As a complementary analysis, I also tested whether τ00 (between-group variance) in a 
random coefficient model is significant. To do this, I compared the -2log likelihood values (using 
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a χ2 test) between two random coefficient models of shared PCFs: (a) a model with a random 
intercept, and (b) a model without a random intercept. For shared individual PCF and shared 
team PCF, I found that τ00 was significantly different from zero, confirming that modeling team-
level variance fits the data significantly better than not. This provides good support for data 
aggregation at the team level. It is also important to note that both IRA an IRA+IRR indexes are 
higher for shared team PCF than for shared individual PCF. 
In step 5, I conducted additional factor analysis at the within-team level to continue 
investigate the construct validity of PCF at the team level. To create the data structure required 
for this analysis, I calculated the difference between the individual score and his or her team 
mean of the respective shared PCF. According to Van Mierlo et al.’s framework, in direct-
consensus composition, the group-level construct is based on shared, although individual, 
evaluations of a construct. Thus, within-group scores should be able to reflect systematic 
individual differences between team members and yield a clear one-factor solution. In contrast, 
in referent-shift composition, the group level construct is based on evaluations of a common 
target: the team. Thus, within-group scores in the same team should simply reflect measurement 
error. In that case, the Van Mierlo et al suggest that a factor analysis should yield no meaningful 
structure.  
Just as in step 1, after running principal components analysis, the results yielded a 2-
factor solution where reversed items indicated a single factor. To better explore this situation, I 
conducted confirmatory factor analysis letting the reversed-item uniquenesses to correlate. When 
modeling shared individual PCF, a one factor solution fit the data very well (χ2 = 22.12, df = 4, p 
= .00, RMSEA = .11, NNFI = .95, CFI=.98, SRMR=.016). A similar phenomenon occurred with 
shared team PCF (χ2 = 5.32, df = 4, p = .26, RMSEA = .031, NNFI = .99, CFI=.99, 
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SRMR=.011). These results suggest that the within-team factor structure for items of shared 
team PCF do not merely represent measurement error but also systematic error. This result may 
also be interpreted as evidence to support hypotheses 1b, which argues that individual-level 
scores influence team-level scores as team members extend their psychological contract to what 
happen with their teams. 
Considering all the results from this section (i.e., the 5 steps), I found consistent support 
for hypothesis 1b, but also evidence for rejecting hypothesis 1a. The data support the idea that 
both constructs can be aggregated at the team level (steps 3 and 4), and that a multilevel model 
represents the data significantly better than a model representing only individual level data (step 
4). Confirmatory factor analyses also support the hypothesis that the collected data are better 
modelled by two factors instead of one, meaning that data are better modeled when the two 
constructs are different (step 1). Nevertheless, the correlations found among items and scales of 
shared individual PCF and shared team PCF are higher than what is expected by chance (step 2). 
The high correlations found at individual, within-team, and especially at the between-team level 
(r = .94), suggest that the constructs are very similar. That is, individuals seem to differentiate 
between their own perceptions of PCF and that of their team as a whole (step 2 and 5), however 
that distinction is less clear at the team level. I will expand this discussion in the next chapter. 
5.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Hypothesis Testing 
Before testing Hypotheses 2-9, I examined the adequacy of the measurement models a) 
between the predictors and shared PCFs, b) between shared PCFs and team motivation variables, 
c) between shared PCFs and team outcomes. These analyses were conducted using the software 
Lisrel 8.8. Table 6 shows the confirmatory factor analysis at the individual and team level for 
PCF, justice, and POS. Models at the team level had one degree of freedom less because I let 
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correlate the error term of the reversed items of the PCF scale (as suggested in the previous 
section). 
 
TABLE 6: CFA for Team-Level Antecedents of Team PCF Construct 
MODELS χ2 df RMSEA NNFI CFI SRMR Δχ2 Δdf 
Individual Level         
Model 1: 3 Factors :PCF, PJ, 
POS 
120.21*** 61 .070 .98 .98 .053 - - 
Model 2: 2 Factors: Merge 
PCF+POS 
517.28*** 63 .240 .84 .86 .150 397.07*** 
(1 vs 2) 
2 
Model 3: 2 Factors: Merge 
PCF+PJ 
566.75*** 63 .240 .82 .86 .170 446.54*** 
(1 vs 3) 
2 
Model 4: 2 Factors: Merge 
PJ+POS 
348.73*** 63 .180 .90 .92 .078 228.52*** 
(1 vs 4) 
2 
Team Level Shared Team PCF         
Model 5: 3 Factors :PCF, PJ, 
POS 
103.71*** 60 .100 .96 .97 .070 - - 
Model 6: 2 Factors: Merge 
PCF+POS 
245.26*** 62 .230 .84 .87 .230 141.55*** 
(5 vs 6) 
2 
Model 7: 2 Factors: Merge 
PCF+PJ 
324.49*** 62 .300 .77 .82 .250 220.78*** 
(5 vs 7) 
2 
Model 8: 2 Factors: Merge 
PJ+POS 
125.39*** 62 .120 .94 .96 .068 21.68*** 
(5 vs 8) 
2 
Team Level Shared Individ. PCF         
Model 9: 3 Factors :PCF, PJ, 
POS 
115.12*** 60 .110 .95 .96 .049 - - 
Model 10: 2 Factors: Merge 
PCF+POS 
257.13*** 62 .240 .83 .86 .220 142.01*** 
(9 vs 10) 
2 
Model 11: 2 Factors: Merge 
PCF+PJ 
232.19*** 62 .300 .77 .82 .220 117.07*** 
(9 vs 11) 
2 
Model 12: 2 Factors: Merge 
PJ+POS 
137.77*** 62 .130 .93 .95 .050 22.65*** 
(9 vs 12) 
2 
Note. PCF=Psychological Contract Fulfillment, PJ=Procedural Justice Climate, POS=Perceived Organizational 
Support. Nindividual-level=189. Nteam-level=57  *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10.  
 
At the individual and team levels, the proposed models of 3 factors fit the data well 
(Model 1: χ2 = 120.21, df = 61, p < .001, RMSEA = .070, NNFI = .98, CFI=.98, SRMR=.053; 
Model 5: χ2 = 103.71, df = 60, p < .001, RMSEA = .10, NNFI = .96, CFI=.97, SRMR=.070; 
Model 9: χ2 = 115.12, df = 60, p < .001, RMSEA = .11, NNFI = .95, CFI=.96, SRMR=.049). At 
the team level, the RMSEA values are a little higher than the recommended cut point, however, 
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this index tends to be too large when sample sizes are small (Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, 
2015). In addition, the hypothesized models were significantly better than other alternative 
models (Models 2-4, 6-8, 10-12). The alternative models included combinations of PCF items 
with POS items or Justice items. These results generally show that these are appropriate 
measurement models at both individual and team levels.  
 
TABLE 7: Confirmatory Factor Analysis between PCF and motivation measures 
MODELS χ2 df RMSEA NNFI CFI SRMR Δχ2 Δdf 
Individual Level         
Model 1: Hypothesized 
Model: 5 factors 
597.63 333 0.057 0.96 0.96 0.080 - - 
Model 2: Merge: PFC + Self 
Efficacy 
1261.29 337 0.130 0.85 0.87 0.150 663.66*** 
(1 vs 2) 
4 
Model 3: Merge: PFC + 
Affect-CT 
779.19 337 0.077 0.93 0.94 0.110 181.56*** 
(1 vs 3) 
4 
Model 4: Merge: PFC + 
Affect-DE 
1226.69 337 0.110 0.86 0.88 0.120 629.06*** 
(1 vs 4) 
4 
Model 5: Merge: PFC + PO 
Fit 
1201.71 337 0.100 0.86 0.88 0.120 604.08*** 
(1 vs 5) 
4 
Team Level Shared Team PCF         
Model 6: Hypothesized 
Model: 5 factors 
213.92 124 0.090 0.94 0.95 0.061 - - 
Model 7: Merge: PFC + 
Team Potency 
337.82 128 0.160 0.86 0.88 0.160 123.90*** 
(6 vs 7) 
4 
Model 8: Merge: PFC + 
Affect-CT Tone 
309.02 128 0.150 0.88 0.90 0.120 95.10*** 
(6 vs 8) 
4 
Model 9: Merge: PFC + 
Affect-DE Tone 
318.21 128 0.140 0.87 0.89 0.130 104.29*** 
(6 vs 9) 
4 
Model 10: Merge: PFC + 
Coll. Fit 
421.36 128 0.180 0.80 0.83 0.170 207.44*** 
(6 vs 10) 
4 
Team Level Shared Individ. PCF         
Model 11: Hypothesized 
Model: 5 factors 
178.52 124 0.069 0.96 0.97 0.061 - - 
Model 12: Merge: PFC + 
Team Potency 
293.50 128 0.140 0.89 0.91 0.140 114.98*** 
(11 vs 12) 
4 
Model 13: Merge: PFC + 
Affect-CT Tone 
274.23 128 0.130 0.90 0.92 0.120 95.71*** 
(11 vs 13) 
4 
Model 14: Merge: PFC + 
Affect-DE Tone 
288.78 128 0.130 0.89 0.91 0.130 110.26*** 
(11 vs 14) 
4 
Model 15: Merge: PFC + 
Coll. Fit 
369.30 128 0.170 0.84 0.87 0.150 190.78*** 
(11 vs 15) 
4 
Note. PCF.I= Psychological Contract Fulfillment; CT: Calmness-Tension; DE: Depression-Enthusiasm; PO: Person-
Organization. Nindividual-level=249; Nteam-level=58.  All χ2 in the table are significant at the p < .001 level. 
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Then, I conducted a series of CFA to examine the measurement models of PCF, 
motivation, and outcomes scales. In order to model an appropriate number of free-estimated 
parameters in relation to the sample size, I conducted CFA models to test the measurement 
model of PCF and motivation variables, and the measurement model of PCF and outcomes, 
separately. Thus, Table 7 shows a summary of CFAs between PCF and motivation variables, and 
Table 8 shows a summary of CFAs between PCF and outcome variables.  
In the CFAs for PCF and motivation (Table 7), the hypothesized measurement models at 
the individual level provided good fit to the data (Individual Level: χ2 = 597.63, df = 333, p < 
.001, RMSEA = .057, NNFI = .96, CFI = .96, SRMR = .080). However, I also investigated 
alternative measurement models that combine PCF variables with motivation variables. These 
alternative models resulted in worse fit indexes.  
At the team level, first I calculated the within-team average of all the items used in the 
surveys. These within-team averages were used as initial indicators for CFAs at the team level. 
Then, a parceling procedure was implemented to ensure that there was enough sample size to run 
the models. I used the single-factor method (Landis et al., 2000), where items are assigned to 
indicators based on the factor loadings in exploratory factor analysis (the items with the highest 
factor loading is assigned to the first indicator, the second highest to the next indicator, and so 
forth). Then, I created 4 parcel items for team potency, 3 parcel items for affect calmness-tension 
(CT), and 3 parcel items for affect depression-enthusiasm (DE). In addition, I let the error terms 
of reversed PCF items to correlate. 
Then, I run the CFAs at the team level for shared team PCF (models 6-10) and shared 
individual PCF (models 11-15) separately. The hypothesized models showed good fit 
(Hypothesized model for Shared Team PCF: χ2 = 213.92, df = 124, p < .001, RMSEA = .090, 
91 
 
NNFI = .94, CFI=.95, SRMR=.061; For Shared Individual PCF: χ2 = 178.52, df = 124, p < .001, 
RMSEA = .069, NNFI = .96, CFI=.97, SRMR=.061). The hypothesized models at the team level 
were significantly better than alternative models that combined shared PCFs with other team 
motivation variables. 
 
TABLE 8: Confirmatory Factor Analysis between PCF and outcome measures 
MODELS χ2 df RMSEA NNFI CFI SRMR Δχ2 Δdf 
Individual Level         
Model 1: Hypothesized 
Model: 5 factors 
975.94 544 0.070 0.94 0.95 0.090 - - 
Model 2: Merge: PFC + 
Engagement 
1827.82 548 0.150 0.83 0.84 0.200 851.88*** 
(1 vs 2) 
4 
Model 3: Merge: PFC + In-
role Performance 
1598.27 548 0.130 0.86 0.87 0.140 622.33*** 
(1 vs 3) 
4 
Model 4: Merge: PFC + 
Contextual Perf. 
1324.45 548 0.110 0.89 0.90 0.150 348.51*** 
(1 vs 4) 
4 
Model 5: Merge: PFC + 
Turnover Intent 
1090.18 548 0.080 0.93 0.93 0.100 114.24*** 
(1 vs 5) 
4 
Team Level Shared Team PCF         
Model 6: Hypothesized 
Model: 5 factors 
136.52 105 0.052 0.95 0.96 0.120 - - 
Model 7: Merge: PFC + 
Team Engagement 
209.79 109 0.098 0.84 0.87 0.140 73.27*** 
(6 vs 7) 
4 
Model 8: Merge: PFC + 
Team Performance 
236.99 109 0.100 0.80 0.84 0.160 100.47*** 
(6 vs 8) 
4 
Model 9: Merge: PFC + 
Team OCBs 
224.15 109 0.140 0.82 0.85 0.160 87.63*** 
(6 vs 9) 
4 
Model 10: Merge: PFC + 
Avrg Turnover Int 
244.63 109 0.120 0.79 0.83 0.150 108.11*** 
(6 vs 10) 
4 
Team Level Shared Individ. PCF         
Model 11: Hypothesized 
Model: 5 factors 
116.22 105 0.000 0.98 0.99 0.120 - - 
Model 12: Merge: PFC + 
Team Engagement 
187.31 109 0.077 0.88 0.90 0.130 71.09*** 
(11 vs 12) 
4 
Model 13: Merge: PFC + 
Team Performance 
218.35 109 0.087 0.83 0.86 0.160 102.13*** 
(11 vs 13) 
4 
Model 14: Merge: PFC + 
Team OCBs 
204.36 109 0.130 0.85 0.88 0.160 88.14*** 
(11 vs 14) 
4 
Model 15: Merge: PFC + 
Avrg Turnover Int 
219.97 109 0.100 0.83 0.86 0.150 103.75*** 
(11 vs 15) 
4 
Note. PCF= Psychological Contract Fulfillment; OCBs: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors. Nindividual-level=249; 
Nteam-level=58.  All χ2 in the table are significant at the p < .001 level. 
 
92 
 
In the CFAs for PCF and outcomes (Table 8), the hypothesized measurement models at 
the individual level provided good fit to the data as well (Individual Level: χ2 = 975.94, df = 
544, p < .001, RMSEA = .07, NNFI = .94, CFI=.95, SRMR=.090). Moreover, alternative models 
showed worse fit than the hypothesized model.  At the team level, I also used a parceling 
procedure to maintain an appropriate parameter to sample size ratio. Similar to the CFAs 
summarized in table 7, I also used single-factor method to assign items to parcel indicators. 
Thus, I created 3 parcel indicators for team engagement, 3 parcels for team performance, and 4 
parcels for OCBs. Finally, in these team-level models, I also created error terms between 
reversed items of PCF and between some parcel items within the same construct. The results 
show that the hypothesized models were better than alternative models which combined different 
outcomes with PCF items (Hypothesized model for Shared Team PCF: χ2 = 136.52, df = 105, p 
< .05, RMSEA = .052, NNFI = .95, CFI=.96, SRMR=.12; For Shared Individual PCF: χ2 = 
116.22, df = 105, p = .21, RMSEA = .00, NNFI = .98, CFI=.99, SRMR=.12). All these results 
provide evidence for the adequacy of the measurement models. 
5.3. Antecedents of the Level of Shared PCFs 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that there would be a positive relationship between justice 
climate and Shared PCFs and between POS climate and Shared PCFs, respectively. To test these 
hypotheses, I run different regression models at the team level. Table 9 summarizes the 
coefficients obtained to test hypotheses 2 and 3. 
As hypothesized, the variables at time 1 were significant predictors of variables at time 2. 
The results show that justice climate has significant relationship with shared individual PCF (b = 
.48, SE = 0.09, p < .001) and shared team PCF (b = .51, SE = 0.08, p < .001), supporting 
hypotheses 2a and 2b, respectively. Also, the results show that POS climate was a significant 
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predictor of shared individual PCF (b = .54, SE = 0.11, p < .001) and shared team PCF (b = .59, 
SE = 0.11, p < .001), supporting hypotheses 3a and 3b. When the two predictors are included in 
the models together, the effects of POS climate become not significant. Even though the VIF are 
not higher than 10 (VIF = 3.75) showing no collinearity problems, this effect may still be due to 
a high correlation between the predictors (r = .86). In these full models, Justice Climate was still 
a significant predictor of Team PCF. 
 
TABLE 9: Team-Level Predictors of Level of Shared PCFs 
Variables Shared Individual PCF   LEVEL (t2) 
Shared Team PCF          
LEVEL (t2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 3.20*** 
(0.39) 
2.56*** 
(0.58) 
2.97*** 
(0.58) 
 2.99*** 
(0.38) 
2.22*** 
(0.56) 
2.61*** 
(0.56) 
Justice Climate (t1) 0.48*** 
(0.09) 
 0.41* 
(0.17) 
0.51*** 
(0.08) 
 0.38* 
(0.16) 
POS Climate (t1)  0.54*** 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.21) 
 0.59*** 
(0.11) 
0.19 
(0.20) 
R2 .38 .31 .38 .41 .36 .42 
F 31.34*** 23.14*** 15.59*** 36.36*** 29.30*** 18.56*** 
Note.  N = 53. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20 
 
5.4. Antecedents of the Strength of Shared PCFs 
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 proposed that team size, team interdependence6, and LMX 
differentiation, respectively, would be related to the strength of shared PCFs, operationalized as 
the within-team standard deviation of PCF ratings. To test these hypotheses, a multiple 
regression analysis was conducted using team size at time 2 and LMX differentiation at time 1 as 
                                                 
6 As mentioned in the previous chapter, team interdependence was dropped from the study due to the unreliability of 
the scale either at individual or team levels of analysis. Thus, hypotheses 5a and 5b were not tested.  In order to get 
rid of the possibility that individuals in my sample understand interdependence in a different way due to cultural 
differences or other idiosyncratic variables, I also measured interdependence using a different scale at time 3 
developed by (Kiggundu, 1983).  The new scale showed good reliability at individual level (α = .82) and at the team 
level (ICC2 = .58). The ICC1 was .21 and the Median Rwg was .87. Thus, the main source of the problematic scale 
does not seem to be exclusively related to the nature of the sample. 
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predictors of Shared PCFs at time 2. Table 10 shows a summary of the resulting standardized 
coefficients.  
Following recommendations of testing team-level relationships of dispersion constructs 
(Roberson, Sturman, & Simons, 2007), a p-value of .10 or lower was considered a significant 
relationship. But even with this more liberal alpha level, none of the antecedents significantly 
predicted the strength of shared PCFs. Team size was not significantly related to either shared 
individual PCF (b = -0.00, SE = 0.01, p > .10) or to shared team PCF (b = -0.01, SE = 0.01, p > 
.10)7. These results fail to support hypothesis 4a and 4b. Similarly, LMX differentiation was not 
significantly related to either shared individual PCF (b = .13, SE = 0.09, p > .10) or to shared 
team PCF (b = .11, SE = 0.10, p > .10), failing to support hypothesis 6a and 6b. Finally, models 3 
and 6 assessed the relationship between all the antecedents together and the strength of shared 
PCFs. The results remained consistent in comparison to previous models. 
TABLE 10: Team-Level Predictors of Strength of Shared PCFs 
Variables Shared Individual PCF   STRENGTH (t2) 
Shared Team PCF          
STRENGTH (t2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 1.00*** 
(0.10) 
0.82*** 
(0.13) 
0.85*** 
(0.15) 
 0.89 
(0.10) 
0.72*** 
(0.14) 
0.75*** 
(0.16) 
Team Size (t2) -0.00 
(0.01) 
 -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 -0.01 
(0.01) 
LMX 
Differentiation (t1) 
 0.13   
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
 0.11 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
R2 .00 .03 .03 .01 .02 .03 
F 0.09 1.74 0.92 0.28 1.20 0.76 
Note. N = 53. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
 
                                                 
7 In order to get rid of the possibility that the team size measure at time 2 was not contaminated by natural 
fluctuations in the demand of labor of the company, I also tested these effects using team size at time 1. However, 
the results remained negative. 
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5.5. Team-Level Outcomes of Shared PCFs.  
Hypotheses 7a and 7b proposed that shared PCFs predict important team level outcomes 
such as team performance, team-level OCBs, average turnover intentions, and team engagement. 
To test these hypotheses, I conducted multiple regression analyses at the team level, using 
response size at time 2 as a weight. Results in Table 11 showed that shared individual PCF (top 
half portion of the table) was a significant predictor of team OCBs (b = 0.26, SE = 0.09, p < .01, 
R2 = .12), and average turnover intentions (b = -0.24, SE = 0.10, p < .05, R2 = .09). In contrast, 
shared individual PCF was not a significant predictor of team performance (b = 0.05, SE = 0.11, 
n. sig., R2 = .00) or team engagement (b = 0.02, SE = 0.05, n. sig., R2 = .00). These results 
provide partial support for Hypothesis 7a. Likewise, shared team PCF (bottom half portion of 
table 11) was a significant predictor of team OCBs (b = .28, SE = 0.09, p < .01, R2 = .16), and 
average turnover intentions (b = -0.20, SE = 0.10, p < .10, R2 = .07), but not of team performance 
(b = 0.07, SE = 0.10, n. sig., R2 = .01) or team engagement (b = 0.02, SE = 0.05, n. sig., R2 = .00). 
These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 7b8. 
As a post-hoc analysis, I also explored whether shared PCFs significantly predict specific 
dimensions of team engagement. The results show that shared individual PCF was significantly 
related to the emotional (b = 0.25, SE = 0.08, p < .01, R2 = .14) and cognitive (b = -0.14, SE = 
0.05, p < .05, R2 = .10) dimensions of team engagement, but not to the physical dimension (b = -
0.05, SE = 0.05, p = .34, R2 = .02). Similar results were found for shared team PCF, which was 
                                                 
8 In order to investigate the robustness of the previous results, I also conducted three additional analyses: First, I 
included other variables in the models (gender proportion and average team tenure) to check whether the 
relationships hold when controls are included. The results did not change for any of the previous models, however, 
the sample size decreased even more as tenure was measured with a self-reported question. Second, in order to use 
all the available information in the database, I conducted a multiple imputation process using the package MICE in 
the software R. This process creates alternative databases filling missing data by predicted values based on the 
available information. After using multiple imputation, the sample size increased to 68 teams, however, the results 
did not change in terms of rejecting or accepting different hypotheses. Finally, I tested different types of weights 
(response size per team vs team size), but the same results hold.  
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significantly related to the emotional (b = 0.24, SE = 0.08, p < .01, R2 = .13) and cognitive (b = -
0.13, SE = 0.05, p < .05, R2 = .10) dimensions of team engagement but not to physical 
engagement (b = -0.04, SE = 0.05, p = .43, R2 = .01). In line with my predictions, shared PCFs 
were positively related to emotional engagement. However, shared PCFs were negatively related 
to cognitive engagement, which is an effect in the opposite direction of what was originally 
predicted. 
 
TABLE 11: Team-Level Outcomes of Shared PCFs 
  Team Outcomes (T3) 
Variables 
Team 
Performance  Team OCBs 
Average 
Turnover 
Intention 
 Team Engagement 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Intercept  5.88*** 
(0.57) 
 4.38*** 
(0.49) 
 3.67*** 
(0.54) 
 6.09*** 
(0.26) 
Shared Individual PCF (T2) 0.05 
(0.11) 
 0.26*** 
(0.09) 
 -0.24** 
(0.10) 
 0.02 
(0.05) 
R2 .00  .12  .09  .00 
F 0.21  7.80***  5.47**  0.21 
  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Intercept  5.78*** 
(0.54) 
 4.28*** 
(0.45) 
 3.44*** 
(0.52) 
 6.09*** 
(0.05) 
Shared Team PCF (T2) 0.07 
(0.10) 
 0.28*** 
(0.09) 
 -0.20* 
(0.10) 
 0.02 
(0.05) 
R2 .01  .16  .07  .00 
F 0.44  10.35***  3.89*  0.23 
Note. N=58. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20 
 
5.6. Team Motivation as a Mediator of Shared PCFs 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b proposed that shared PCFs would be significant predictors of team 
motivation, operationalized in the form of team potency, affective climate, and external 
collective fit. Hypotheses 9a and 9b proposed that team motivation variables mediate the 
relationship between shared PCFs and team outcomes. The results for these hypotheses are 
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summarized in Tables 12-15. In each table, one specific team motivation variable is tested as an 
outcome of shared PCFs and as a mediator between shared PCFs and team-level outcomes. To 
test mediation, I used the bootstrapping method, which consists in randomly generating multiples 
subsamples (in this case, 1000), and calculating confidence intervals of the distribution of the 
calculated indirect effect of each of those 1000 samples. Confidence intervals that do not include 
zero provide evidence for a significant indirect or mediation effect.  
Table 12 shows that shared individual PCF (b = 0.25, SE = 0.06, p < .01, R2 = .23) and 
shared team PCF (b = 0.24, SE = 0.06, p < .01, R2 = .22) are significantly related to team potency.  
These results support hypotheses 8a and 8b. 
However, team potency was not related to either of the dependent variables. Then, the 
indirect effects of shared individual PCF on team outcomes through team potency, were not 
significant for either team performance (Indirect Effect = 0.07, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.01, 
.15]), team OCBs (Indirect Effect = -0.01, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.13, .06]), average 
turnover intentions (Indirect Effect = 0.02, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.08, .14]), or all the 
dimensions of team engagement, i.e. team engagement-physical (Indirect Effect = 0.00, 
Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.04, .05]), team engagement-emotional (Indirect Effect = -0.01, 
Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.11, .09]), or team engagement-cognitive (Indirect Effect = 0.03, 
Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.03, .09]). Moreover, the coefficients of shared individual PCF did 
not change significantly in comparison to the coefficients found in Table 11, which tested the 
direct effects of shared PCFs on team outcomes. Thus, hypotheses 9a is not supported. The 
indirect effect of shared team PCF on team outcomes through team potency, was not significant 
either for team performance (Indirect Effect = 0.06, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.01, .13]), team 
OCBs (Indirect Effect = -0.01, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.10, .05]), average turnover 
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intentions (Indirect Effect = 0.01, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.08, .13]), team engagement-
physical (Indirect Effect = -0.00, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.04, .03]), team engagement-
emotional (Indirect Effect = 0.00, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.09, .08]), or team engagement-
cognitive (Indirect Effect = 0.02, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.03, .08]). These results also reject 
hypothesis 9b. 
 
TABLE 12: Team Potency as a Mediator Between Team PCF and Team-Level Outcomes 
Variables 
Team 
Potency 
(T2) 
Team 
Performance 
(T3) 
Team 
OCBs 
(T3) 
Average 
Turnover 
Intention 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Physical 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Emotional 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Cognitive 
(T3) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 
 
4.64*** 
(0.32) 
4.64*** 
(1.23) 
4.33*** 
(1.07) 
3.11** 
(1.20) 
6.79*** 
(0.55) 
4.72*** 
(0.97) 
6.45*** 
(0.64) 
Shared Indiv. PCF (T2) 0.25*** 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
-0.27** 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.25** 
(0.10) 
-0.16** 
(0.06) 
Team Potency (T2) 
  
0.27 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.12 
(0.23) 
-0.00 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.12) 
R2 .23 .03 .12 0.09 0.02 .14 .11 
F  17.28*** 0.75 3.83** 2.84* 0.45 4.42 3.30** 
Indirect Effect    0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03 
Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90%   [-.01, .15] [-.13, .06] [-.08, .14] [-.04, .05] [-.11, .09] [-.03, .09] 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Intercept 
 
4.73*** 
(0.31) 
4.66*** 
(1.23) 
4.36*** 
(1.05) 
3.12** 
(1.21) 
6.79*** 
(0.55) 
4.72*** 
(0.97) 
6.44*** 
(0.64) 
Shared Team PCF (T2) 0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.28*** 
(0.10) 
-0.21* 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
Team Potency (T2) 
  
0.24 
(0.24) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
R2 .22 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.01 .13 .11 
F  16.16*** 0.73 5.08*** 1.96† 0.32 4.28** 3.25** 
Indirect Effect    0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02 
Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90%   [-.01, .13] [-.10, .05] [-.08, .13] [-.04, .03] [-.09, .08] [-.03, .08] 
Note. N=58. Standard errors in parenthesis.  Results for shared individual PCF are in the top half 
portion of the table, whereas results for shared team PCF are in the bottom half portion of the 
table. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20  
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Table 13 shows that shared individual PCF (Model 1: b = -0.39, SE = 0.08, p < .01, R2 = 
.29) and shared team PCF (Model 8: b = -0.39, SE = 0.08, p < .01, R2 = .30) were significantly 
related to the calmness-tension dimension of affective climate, supporting hypotheses 8a and 8b. 
This suggest that teams with higher team PCF tend to have affective climates characterized by 
more calmness (more calm, tranquil, and relaxed) and less tension (tense, jittery, anxious). 
 
TABLE 13: Affective Climate (Calmness-Tension) as a Mediator Between Shared PCFs 
and Team-Level Outcomes 
Variables 
Team 
Affect 
CT (T2) 
Team 
Performance 
(T3) 
Team 
OCBs 
(T3) 
Average 
Turnover 
Intention 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Physical 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Emotional 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Cognitive 
(T3) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 
 
5.30*** 
(0.42) 
6.09*** 
(1.10) 
5.71*** 
(0.92) 
1.28 
(0.99) 
7.84*** 
(0.46) 
7.09*** 
(0.77) 
7.10*** 
(0.56) 
Shared Indiv. PCF 
(T2) 
-0.39*** 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.07** 
(0.09) 
-0.16** 
(0.07) 
Team Affect CT 
(T2)   
-0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.25* 
(0.15) 
0.45*** 
(0.16) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-0.44 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
R2 .29 .00 .17 .20 0.13 .30 .11 
F  23.84*** 0.13 5.47*** 7.04*** 4.21** 11.72*** 3.40** 
Indirect Effect    0.01 0.09 -0.18 0.07 0.15 0.02 
Bootstrap = 1000 
C.I. 90%   [-.08, .10] [.01, .21] [-.30, -.06] [.02, .12] [.05, .25] [-.03, .07] 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Intercept 
 
5.23*** 
(0.40) 
5.86*** 
(1.07) 
5.40*** 
(0.89) 
0.88 
(0.97) 
7.74*** 
(0.45) 
7.16*** 
(0.76) 
7.07*** 
(0.55) 
Shared Team PCF 
(T2) 
-0.39*** 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.11 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.16** 
(0.06) 
Team Affect CT 
(T2)   
-0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.22 
(0.15) 
0.49*** 
(0.16) 
-0.19** 
(0.07) 
-0.45*** 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
R2 .30 0.01 0.19 0.20 0.12 .30 .11 
F  24.64*** 0.22 6.34*** 6.87*** 3.75** 11.64** 3.38** 
Indirect Effect    -0.00 0.08 -0.19 0.07 0.15 0.02 
Bootstrap = 1000 
C.I. 90%   [-.09, .08] [.003, .19] [-.32, -.08] [.02, .12] [.06, .26] [-.04, .07] 
Note. N=58. Standard errors in parenthesis.  Results for shared individual PCF are in the top half 
portion of the table, whereas results for shared team PCF are in the bottom half portion of the 
table. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20  
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When team PCF and affective climate (CT) are tested together as predictors of team 
outcomes, the indirect effects were significantly different from zero for most dependent 
variables. The indirect effects of shared individual PCF on team outcomes through team affect 
(CT), was significant for team OCBs (Indirect Effect = 0.09, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.01, 
.21]), average turnover intentions (Indirect Effect = -0.18, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.30, -
.06]), team engagement-physical (Indirect Effect = 0.07, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.02, .12]), 
and team engagement-emotional (Indirect Effect = 0.15, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.05, .25]). 
Similar results were found for the indirect effects of shared team PCF on team outcomes through 
team affect (CT). Specifically, the results show significant indirect effects for team OCBs 
(Indirect Effect = 0.08, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.003, .19]), average turnover intentions 
(Indirect Effect = -0.19, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.32, -.08]), team engagement-physical 
(Indirect Effect = 0.07, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.02, .12]), and team engagement-emotional 
(Indirect Effect = 0.15, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.06, .26]). These results provided mixed 
support for hypotheses 9a and 9b. 
Similarly, Table 14 shows that shared individual PCF (Model 1: b = 0.36, SE = 0.07, p < 
.01, R2 = .32) and shared team PCF (Model 8: b = .36, SE = 0.07, p < .01, R2 = .34) were 
significantly related to the depression-enthusiasm (DE) dimension of affective climate, 
supporting hypotheses 8a and 8b. This suggest that teams with higher shared PCFs tend to have 
affective climates characterized by more enthusiasm (more cheerful, enthusiastic, optimistic) and 
less depressive affects (pessimistic, gloomy, discouraged).  
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TABLE 14: Affective Climate (Depression-Enthusiasm) as a Mediator Between Shared 
PCFs and Team-Level Outcomes 
Variables 
Team 
Affect 
DE (T2) 
Team 
Performance 
(T3) 
Team 
OCBs 
(T3) 
Average 
Turnover 
Intention 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Physical 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Emotional 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Cognitive 
(T3) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 
 
3.82*** 
(0.37) 
6.87*** 
(0.96) 
3.97*** 
(0.84) 
4.88** 
(0.92) 
6.18*** 
(0.42) 
3.00*** 
(0.70) 
6.05*** 
(0.49) 
Shared Indiv. PCF (T2) 0.36*** 
(0.07) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Team Affect DE (T2) 
  
-0.26 
(0.21) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
-0.32 
(0.20) 
0.16* 
(0.09) 
0.46*** 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.11) 
R2 .32 .03 .13 0.13 0.07 .26 .15 
F  26.68*** 0.91 4.03** 4.13** 1.99† 9.78*** 4.92** 
Indirect Effect    -0.08 0.04 -0.14 0.05 0.16 0.07 
Bootstrap = 1000  
C.I. 90%   [-.22, .02] [-.05, .13] [-.29, .01] [-.00, .10] [.04, .30] [.01, .15] 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Intercept 
 
3.85*** 
(0.35) 
6.94*** 
(0.96) 
4.08*** 
(0.82) 
4.87*** 
(0.93) 
6.14*** 
(0.42) 
3.02*** 
(0.71) 
5.98*** 
(0.49) 
Shared Team PCF (T2) 0.36*** 
(0.07) 
0.18 
(0.13) 
0.26** 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.09† 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.21*** 
(0.06) 
Team Affect DE (T2) 
  
-0.30 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
-0.37* 
(0.20) 
0.15† 
(0.09) 
0.47*** 
(0.15) 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
R2 .34 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.06 .26 .15 
F  29.35*** 1.29 5.13*** 3.73** 1.69 9.66*** 5.02*** 
Indirect Effect    -0.09 0.02 -0.15 0.05 0.16 0.07 
Bootstrap = 1000  
C.I. 90%   [-.23, .01] [-.07, .11] [-.30, .00] [-.01, .10] [.04, .30] [.01, .15] 
Note. N=58. Standard errors in parenthesis. Results for shared individual PCF are in the top half 
portion of the table, whereas results for shared team PCF are in the bottom half portion of the 
table. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20 
 
When affective climate (ED) was tested as a mediator, I found mixed results. The indirect 
effects of shared individual PCF on team outcomes through team affect (DE) was significant 
only for team engagement-emotional (Indirect Effect = 0.16, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.04, 
.30]) and team engagement-cognitive (Indirect Effect = 0.07, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.01, 
.15]). The same result were found for the indirect effects of shared team PCF on team outcomes 
through team affect (DE), which were only significant for team engagement-emotional (Indirect 
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Effect = 0.16, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.04, .30]), and team engagement-cognitive (Indirect 
Effect = 0.07, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [.01, .15]). These results provided mixed support for 
hypotheses 9a and 9b. 
Finally, Table 15 shows that shared individual PCF (Model 1: b = 0.46, SE = 0.10, p < 
.01, R2 = .09) and shared team PCF (Model 8: b = .38, SE = 0.10, p < .01, R2 = .09) were 
positively and significantly related to external collective fit, supporting hypotheses 8a and 8b. 
When external collective fit was tested as a mediator, the only indirect effect that was 
significantly different from zero was the indirect effect of shared team PCF on turnover 
intentions (Indirect Effect = -0.10, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.20, -.003]). The indirect effects 
of shared individual PCF on average turnover intentions was not significance (Indirect Effect = -
0.12, Bootstrap = 1000 C.I. 90% [-.23, .01]). These results generally reject hypotheses 9a and 9b, 
except for the relationship among shared team PCF, external collective fit, and average turnover 
intentions. 
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TABLE 15: External Collective Fit as a Mediator Between Shared PCFs and Team-Level 
Outcomes 
Variables Collective Fit (T2) 
Team 
Performance 
(T3) 
Team 
OCBs 
(T3) 
Average 
Turnover 
Intention 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Physical 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Emotional 
(T3) 
Team 
Engagement 
Cognitive 
(T3) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 
 
3.31*** 
(0.53) 
5.55*** 
(0.75) 
4.27*** 
(0.65) 
4.28** 
(0.70) 
6.74*** 
(0.32) 
4.52*** 
(0.57) 
6.59*** 
(0.38) 
Shared Indiv. PCF 
(T2) 
0.46*** 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
0.22** 
(0.10) 
-0.16** 
(0.06) 
Collective Fit (T2) 
  
0.10 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.19† 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
R2 .27 .01 .13 0.12 0.02 .14 .11 
F  20.85*** 0.33 3.87** 3.70* 0.46 4.63** 3.41* 
Indirect Effect    0.04 0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.06 0.04 
Bootstrap = 1000  
C.I. 90%   [-.04, .15] [-.08, .08] [-.23, .01] [-.03, .04] [-.03, .14] [-.02, .10] 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Intercept 
 
3.71*** 
(0.52) 
5.48*** 
(0.75) 
4.16*** 
(0.64) 
4.24** 
(0.71) 
6.73*** 
(0.33) 
4.48*** 
(0.58) 
6.61*** 
(0.38) 
Shared Team PCF 
(T2) 
0.38*** 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.27*** 
(0.10) 
-0.12* 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
Collective Fit (T2) 
  
0.08 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.22† 
(0.13) 
-0.00 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
R2 .20 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.01 .15 .11 
F  14.38*** 0.38 5.13*** 3.37** 0.31 4.68** 3.23* 
Indirect Effect    0.03 0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.05 0.02 
Bootstrap = 1000  
C.I. 90%   [-.03, .12] [-.08, .06] [-.20, -.003] [-.04, .03] [-.02, .13] [-.03, .06] 
Note. N=58. Standard errors in parenthesis. Results for shared individual PCF are in the top half 
portion of the table, whereas results for shared team PCF are in the bottom half portion of the 
table. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20 
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5.7. Cross-Level Effects of Shared PCFs 
To test Hypotheses 10a and 10b, I conducted several analyses using random coefficient 
modelling (RCM) and the multilevel package developed in R. Hypotheses 10a and 10b stated 
that shared individual PCF and shared team PCF, respectively, moderate the relationship 
between individual PCF and individual outcomes, such that the relationship would be stronger 
when shared PCFs are similar to individual level perceptions of how the organization fulfills 
employment promises.  
Table 16 shows the interaction effects of shared individual PCF whereas Table 17 shows 
the results for shared team PCF. In model 1, I simply tested the individual level relationship 
between individual PCF and individual outcomes using RCM. RCM provides unbiased 
parameter estimates, given that the individual level data are nested in teams and thus are non-
independent. In models 2 and 3 I included the direct effects of both individual and team-level 
PCF variables. In models 2 the slopes per team are fixed, whereas in models 3 the slope per team 
can vary across teams. In the last two models, I conducted a formal test of variation of slopes. A 
significant test of random slopes suggests that the slopes per team are significantly different from 
each other. But even if the slopes did not statistically vary, interactions effects were estimated 
anyway in models 4, as several authors have strongly recommended to continue with an 
interaction test when theory supports the effect (Bliese et al., 2017; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
Finally, models 5 test the interaction effects using group-mean centering in order to verify that 
the interaction effect is not artificially created by group means interacting (Bliese et al., 2017; 
Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).   
As expected, and congruent with the literature on PCF, most of the relationships in 
models 1 in tables 15 and 16 were significant and in the expected direction, with the exception of 
105 
 
engagement which was not significant. A post-hoc analysis revealed that when engagement is 
disaggregated into 3 different dimensions, PCF was significantly related to emotional 
engagement (b = 0.18, SE = 0.05, p < .001), but not to physical (b = 0.02, SE = 0.04, n. sig) or 
cognitive engagement (b = -0.06, SE = 0.04, n. sig). The models that tested the individual-level 
relationship between PCF and the 3 dimensions of engagement were the only models where an 
analysis of subdimensions of engagement created any difference.  
Regarding the results of the tests of slope variability, none of these tests was significant, 
using either shared individual PCF or shared team PCF. This suggests that the tests were not able 
to detect significant variation of slopes across teams. Also, in the case of turnover intentions, the 
random slope model 3 did not converge either in tables 16 or 17. This non-convergence occurred 
even after applying functions to optimize the convergence process. Thus, the test of different 
slopes for PCF and turnover intentions across teams could not be tested. 
Regarding the tests of interaction coefficients, the cross-level shared individual PCF × 
individual PCF interaction term was significant when the dependent variable was contextual 
performance (b = 0.08, SE = 0.04, p < .10), turnover intention (b = -0.20, SE = 0.10, p < .05), and 
engagement (b = 0.08, SE = 0.05, p < .10). However, when I tested the interaction effects using 
group-mean centering, the only interaction effect that remained significant was contextual 
performance (b = 0.10, SE = 0.06, p < .05). These results remained the same even when I 
separately tested the interaction effects for specific dimensions of individual engagement. As 
shown in Figure 3, individual PCF related more positively to contextual performance when 
shared individual PCF was high, supporting the hypothesis. In conclusion, all this evidence 
suggests that Hypothesis 10a was only supported for contextual performance.  
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TABLE 16: Cross-Level Analysis of Individual-Level Outcomes (Shared Individual PCF) 
  In-role Performance   Contextual Performance 
Variables 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
Intercept 5.24*** 
(0.20) 
4.19*** 
(0.41) 
4.19*** 
(0.41) 
5.32*** 
(1.33) 
4.20*** 
(0.41) 
 5.84*** 
(0.17) 
5.70*** 
(0.26) 
5.71*** 
(0.27) 
7.73*** 
(1.18) 
5.74*** 
(0.26) 
Individual. PCF 0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.20 
(0.25) 
-0.20 
(0.29) 
 0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.06† 
(0.04) 
0.07† 
(0.04) 
-0.32† 
(0.22) 
-0.45† 
(0.32) 
Shared Indiv. 
PCF 
 0.24*** 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
  0.04 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.37† 
(0.24) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
Individual PCF 
× Shared 
Indiv. PCF 
   0.04 
(0.05) 
     0.08* 
(0.04) 
 
Individual PCF 
(Group-mean 
centered) × 
Shared Indiv. 
PCF 
    0.04 
(0.06) 
     0.10* 
(0.06) 
Test of Random 
Slopes 
 Models 2 vs 3 
df=2, L.Ratio=1.08E-
7 
p=1.0 
    Models 2 vs 3 
df=2, L.Ratio=.82 
p=.66 
  
 Turnover Intentions  Engagement 
 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
Intercept 4.15*** 
(0.39) 
3.87*** 
(0.55) 
--- -1.64 
(2.86) 
3.86*** 
(0.55) 
 5.95*** 
(0.19) 
6.18*** 
(0.30) 
6.18*** 
(0.30) 
8.27*** 
(1.27) 
6.18*** 
(0.30) 
Individual. PCF -0.35*** 
(0.07) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
--- 0.66 
(0.52) 
0.49 
(0.73) 
 0.05† 
(0.04) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.33† 
(0.24) 
-0.18† 
(0.34) 
Shared Indiv. 
PCF 
 0.10 
(0.14) 
--- 1.19** 
(0.58) 
-0.29*** 
(0.10) 
  -0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.50* 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
Individual PCF 
× Shared 
Indiv. PCF 
   -0.20** 
(0.10) 
     0.08* 
(0.05) 
 
Individual PCF 
(Group-mean 
centered) × 
Shared Indiv. 
PCF 
    -0.18 
(0.14) 
     0.05 
(0.07) 
Test of Random 
Slopes 
 ---     Models 2 vs 3 
df=2, L.Ratio=0.004 
p=.99 
  
Notes. Nobs=209; Ngroups=58. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
For models “e”, the Individual PCF variable is the group-mean centered value. 
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20. 
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FIGURE 3: Shared Individual PCF × Individual PCF interaction effect on Individual 
Contextual Performance 
 
 
Similarly, Table 17 shows the analyses to test the interaction effect of shared team PCF. 
The cross-level Shared Team PCF × Individual PCF interaction term was only significant when 
the dependent variable was turnover intention (b = -0.20, SE = 0.10, p < .01). Figure 4 shows that 
when shared team PCF was high, the individual level relationship was strengthened but it was 
attenuated when shared team PCF was low.  This provides supports for Hypothesis 10b for 
turnover intentions only. Note that Model 5 for turnover intentions in table 17 did not converge, 
which means that I cannot get rid of the alternative explanation that the interaction effect is due 
to an interaction between the group-mean of individual PCF and shared team PCF.  
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TABLE 17: Cross-Level Analysis of Individual-Level Outcomes (Shared Team PCF) 
  In-role Performance   Contextual Performance 
Variables 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
Intercept 5.24*** 
(0.20) 
4.23*** 
(0.41) 
4.23*** 
(0.41) 
4.71*** 
(1.21) 
4.24*** 
(0.41) 
 5.84*** 
(0.17) 
5.65*** 
(0.25) 
5.65*** 
(0.26) 
6.52*** 
(1.12) 
5.69*** 
(0.25) 
Individual. PCF 0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.23) 
-0.05 
(0.27) 
 0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.06† 
(0.04) 
0.06† 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.22) 
-0.09† 
(0.30) 
Shared Team 
PCF 
 0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.13 
(0.25) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
  0.05 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.23) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
Individual PCF 
× Shared 
Team PCF 
   0.02 
(0.05) 
     0.03 
(0.04) 
 
Individual PCF 
(Group-mean 
centered) × 
Shared Team 
PCF 
    0.02 
(0.05) 
     0.03 
(0.06) 
Test of Random 
Slopes 
 Models 2 vs 3 
df=2, L.Ratio=1.20E-
7 
p=1.0 
    Models 2 vs 3 
df=2, L.Ratio=.60 
p=.74 
  
 Turnover Intentions  Engagement 
 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
 
Model 1 
Indivi-
dual 
Model 2 
Fixed 
slope 
Model 3 
Random 
Slope 
Model 4 
Interac-
tion 
Model 5 
Interac-
tion 
Intercept 4.15*** 
(0.39) 
3.79*** 
(0.53) 
--- -1.41 
(2.70) 
---  5.95*** 
(0.19) 
6.14*** 
(0.30) 
6.14*** 
(0.30) 
7.28*** 
(1.18) 
6.18*** 
(0.30) 
Individual. PCF -0.35*** 
(0.07) 
-0.41*** 
(0.09) 
--- 0.62 
(0.51) 
---  0.05† 
(0.04) 
0.07† 
(0.04) 
0.07† 
(0.04) 
-0.16 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
Shared Team 
PCF 
 0.13 
(0.13) 
--- 1.14** 
(0.55) 
---   -0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.29 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
Individual PCF 
× Shared 
Team PCF 
   -0.20** 
(0.10) 
     0.05 
(0.05) 
 
Individual PCF 
(Group-mean 
centered) × 
Shared Team 
PCF 
    ---      0.01 
(0.06) 
Test of Random 
Slopes 
 ---     Models 2 vs 3 
df=2, L.Ratio=0.008 
p=.99 
  
Notes. Nobs=209; Ngroups=58. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
For models “e”, the Individual PCF variable is the group-mean centered value. 
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20. 
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FIGURE 4: Shared Team PCF × Individual PCF interaction effect on Individual Turnover 
Intentions 
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5.8. Homology Tests of Effects of PCF at Individual and Team Level of Analysis 
Hypotheses 11a and 11b were related to the strength of the effects of shared PCFs on 
several types of variables. Specifically, Hypotheses 11a proposed that the relationship between 
team PCFs and team motivation, and between team PCF and team outcomes should be stronger 
at the team level. Following recommendations by Chen et al. (2005), I conducted several 
analyses to test homology/similarity using different steps. First, I tested for configural similarity.  
Tables 18 and 19 summarize the results previously presented in tables 11 through 17 in which a 
comparison of patterns of significance can be observed. Also, in order to make comparisons of 
the relationships between different variables at the individual and team level, it is first necessary 
to obtain all the relevant coefficients at both levels of analysis. For that reason, Table 18 also 
includes unbiased parameter estimates using RCM for the individual level relationship between 
PCF and motivation variables, which had not been estimated in previous tables. These 
estimations were needed to compare homology between PCF and motivation variables. 
From Table 18, individual-level PCF is significantly related to self-efficacy (b = 0.07, SE 
= 0.04, p < .05), affect-CT (b = -0.35, SE = 0.06, p < .01), affect-DE (b = 0.41, SE = 0.05, p < 
.01), and PO Fit (b = 0.17, SE = 0.05, p < .01). These results are congruent with the previous 
literature on psychological contracts (e.g. Conway & Briner, 2002, 2005). Similarly, these 
relationships are also significant at the team level for both shared individual PCF and shared 
team PCF. Thus, PCF shows configural similarity across levels.  
From Table 19, individual-level PCF is significantly related to in-role performance, 
contextual performance, and turnover intentions, but not to engagement (although emotional 
engagement was significantly predicted by individual PCF, as discussed in section 5.7). These 
results are also in line with the previous literature on psychological contracts (Bal et al., 2008; 
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Zhao et al., 2007). When data is tested at the team level, shared individual PCF and shared team 
PCF are significant predictors of only Team OCB and Average Turnover Intentions, showing 
configural similarity. This configural similarity occurs for both shared individual PCF and shared 
team PCF. However, there is no configural similarity for the PCF-Performance relationship at 
individual and team levels, as the relationship was significant at the individual level but not at 
the team level.  
 
TABLE 18: Multi-level Regression Results for PCF Predicting Motivation 
Variables Self Efficacy  Affect (TC) Affect (ED) PO Fit 
Individual-Level Results Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept)  5.83*** (0.20) 
4.99*** 
(0.30) 
3.57*** 
(0.26) 
5.16*** 
(0.28) 
PCF  0.07** (0.04) 
-0.35*** 
(0.06) 
0.41*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
 
 Team Potency 
Affective 
Climate CT 
Affective 
Climate DE Collective Fit 
Team-Level Results Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
(Intercept)  4.64*** (0.32) 
5.30*** 
(0.42) 
3.82*** 
(0.37) 
3.31*** 
(0.53) 
Shared Indiv. PCF  0.25*** (0.06) 
-0.39*** 
(0.08) 
0.36*** 
(0.07) 
0.46*** 
(0.10) 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
(Intercept) 
 
4.73*** 
(0.31) 
5.23*** 
(0.40) 
3.85*** 
(0.35) 
3.71*** 
(0.52) 
Shared Team PCF  0.24*** (0.06) 
-0.39*** 
(0.08) 
0.36*** 
(0.07) 
0.38*** 
(0.10) 
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20 
 
In the case of the PCF-engagement relationship, the patterns of significance were equal at 
both level of analysis (in this case, not significant at either individual or team level). But this 
relationship is better described when engagement is studied with its subdimensions. As described 
in section 5.5, there was a significant relationship between shared PCFs and emotional and 
cognitive engagement. At the individual level, however, the relationship is significant only for 
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emotional engagement, which suggests that there’s configural similarity only for the PCF-
engagement (emotional) relationship.  
 
TABLE 19: Multi-level Regression Results for PCF Predicting Outcomes 
Variables In-role Performance  
Contextual 
Performance 
Turnover 
Intention Engagement 
Individual-Level Results Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept)  5.24*** (0.20) 
5.84*** 
(0.17) 
4.15*** 
(0.39) 
5.95*** 
(0.19) 
PCF  0.07* (0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.35*** 
(0.07) 
0.05† 
(0.04) 
  
Team 
Performance Team OCB 
Average 
Turnover Int. 
Team 
Engagement 
Team-Level Results Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
(Intercept)  5.88*** (0.57) 
4.38*** 
(0.49) 
3.67*** 
(0.54) 
6.09*** 
(0.26) 
Shared Indiv. PCF  0.05 (0.11) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.24** 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
(Intercept) 
 
5.78*** 
(0.54) 
4.28*** 
(0.45) 
3.44*** 
(0.52) 
6.09*** 
(0.05) 
Shared Team PCF  0.07 (0.10) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20 
 
Second, I examined scalar similarity using equation (1) in section 4.3. In a concrete 
example of the use of equation (1), to test scalar similarity of the PCF-Performance relationship 
when shared team PCF is taken as the homologous team-level construct of Individual PCF, A = 
0.05 as this is the team-level coefficient that was estimated in model 5 of Table 19. The scalar 
similarity tests are summarized in Table 20.  
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TABLE 20: Test of Scalar Similarity of PCF Predicting Motivation and Outcomes Across 
Levels of Analysis 
Variables Self-Efficacy - A * PCF 
Affect CT 
- A * PCF 
Affect DE  
- A * PCF 
PO Fit  
- A * PCF 
Shared Individual PCF     
Intercept  5.83*** 
(0.20) 
4.99*** 
(0.30) 
3.57*** 
(0.26) 
5.16*** 
(0.28) 
Individual PCF  -0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.29*** 
(0.05) 
Shared Team PCF      
Intercept  5.83*** 
(0.20) 
4.99*** 
(0.30) 
3.57*** 
(0.26) 
5.16*** 
(0.28) 
Individual PCF  -0.17*** 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
  Performance 
- A * PCF 
Contextual 
Performance 
- A * PCF 
Turnover 
Intention 
- A * PCF 
Engagement 
- A * PCF 
Shared Individual PCF      
Intercept  5.24*** 
(0.20) 
5.84*** 
(0.17) 
4.15*** 
(0.38) 
5.95*** 
(0.19) 
Individual PCF  0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
-0.11† 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Shared Team PCF      
Intercept  5.24*** 
(0.20) 
5.84*** 
(0.17) 
4.15*** 
(0.38) 
5.95*** 
(0.19) 
Individual PCF  -0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.20*** 
(0.03) 
-0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Notes. Nobs=209; Ngroups=58. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .20. 
 
According to these results, there is evidence for scalar similarity in the following 
multilevel relationships: PCF-Efficacy (For shared individual PCF: B1 = -0.18, SE = 0.04, p < 
.01; For shared team PCF: B1 = -0.17, SE = 0.04, p < .01), PCF-Fit (For shared individual PCF: 
B1 = -0.29, SE = 0.05, p < .01; For shared team PCF: B1 = -0.21, SE = 0.05, p < .01), and PCF-
Contextual Performance (For shared individual PCF: B1 = -0.18, SE = 0.03, p < .01; For shared 
team PCF: B1 = -0.20, SE = 0.03, p < .01). Moreover, all the significant difference coefficients 
found in tables 20 were negative, supporting Hypothesis 11a that the relationships at the team 
level are stronger than at the individual level.  
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In the case of the PCF-Turnover intent relationship, the coefficients found in table 20 
were also significant and negative (For shared individual PCF: B1 = -0.11, SE = 0.07, p < .20; For 
shared team PCF: B1 = -0.15, SE = 0.07, p < .05), but as this variable is negatively coded, a 
negative coefficient represents that the relationship at the individual level is stronger than at the 
team level. 
In the case of the PCF-Performance relationship and the PCF-Engagement relationship, 
there was no evidence for scalar similarity, however, this information must be complemented 
with the analysis for configural similarity where I couldn’t find evidence to support that the 
relationships are significant at both levels of analysis, excepting for the relationship between 
PCF and the emotional dimension of engagement. Thus, I conducted an additional scalar 
similarity test for this specific dimension of engagement. The results show that there’s no strong 
evidence to support scalar similarity of the PCF-Emotional engagement relationship (For shared 
individual PCF: B1 = -0.07, SE = 0.05, p = .16; For shared team PCF: B1 = -0.06, SE = 0.05, p = 
.23). 
In the case of the PCF-Affect relationships, there was no evidence for scalar similarity. 
Considering that there was also strong support for configural similarity in these cases, I cannot 
discard the null hypothesis that the strength of these relationships are equal at both levels of 
analysis. Thus, for the PCF-Affect relationships, Hypothesis 11a is rejected. 
Finally, Hypothesis 11b stated that shared team PCF has a stronger effect on team 
motivation and outcomes than shared individual PCF. This hypothesis can be evaluated based on 
the observation of the standardized coefficients of Tables 11-15. Table 21 provides a 
standardization of the coefficients in those models, which were obtained using the QuantPsyc 
package in the software R. Standardized coefficients are expressed in units of standard 
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deviations, which mean that they represent how many standard deviations a dependent variable 
will change when the independent variable increases by one standard deviation. Contrary to what 
was expected, there was no clear pattern to determine whether shared team PCF or shared 
individual PCF had stronger effects on team motivation variables and team outcomes. Shared 
Individual PCF had a stronger effect on team potency, affective climate (CT), external collective 
fit, and average turnover intentions, whereas shared team PCF showed a stronger effect on team 
performance, team OCBs, and affective climate (DE). Thus, Hypothesis 11b is generally 
rejected. 
 
TABLE 21: Summary of Standardized Coefficients of Shared Individual PCF vs Shared 
Team PCF on Team Motivation and Team Outcomes 
Variables Team Potency Affective Climate CT 
Affective Climate 
DE  
External 
Collective Fit 
Shared Individual PCF 0.50 -0.54 0.57 0.51 
Shared Team PCF  0.47 -0.53 0.58 0.43 
Stronger Effect:  Shared Indiv PCF Shared Indiv PCF Shared Team PCF Shared Indiv PCF 
  Team 
Performance 
Team OCBs Average 
Turnover Intent 
Team 
Engagement 
Shared Individual PCF  0.06 0.35 -0.29 0.06 
Shared Team PCF  0.08 0.38 -0.24 0.06 
Stronger Effect:  Shared Team PCF Shared Team PCF Shared Indiv PCF Equal 
 
Finally, Table 22 provides a summary of hypotheses, results, and some relevant 
observations for each of them.  
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TABLE 22: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypotheses Tested Relationship Results Observation  
Hypothesis 1a:   
Shared individual PCF is 
distinguishable from shared team 
PCF, forming two different 
constructs. 
Shared Individual PCF 
vs. Shared Team PCF 
Not supported Even though the data is better 
modeled with two team level factors, 
the correlation between the two 
variables was very high (ɸ = .93), 
questioning discriminant validity. 
Hypothesis 1b:   
At the team level, shared 
individual PCF and shared team 
PCF are positively related. 
Shared Individual PCF 
vs. Shared Team PCF 
Supported Even though the latent correlation was 
positive, the value was too high (ɸ = 
.93) to provide evidence of 
discriminant validity. 
Hypothesis 2a:  
Justice Climate positively 
predicts shared individual PCF. 
PJ Climate → SIPCF Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
Hypothesis 2b:  
Justice Climate positively 
predicts shared team PCF. 
PJ Climate → STPCF Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
Hypothesis 3a:  
POS Climate positively predicts 
shared individual PCF. 
POS Climate → SIPCF Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
The relationship becomes not 
significant when PJ Climate is 
controlled. 
Hypothesis 3b:  
POS Climate positively predicts 
shared team PCF. 
POS Climate → STPCF Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
The relationship becomes not 
significant when PJ Climate is 
controlled. 
Hypothesis 4a:   
Smaller team size facilitates the 
emergence of shared individual 
PCF. 
Team Size → SIPCF Not supported No significant relationship was found. 
Hypothesis 4b:   
Smaller team size facilitates the 
emergence of shared team PCF. 
Team Size → STPCF Not supported No significant relationship was found. 
Hypothesis 5a:   
High team interdependence 
facilitates the emergence of 
shared individual PCF. 
Interdependence → 
SIPCF 
Not tested The Interdependence measure was not 
reliable at either individual or team 
level of analysis. 
Hypothesis 5b:   
High team interdependence 
facilitates the emergence of 
shared team PCF. 
Interdependence → 
STPCF 
Not tested The Interdependence measure was not 
reliable at either individual or team 
level of analysis. 
Hypothesis 6a:  
LMX differentiation will 
undermine the emergence of 
shared individual PCF. 
LMX Diff. → SIPCF Not supported No significant relationship was found. 
Hypothesis 6b:  
LMX differentiation will 
undermine the emergence of 
shared team PCF. 
LMX Diff. → STPCF Not supported No significant relationship was found. 
Note. PCF: Psychological Contract Fulfillment; SIPCF: Shared individual PCF; STPCF: Shared team PCF; LMX: 
Leader-member exchange, PJ: Procedural Justice; POS: Perceived Organizational Support; OCB: Organizational 
Citizenship Behaviors; CT: Calmness-Tension; DE: Depression-Enthusiasm. 
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TABLE 22: (Continued) 
Hypotheses Tested Relationship Results Observation  
Hypothesis 7a:   
Shared individual PCF will 
predict team-level outcomes 
(team performance, team-level 
OCB, average turnover 
intentions, team engagement). 
SIPCF → Team 
Performance 
Not supported No significant relationship was found. 
However, SIPCF was significantly 
and positively related to the average 
individual performance. 
SIPCF → Team OCB Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
SIPCF → Average 
Turnover Intention 
Supported Negative and significant relationship. 
SIPCF → Team 
Engagement 
Partly supported Positive and significant relationship 
for emotional team engagement. 
Negative and significant relationship 
for cognitive team engagement. No 
significant relationship was found for 
physical team engagement. 
Hypothesis 7b:   
Shared team PCF will predict 
team-level outcomes (team 
performance, team-level OCB, 
collective turnover intentions, 
team engagement). 
STPCF → Team 
Performance 
Not supported No significant relationship was found. 
However, SIPCF was significantly 
and positively related to the average 
individual performance. 
STPCF → Team OCB Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
STPCF → Average 
Turnover Intention 
Supported Negative and significant relationship. 
STPCF → Team 
Engagement 
Partly supported Positive and significant relationship 
for emotional team engagement. 
Negative and significant relationship 
for cognitive team engagement. No 
significant relationship was found for 
physical team engagement. 
Hypothesis 8a:  
Shared individual PCF will 
predict team motivational states 
(team potency, team external 
collective fit, team affective 
tone). 
SIPCF → Team Potency Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
SIPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (CT) 
Supported Negative and significant relationship. 
SIPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (DE) 
Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
SIPCF → Team External 
Collective Fit 
Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
Hypothesis 8b:  
Shared team PCF will predict 
team motivational states (team 
potency, team external collective 
fit, team affective tone). 
STPCF → Team Potency Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
STPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (CT) 
Supported Negative and significant relationship. 
STPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (DE) 
Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
STPCF → Team 
External Collective Fit 
Supported Positive and significant relationship. 
Note. PCF: Psychological Contract Fulfillment; SIPCF: Shared individual PCF; STPCF: Shared team PCF; LMX: 
Leader-member exchange, PJ: Procedural Justice; POS: Perceived Organizational Support; OCB: Organizational 
Citizenship Behaviors; CT: Calmness-Tension; DE: Depression-Enthusiasm. 
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TABLE 22: (Continued) 
Hypotheses Tested Relationship Results Observation  
Hypothesis 9a:  
Team motivation states will 
mediate the relationship between 
shared individual PCF and team 
outcomes. 
SIPCF → Team Potency 
→ Outcomes 
Not supported No significant mediation effect was 
found for any of the team outcomes. 
SIPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (CT) 
→ Outcomes 
Partly supported A significant mediation effect was 
found for the following outcomes: 
- Team OCB 
- Average turnover intent 
- Team engagement (Physical) 
- Team engagement (Emotional) 
SIPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (DE) 
→ Outcomes 
Partly supported A significant mediation effect was 
found for the following outcomes: 
- Team engagement (Cognitive) 
- Team engagement (Emotional) 
SIPCF → Team External 
Collective Fit → 
Outcomes 
Not supported No significant mediation effect was 
found for any of the team outcomes. 
Hypothesis 9b:  
Team motivation states will 
mediate the relationship between 
shared team PCF and team 
outcomes. 
STPCF → Team Potency 
→ Outcomes 
Not supported No significant mediation effect was 
found for any of the team outcomes. 
STPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (CT) 
→ Outcomes 
Partly supported A significant mediation effect was 
found for the following outcomes: 
- Team OCB 
- Average turnover intent 
- Team engagement (Physical) 
- Team engagement (Emotional) 
STPCF → Team 
Affective Tone (DE) 
→ Outcomes 
Partly supported A significant mediation effect was 
found for the following outcomes: 
- Team engagement (Cognitive) 
- Team engagement (Emotional) 
STPCF → Team 
External Collective Fit 
→ Outcomes 
Partly supported A significant mediation effect was 
found only for average turnover intent. 
Hypothesis 10a:   
Shared individual PCF will 
moderate the relationship 
between individual PCF and 
individual outcomes (in-role 
performance, OCBs, turnover 
intentions, engagement). 
(SIPCF x PCF) → 
Individual Outcomes 
Partly supported SIPCF significantly moderated the 
relationship between PCF and OCBs 
(but not for the rest of individual 
outcomes). 
Hypothesis 10b:   
Shared team PCF will moderate 
the relationship between 
individual PCF and individual 
outcomes (in-role performance, 
OCBs, turnover intentions, 
engagement). 
(STPCF x PCF) → 
Individual Outcomes 
Partly supported STPCF significantly moderated the 
relationship between PCF and 
turnover intent (but not for the rest of 
individual outcomes). 
Note. PCF: Psychological Contract Fulfillment; SIPCF: Shared individual PCF; STPCF: Shared team PCF; LMX: 
Leader-member exchange, PJ: Procedural Justice; POS: Perceived Organizational Support; OCB: Organizational 
Citizenship Behaviors; CT: Calmness-Tension; DE: Depression-Enthusiasm. 
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TABLE 22: (Continued) 
Hypotheses Tested Relationship Results Observation  
Hypothesis 11a:  
The relationships between PCF, 
motivation, and outcomes at 
team levels of analysis are 
stronger than at individual levels 
of analysis. 
Scalar similarity between 
PCF and motivational 
states. 
Partly supported Scalar similarity was found for the 
following relationships: 
- PCF-Efficacy 
- PCF-Fit 
Configural similarity was also found 
for PCF-Affect. 
Scalar similarity between 
PCF and outcomes. 
Partly supported Scalar similarity was found for the 
following relationships: 
- PCF-OCBs 
- PCF-Turnover intent (stronger at 
individual level) 
Hypothesis 11b:  
Shared team PCF has a stronger 
effect on team motivation and 
team outcomes than shared 
individual PCF. 
SIPCF → 
Motivation/Outcomes 
vs. 
STPCF → 
Motivation/Outcomes 
Not supported No clear pattern to determine whether 
SIPCF or STPCF had stronger effects 
on team motivation variables or team 
outcomes 
Note. PCF: Psychological Contract Fulfillment; SIPCF: Shared individual PCF; STPCF: Shared team PCF; LMX: 
Leader-member exchange, PJ: Procedural Justice; POS: Perceived Organizational Support; OCB: Organizational 
Citizenship Behaviors; CT: Calmness-Tension; DE: Depression-Enthusiasm. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Since the very early conceptualizations of the psychological contract construct, this field 
has evolved to become now a very important topic in organizational behavior research. In the last 
50 years, the field has established clear definitions of psychological contract, it has gathered 
evidence about its existence and its effects, and it has developed well-accepted measurement 
instruments. However, the field is still in an “augmentation” stage (Reichers & Schneider, 1990), 
where reconceptualizations of the construct appear and new lenses are applied to develop more 
useful explanations of how psychological contracts can be better managed to help organizations 
to be more efficient and productive. In this dissertation, I strived to contribute to this field by 
expanding theory and empirical research on psychological contracts in the team context, 
enriching our understanding of whether or not team members share perceptions of PCF, by 
studying ways to operationalize PCF in teams, and by more generally providing a new 
conceptualization of PCF at the team level. Below, I discuss the results of the formal tests of my 
proposed hypotheses and their implications for my initially proposed research objectives. 
6.1. Discussion of Research Objectives 
6.1.1. Construct Validity of Shared PCF Constructs.  
First, regarding research objective #1 (regarding hypotheses 1a and 1b about whether 
shared PCF could be treated as two separate constructs or not), the data suggests that at the 
individual level of analysis, team members may be able to differentiate their perceptions of 
fulfillment of their own psychological contracts versus the ones of their team. The correlation 
between the items at the individual level and at the within-team level (group-mean centering) 
suggest that employees have somewhat different perceptions of fulfillment of promises to them 
individually or to the team (step 2 in Van Mierlo et al.’ procedure). The correlations among items 
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were below the r=.85 cut point to establish lack of discriminant validity, but they were still very 
high (.84 at individual level; .75 at the within-team level), which suggest that they are similar 
constructs.    
However, that important distinction is clearer at the team level. My results show that 
shared individual PCF and shared team PCF are very highly correlated, which means that 
practically speaking, there is not much of a difference between constructs, even though 
confirmatory factor analyses suggest that models with two latent constructs fit the data better 
than single construct models (step 1 in Van Mierlo et al.’s procedure). In fact, with only a few 
exceptions, shared individual PCF and shared team PCF demonstrated very similar relationships 
with antecedents and outcomes. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that 
individuals may be reporting individual and team promises as a single phenomenon as the 
experience of fulfillment of promises to individuals and to teams may be aligned in team 
members´ psychology due to more collectivistic approaches to face organizational phenomena or 
other unknown cognitive processes used to interpret employment-related events. Thus, individual 
perceptions of PCF and team PCF may bias the evaluations of each other. 
An alternative explanation is that, team members may be constructing their opinions 
about team PCF from a weighted average of the PCF of other team members, and not exclusively 
from perceptions of fulfillment of promises made to the team as an autonomous entity. Similarly, 
individuals may be considering how the organization fulfills promises to the team as a way to 
evaluate the perceptions of their own PCF. Individuals may be extending their identities to what 
happen with their teams such that breaches to other team members are perceived as breaches to 
oneself. In any case, the results show that the distinction between shared individual PCF and 
shared team PCF is more conceptual than empirical (at least, when using global measures of 
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PCF). In practice, using these two different measures can make little difference in terms of 
affecting the significance of relationships with other constructs or in the capacity to detect 
significant effects. Most likely, this distinction may create little or no differences in terms of 
testable effects in future meta-analyses. In other words, both shared individual PCF and shared 
team PCF seem to be appropriate ways to capture a team-level construct of within-team 
sharedness of perceptions of PCF.  
Regardless of the high correlation between shared individual PCF and shared team PCF, 
the data suggested that an important portion of the individual level variance of PCF is explained 
by team membership. It seems that employees tend to share their opinions about how the 
organization fulfills the promises to all the members of the same team and to the team as a 
whole, creating a shared, emergent team-level phenomenon for both shared PCFs. This is mainly 
shown by high median values of rwgs, which suggest strong agreement of PCF among team 
members; and also by relatively high ICC1s, which show a relatively high proportion of variance 
of PCF that is explained by team membership. That means that individuals strongly define their 
perceptions of fulfillment based on phenomena occurring at the team level. This has implications 
for organizations and managers who should be careful about not breaching promises to any team 
member (or to the team as a whole) because what the team thinks about the organization has an 
important effect on how individuals behave. 
6.1.2. Antecedents of the Level of Shared PCF Constructs 
Research objective #2 intended to explore the relationship that shared PCFs have with 
other social exchange indicators at the team level (Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b). The results 
support the hypotheses that procedural justice climate and perceived organization support (POS) 
climate are significant predictors of shared PCFs. In teams with shared perceptions that the 
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procedures to arrive at rewards are consistent and free of bias and feel free to express thoughts 
and feelings about those procedures, it is more likely to have higher levels of shared PCFs.  
Companies that are transparent about procedures to distribute rewards, and openly ask 
employees for feedback about those procedures, may be indirectly creating a positive 
environment that decreases the likelihood of team members perceiving employment breaches. 
The same is true with respect to POS climate. Teams that perceive that the organization values 
the contribution of team members, shows interest for team members, and considers the need of 
team members, are more likely to display higher perceptions of fulfillment of individual and 
team psychological contracts. As theorized in previous chapters, both justice climate and POS 
climate may create a generalized environment that decrease social vigilance, giving the 
organization the benefit of the doubt when individuals evaluate whether promises had been 
fulfilled or breached. Thus, these findings are important as they suggest that a practical way to 
increase shared PCFs may be to alter the levels of justice climate or POS climate. 
When justice climate and POS climate were evaluated as antecedents of shared PCFs in 
the same model, the effects of POS climate disappeared. It is likely that the high correlation 
between justice climate and POS climate is constraining the available variance to be estimated in 
the model. In addition, future research should examine the possibility of more intricate 
relationships. For example, at the individual level, Tekleab et al. (2005) argued that POS may 
work as a mediator between procedural justice and psychological contract violations. Whether 
this mediation relationship holds at the team level is still an open researchable question. 
6.1.3. Antecedents of the Strength of Shared PCF Constructs 
In research objective #3, I studied whether some relevant variables affected the strength 
of shared PCFs (Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 6a, and 6b). Contrary to the study’s predictions, the data 
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collected in this dissertation shows that neither team size nor LMX differentiation was a 
significant predictor of shared PCFs strength. One potential explanation for these non-significant 
results is a possible lack of variability to be estimated on the strength variables. For example, the 
coefficient representing the relationship between LMX differentiation and shared individual PCF 
strength was very close to the cut point of .10, suggesting that there may be a significant effect 
that could not be discovered. Another alternative explanation is that there are unmeasured 
mediators that are more strongly driving these effects. For example, as hypothesized in chapter 3, 
team size should be related to the strength of shared PCFs because team size can shape the types 
of interactions within teams. However, I did not directly measure the level of interaction of team 
members. It may be the case that, for some unknown reason, the level of interaction of team 
members is not strongly driven by team size in my sample. Another possibility is that the part-
time workforce (not surveyed), which is relatively unstable, untenured, and that vary team by 
team, may be contaminating the measure of team size or even slightly altering the level of 
interaction within teams.  
Finally, in this data collection effort it was not possible to provide a reliable measure of 
team interdependence at time 1 as a predictor of the strength of shared PCFs. The chosen 
measure of interdependence did not only show poor internal consistency at the individual level, 
but it also showed poor aggregation indexes at the team level, which means that it was not 
possible to use it at time 1 to test hypothesis 5a and 5b. Future research may examine this 
relationship as it can better inform researchers how shared PCFs emerge from individual 
perceptions. 
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6.1.4. Team-Level Outcomes of Shared PCF Constructs 
In research objective #4, I proposed to test the relationship between shared PCFs and 
team-level outcomes, namely, team performance, team OCBs, average turnover intentions, and 
team engagement (Hypotheses 7a and 7b). First, shared PCF variables were significant predictors 
of team OCBs. This suggests that when teams have a high shared perception that the 
organization fulfill its promises to individuals or teams, they also tend to display more 
organizational citizenship behaviors toward other individuals (e.g. helping others who have been 
absent, showing concern and courtesy for others, assisting other team members with their duties) 
and toward the organization (e.g. defending the organization when others criticize it, expressing 
loyalty, demonstrating concern about the image of the company). This result is important for 
organizations because it shows that one way to foster positive behaviors that goes beyond the 
mandatory duties or essential functions of a job, is to develop teams where most of the 
individuals perceive that employment promises are fulfilled. That is, individuals will not only 
display these citizenship behaviors as reciprocate behaviors that respond to fulfilled individual 
promises, but because a social environment is created within teams where most team members 
display these behaviors, and by their actions, the behavior is reinforced and promoted within the 
team. 
Shared PCFs were also significant predictors of average turnover intentions within teams. 
As expected, these relationships were negative, meaning that the more team members think that 
organizations fulfill promises, the less the average intention to leave the organization. That is, 
when organizations take care of the shared perceptions of fulfillment of psychological contracts, 
they may be also reduce the likelihood of actual turnover by influencing the behavioral intentions 
and thoughts associated with leaving the company. Nevertheless, I need to emphasize that the 
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variable “average turnover intention” is merely an average within teams, not an emergent team-
level construct (as indicated by its low Rwg’s and ICC’s).  
Although shared PCFs initially were not predicting team engagement, an analysis of 
subdimensions of team engagement show more nuanced results. Both shared individual PCF and 
shared team PCF were predicting the emotional and cognitive dimensions of team engagement, 
but not the physical dimension. First, shared PCFs were positively predicting team emotional 
engagement, supporting the initial hypothesis. That is, when team members share perceptions 
that organizations generally fulfill promises made to team members and to the team, team 
members tend to be more excited or energetic in their jobs (emotional team engagement). 
Second, the results show, in contrast, that high shared PCFs were negatively related to cognitive 
team engagement. That is, when team members share perceptions that organizations generally 
fulfill promises made to team members and to the team, team members tend to be less 
concentrated, less absorbed, or less focused on their jobs. This effect was opposite to what was 
originally theorized. One potential explanation for this result is that in teams with low shared 
PCFs, team members may be exerting more cognitive effort in trying to do their jobs flawlessly 
and thus signaling the company that they are units that deserve a better treatment. 
Contrary to what was expected, shared individual PCF or shared team PCF were not 
significantly related to team performance. At the individual level, however, the relationship 
between individual PCF and individual performance was significant at the α=.10 level, which 
was expected from the psychological contract literature (Zhao et al., 2007). One possible 
explanation for this non-significant result at the team level is that the team performance measure 
had been contaminated by the fact that team leaders were biased to evaluate team performance as 
a measure of their own performance as managers. Another potential alternative explanation is 
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that there are unknown mediators or moderators that were not measured. As a post-hoc analysis, 
I tested the relationship between shared PCFs and the average performance scores of team 
members in each team. The relationship was significant and in the expected direction for shared 
individual PCF (b = 0.26, SE = 0.08, p < .01) and shared team PCF (b = 0.26, SE = 0.08, p < .01).  
In conclusion, shared PCFs seem to be significant predictors of team-level outcomes in 
general. These results provide compelling evidence to believe that shared PCFs could be 
important constructs in OB/HR research. Future research should both confirm these results in 
other samples, industries, and/or countries, and expand the range of outcomes that can be 
predicted by shared PCFs. 
6.1.5. Team Motivation as Mediator of Shared PCF and Team Outcomes 
In research objective #5, I examined whether team motivation could be a mediator 
between shared PCFs and team outcomes (Hypotheses 8a, 8b, 9a, and 9b). Team motivation was 
operationalized with 4 team-level variables: team efficacy, team affect (calmness-tension), team 
affect (depression-enthusiasm), and external collective fit. I will discuss the mediation effect of 
each of these variables separately. 
First, the results show that team potency was significantly predicted by shared PCFs. 
That is, teams with high shared perception of fulfillment of promises tend to perceive higher 
levels of potency, or the extent to which the team members believe that the team can mobilize 
enough resources to be successful in general. However, team potency was not significantly 
related to any of the team outcomes. The mediation tests showed that all the indirect effects of 
shared PCF constructs on team outcomes through team potency, were not significantly different 
from zero. A possible explanation for these non-significant results is the low reliability of the 
team means of team potency (i.e. ICC2 = .13), which may impede the detection of significant 
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effects. Another potential explanation is that although previous research supports a linear 
relationship between potency and team performance, recent theories have also proposed a 
curvilinear relationship where overconfident teams may display lower performance (e.g. Park, 
Kim, & Gully, 2017). A post-hoc analysis, however, did not show any significant nonlinear 
effects. 
Second, the results show that the calmness-tension dimension of team affect was 
significantly predicted by shared PCFs. That is, teams with high shared perception of fulfillment 
of promises tend to have environments dominated by more calmness and less tension affects. 
Fulfilled promises to several individuals or to the team as a whole could foster an environment of 
positive affect as several team members display more calmness and those affect states can 
become more contagious within teams, reinforcing a team-level state. Moreover, the calmness-
tension dimension of team affect significantly mediated the relationship between shared PCF 
constructs and team OCBs, average turnover intentions, team engagement (physical), and team 
engagement (emotional). These results suggest that some of the most important effects of shared 
PCFs are explained, in part, by their effects on shared experiences of affect within teams. 
Regarding team engagement, it is important to note that shared PCFs show significant indirect 
effects on the physical dimension of team engagement through team affect, but there was a non-
significant direct effect between the predictors and the outcome (as shown in Table 10). This 
suggests that the calmness-tension dimension of team affect could be fully mediating the effect 
of shared PCFs on the physical dimension of team engagement.  
Third, the depression-enthusiasm dimension of team affect was also significantly 
predicted by shared PCFs. That is, teams with high shared perception of fulfillment of promises 
tend to have environments with more enthusiasm, optimism, and cheerfulness, and less 
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depression, pessimism, or discouragement. Breached promises are likely to boost depressive 
states, which can also be spread out to other team members through multiple interactions. In 
addition, this dimension of team affect significantly mediated the relationship between shared 
PCF constructs and emotional and cognitive team engagement. This means that shared PCF 
constructs facilitate environments of general enthusiasm which have an impact in the way team 
members are engaged in the workplace. Regarding average turnover intentions and physical team 
engagement, the confidence intervals of the indirect effects in Table 14 only included zero closer 
to its limit, which may suggest that there may be a mediation effect that the current data was not 
able to strongly detect. I would suggest that these results are still evidence for mediation. 
Nevertheless, more research is needed to confirm this preliminary conclusion. 
Finally, shared PCFs significantly predicted external collective fit. This evidence may 
confirm the assertion that when team members perceive high shared PCF constructs they may 
think that some of the reasons of that fulfillment is that the team as a whole has what is necessary 
to attend the demands that the company requests. However, there was a general weak 
relationship between external collective fit and team outcomes. In terms of the mediation 
analysis, the results show that the indirect effect of shared PCFs on team outcomes through 
external collective fit was significantly different from zero only for average turnover intentions.  
More generally, the results show that the most important mediator between shared PCF 
constructs and team outcomes are team affect variables. In contrast, team potency has no 
apparent role in this relationship, and external collective fit only mediates the effect of shared 
PCFs on average turnover intention. Considering that team affect has been treated in the past as a 
relevant operationalization of team motivation (Park et al., 2013), it can be argued that, similar to 
what occurs at individual levels, motivation may explain why shared PCFs could impact team 
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outcomes. Regarding this research question, future research may expand other mediators 
explaining the relationship between shared PCFs and team outcomes. In addition, more research 
should confirm the mediation results in this dissertation with samples in other organizations, 
industries or countries. 
6.1.6. Shared PCF Constructs as Moderators of the PCF-Outcome Relationship 
In research objective #6, I examined the cross-level moderating effects of shared PCF 
constructs on PCF-outcome relationships at the individual level (Hypotheses 10a and 10b). In 
chapter 3, I argued that when individuals evaluate the appropriate behaviors to respond to the 
fulfillment of individual psychological contracts, they may also consider how the company 
fulfills other individuals or entities’ promises. Negative shared PCFs should neutralize the 
known positive associations between individual PCF and individual outcomes. These 
hypothesized cross-level interactions lie at the heart of social information processing (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1978) and the multi-level theory of PCF in teams (Laulié & Tekleab, 2016) as social 
contexts provide important information that individuals use to make sense of the world that they 
experience. However, I only found one significant interaction effect: shared individual PCF 
moderating the positive relationship between individual PCF and contextual performance.  
When shared individual PCF was high, the positive relationship between PCF and 
contextual performance was strengthened. In contrast, low shared individual PCF neutralized the 
PCF-Contextual Performance relationship. This suggests that the effects of fulfilled 
psychological contracts are much stronger when individuals perceive that the organization 
fulfilled the promises to all their team members, and that individuals reciprocate the organization 
only when they perceive consistency in fulfillment of employment promises in general. This 
result has many implications. For example, if organizational agents want to focus on fulfilling 
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employment promises to some team members but not to others, such an action is likely to 
neutralize the positive effects of any positive action toward fulfilling individuals’ psychological 
contracts. Thus, organizations should try to enhance perceptions of fulfillment of promises of all 
team members at the same time, because shared perceptions of high PCF can actually boost 
individual level outcomes.  
Regarding the effect of shared team PCF on the individual level relationship between 
PCF and turnover intentions, the results show that when promises to the team are fulfilled, this 
creates an environment that reinforce individual’s intention to leave when they perceive that their 
own psychological contracts have been fulfilled. In contrast when individuals perceive low 
individual PCF but also low shared team PCF, this can buffer the effects of low individual PCF. 
A possible explanation is that when individuals perceive that not only their promises but also 
promises to the team have been breached, this could facilitate resignation thoughts. However, 
these results must be evaluated carefully as the model that contained the test of the significant 
interaction term using group-mean centering could not converge. That means that the alternative 
explanation that shared team PCF and the average of individual PCF were interacting to affect 
turnover intentions cannot be ruled out.  
The data did not provide evidence for any other significant interactive effects. 
Nevertheless, these non-significant results should also be interpreted cautiously. As noted by 
Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, and Chen (2012, p. 961), in multilevel research “[generally,] the 
power to detect significant cross-level interactions is quite modest.” According to these authors, 
the power of these tests is primarily determined (in order) by the magnitude of the interaction 
effect, the magnitude of the direct cross-level effect, and the variability of individual-level 
slopes, followed by level-1 and level-2 sample size (Mathieu et al., 2012). Thus, it is likely that 
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the significant interaction coefficients were detected when contextual performance and turnover 
intentions were the dependent variables, because they displayed strong direct effects of shared 
PCFs. Complementarily, and as suggested by the non-significance of the tests of different slopes, 
the variability of level-1 slope coefficients may have not been enough to strongly detect 
interaction effects. Thus, future research should further explore these results.  
6.1.7. Homology of PCF 
In research question #7 I explored how PCF-outcome relationships generalize across 
levels (individuals, teams) (Hypotheses 11a and 11b). This research question is especially 
relevant from theoretical and practical points of view. First, it is important to decipher whether 
the known literature on PCF can be generalizable to other levels of analysis because if they do, 
this can add parsimony and more simplicity to theoretical backgrounds. Second, if these 
relationships differ across levels, this can show that there are boundary conditions that need to be 
better understood and further explored.  
In line with my hypotheses, results showed that the relationships between PCF and 
motivation and between PCF and outcomes are generally stronger at the team level. These results 
are in line with recent developments in the psychological contract literature which have shown 
that social contexts may have a key role in different outcomes of PCF (e.g. Dabos & Rousseau, 
2013; Ho & Levesque, 2005; Ho et al., 2006). Moreover, the evidence that support stronger 
effects at the team level may be showing that social contexts and social interactions may be 
driving the effects of PCF with a higher importance than what has been previously theorized.  
In practice, this implies that organizations may try to focus their efforts on managing PCF 
at the level of analysis that is more likely to have a bigger impact on concrete outcomes: the 
team. For instance, organizations should try to build shared psychological contracts (or 
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normative contracts), to put more effort on the promises made to the majority of team members, 
to train team leaders and HR representatives to form more unified psychological contracts, or to 
put more effort in identifying which promises are more important for the majority of team 
members. Organizations may also want to more consciously design communicational strategies, 
emphasizing the fulfillment of explicit organizational promises to all the members of the team. 
In addition, results from this dissertation show that the stronger effects of shared PCFs on 
motivation and outcomes did not vary according to the use of shared individual PCF or shared 
team PCF. In practice, promises made to several individuals and promises made to the team as 
whole, although theoretically different, are practically equivalent at the team level. For research 
purposes, this may show a lack of discriminant validity between shared individual PCF and 
shared team PCF, but it also shows that future researchers are equally equipped to detect 
significant effects using either construct. 
6.2. Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The results of this dissertation contribute to both research and practice. This dissertation 
not only expanded psychological contract theory to higher levels of analysis, but also provided 
important pieces of evidence that support that individuals within teams tend to converge in their 
perceptions of PCF above and beyond what is expected by random error. In the previous pages, I 
expanded this emerging field on PCF in teams, examining the antecedents, mediators and 
outcomes of shared PCFs. As the field starts to grow in number of studies and in number of 
interested researchers, it needs a more complete understanding of what are the most important 
correlates of these variables. Importantly, my dissertation results provided evidence to confirm 
that shared PCFs significantly predict relevant team-level outcomes such as team OCBs, average 
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turnover intentions, and some dimensions of team engagement. This also suggests that the field 
of PCF in teams is a relevant topic that needs to be better understood in the future.  
This dissertation also expanded the field by empirically testing whether shared individual 
PCF is a construct similar or different from shared team PCF. This test was important in order to 
improve the construct validity of shared PCFs. As previously discussed, the results show that 
these two constructs are very highly correlated, which implies that future theoretical and 
empirical advancements of team PCF theory should be equally equipped to test different 
propositions using either measure. However, at this stage of the development of this research 
topic, I still recommend researchers to keep measuring both shared individual PCF and shared 
team PCF if possible, until more evidence confirm (with different samples) that the results found 
in this dissertation hold in other settings. 
This dissertation also expanded theory by examining some of the mechanisms that 
explain why PCF at the team level can have an impact on several team-level dependent variables. 
By integrating the emerging literature of PCF at the team level with the growing literature on 
team motivation, this dissertation provided new insights about how teams develop motivational 
states from experiences of fulfillment of psychological contracts. Concretely, the results suggest 
that affective climate, especially, is an important mediator between shared PCFs and team 
outcomes. Although previous research has emphasized that broken promises may alter daily 
moods and spark emotional reactions at the intra-individual level (Conway & Briner, 2002), 
these relationships had not been previously tested at the team level. Thus, this dissertation 
broadens our understanding of mediators of shared PCFs. 
Although the idea that psychological contracts could be shared among coworkers had 
been theorized by researchers in the past (Alcover, Rico, Turnley, & Bolino, 2017; De Vos & 
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Tekleab, 2014; Laulié & Tekleab, 2016; Marks, 2001; Rousseau, 1995), no study had compared 
and tested the configural and scalar similarities (homology) between PCF and outcomes at both 
individual and team levels of analysis. My dissertation results suggest that although the 
psychological contract field assumes that PCF affect important outcomes, these effects tend to be 
even stronger at higher levels. Consequently, this dissertation provides evidence that future 
theoretical and empirical research on PCF at the team level may have a greater impact on 
organizations and their effectiveness. 
This study also contributes to practice. Organizations should realize that developing 
shared and more positive perceptions of PCF at the team level can have a very concrete business-
related impact as it can affect the dynamics and the collective behaviors of team members. This 
may have implications, for instance, when organizations decide communicational strategies, 
interventions, or training programs. For example, HR representatives may decide to 
communicate employment promises to the entire team, instead of focusing on individual 
promises. Likewise, managers could be trained to not only manage perceptions of fulfillment at 
the individual level, but also at the team level. As discussed in previous pages, managers should 
learn a) that the interactions of different team members may alter the perceptions of PCF of 
different individuals, b) that high shared PCFs can actually help teams to display better 
outcomes, and c) that the fulfillment of employment promises to some individuals but not to 
others might be detrimental to the organization. Knowing that shared perceptions of PCF can 
alter team outcomes is a relevant piece of information to make better decisions about how to 
increase organizational effectiveness.  
Managers and organizational agents in general should also be aware of less obvious ways 
to create promises to a team as a whole. For instance, providing more security in teams with 
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contact with the public, hiring more team members for professional teams, or buying new 
machinery for manufacturing teams are decisions that may be normally seen by leaders as 
decisions to reach certain organizational goals (strategic or operational decisions). However, in 
the eyes of team members, announcements of strategic or operational decisions like these could 
be interpreted as employment promises to the team, influencing the development of shared PCFs. 
From the results of this dissertation it can be inferred that when these strategic decisions change 
they could create unintended changes in shared PCFs and potentially, changes in team-level 
outcomes. Team leaders who are aware of this possibility should be more likely to obtain more 
positive results. 
6.3. Future Research 
Treating PCF as a team-level construct added explanatory power to a more general theory 
of psychological contracts that has a longer tradition on studies at the individual level of analysis. 
However, as Hackman (2003) argued, research in organizations may benefit from “bracketing” 
focal phenomena, that is, by conducting conceptual and empirical research at both lower but also 
higher levels of analysis. In terms of lower levels, future research may expand our understanding 
of how shared PCFs emerge from individuals’ social interactions and day to day organizational 
events and routines. Knowing a more extended list of antecedents of the strength of shared PCFs 
could benefit the literature as well as examining the types of variables or conditions under which 
shared PCFs emerge in time. Some examples of that research may include questions such as: 
What social network properties may affect the convergence of opinions of PCF?  
Are there individual actions or special team configurations that may allow the emergence 
of shared PCFs?  
How daily perceptions of PCF (trajectories) may affect more global perceptions of PCF?  
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What relevant events may create convergence or divergence of PCF perceptions? 
Likewise, future research should “go up” in the levels of analyses in which shared PCFs 
are conceptualized and operationalized. For example, shared PCFs may be studied at the 
organizational level, examining whether there could be more general PCF “climates” in different 
organizations. Similarly, researchers should better understand whether different regional or 
national cultures could affect the way in which individual and teams understand and evaluate 
psychological contracts (e.g. Rousseau & Schalk, 2000). 
Future research should also assess whether the results in chapter 5 hold when using a 
composite measure of shared PCFs, instead of a global measure as the one used in this 
dissertation. Composite measures of PCF ask individuals to rate the fulfillment of promises using 
specific items or currencies of exchange (e.g. autonomy, pay, training opportunities) and may 
alter the scope of promises that are brought to mind to individuals. If researchers ask directly 
about team-level types of promises that are difficult to make to single individuals (e.g. provide a 
right number of team members), it is more likely that shared individual PCF and shared team 
PCF have a lower correlation, and may display a slightly different nomological network. Thus, 
more research is needed in terms of different ways to capture these team-level shared PCFs. 
Finally, future research would benefit from integrating the PCF literature in teams with 
other relevant literatures in the organizational sciences, such as the leadership literature. For 
example, certain types of leadership styles (such as servant leadership) or certain types of leader 
messages (such as social accounts) may be more suitable for enhancing the level of shared PCFs. 
The answers to all these questions may better inform organizational agents on ways to better 
manage shared perceptions of PCF. 
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6.4. Limitations and Strengths of the Study 
In this section, I identify some limitations of the present study. First, the data used in this 
dissertation was collected in a single organization and thus it was not possible to rigorously 
assess whether the organizational culture or any other characteristic of the industry may be 
altering some of the relationships found. Continuous studies about shared PCFs in other 
companies may contribute to support the external validity of these findings. Second, the data 
used in this dissertation was collected in Chile, a country with a particular national culture that 
may or may not have affected the results of the study. Chile is known as a more collectivistic 
culture (in comparison to strongly individualistic cultures such as the US), where individuals 
value group harmony and are more likely to develop meaningful relationships in the workplace. 
Thus, it may be possible that team-level phenomena were easier to observe in this setting. Third, 
even though the sample size collected was equivalent to similar studies at the team level (Chen et 
al., 2007; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Vidyarthi et al., 2016), it would have benefitted from a larger 
sample in order to increase the power of the different statistical tests. This was especially 
relevant in the non-significant results found for the tests of antecedents of the strength of shared 
PCFs and the tests of cross-level interactions. Future replication studies should try to test the 
hypotheses of this dissertation using larger samples.  
In this dissertation, I collected data in a field setting, and thus, it was not perfectly 
possible to control or manipulate different variables, as in a lab study, to fully address causality. 
Nevertheless, collecting data from a field setting was also a strength as it allowed the observation 
of the phenomenon of psychological contracts with individuals who actually experience 
employment relationships with a company. Also, the design of the study generally measured 
antecedents before the data collection of outcomes and the lapse of time between surveys was 
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enough to let some psychological variables to have an impact on other attitudes, behaviors, and 
other psychological states at the team level. The fact that I collected multiple surveys and that I 
used multiple sources were also strengths of the research design as they help to reduce common 
method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003), which could have artificially inflated some correlations 
among variables. 
6.5. Conclusion  
In the book “Psychological Contracts in Organizations”, Rousseau (1995, p. 47) stated 
that “the sharing of a contract makes the contract even stronger.” In this dissertation, I tried to 
test the veracity of that statement, but I also examined different antecedents, mediators, and 
outcomes of shared perceptions of psychological contracts within teams. I hope to have 
contributed to this field by providing evidence to expand theory of PCF in teams.  
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APPENDIX A: SCALES 
A. ANTECEDENTS 
 
POS Climate (From Bashshur et al, 2011, based on Gonzalez Romá et al., 2009;) 
 
1. Team members feel supported by the organization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. You can tell that the company is interested in the members of 
the team. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The human resources management is carried out keeping the 
team members in mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The team manager contributes to creating a friendly and 
cordial work climate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Procedural Justice Climate (From Erhart, 2004, based on Colquitt et al., 2002)  
For the following items, think about the procedures used to arrive at rewards in your team. With 
regard to those procedures, to what extent… 
 
Have those procedures been applied consistently in your team? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Have those procedures been free of bias in your team? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Have people in your  team been able to express their views and 
feelings about those procedures? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Have those procedures in your team upheld ethical and moral 
standards? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Task Interdependence (From Wageman, Hackman, and Lehman Team diagnostic survey, 
Also used in McClelland, Giles P. Leach, Desmond J, Clegg, Chris W McGowan, Ian, 2014) 
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
1. Members of this team have their own individual jobs to do, 
with little need for them to work together. (R) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Generating the outcome or product of this team involves a 
great deal of communication and coordination among 
members. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Members of this team depend heavily on one another to get 
the team’s work done. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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LMX (Bauer and Green, 1996, based on Scandura and Graen, 1984, & Liden et al., 1993) 
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
 
1. Regardless of how much power he/she has built into his/her 
position, my supervisor would be personally inclined to use 
his/her power to help me solve problems in my work.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I can count on my supervisor to "bail me out," even at his or 
her own expense, when I really need it.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My supervisor understands my problems and needs.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My supervisor recognizes my potential well.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My supervisor has enough confidence in me that he/she 
would defend and justify my decisions if I were not present 
to do so.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I usually know where I stand with my supervisor.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I usually know how satisfied my manager is with me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I would characterize the working relationship I have with my 
manager as extremely effective. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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C. PCF MEASURES 
 
Individual Psychological contract fulfillment (Robinson & Morrison, 2000)  
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
1. Almost all of the promises made to me by my employer have 
been kept so far.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling the 
promises made to me when I was hired.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. So far my employer has done an excellent job of fulfilling its 
promises to me.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I have not received everything promised to me in exchange 
for my contributions. (R)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My employer has broken many of its promises to me even 
though I’ve upheld my side of the deal. (R) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Team Psychological Contract Fulfillment (From Robinson & Morrison, 2000, Team PCF 
Climate in DeVos et al, Study 1). 
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
1. Almost all of the promises made to my team by my employer 
have been kept so far.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling the 
promises made to my team.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. So far my employer has done an excellent job of fulfilling its 
promises to my team.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My team has not received everything promised to us in 
exchange for our contributions. (R)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Our employer has broken many of its promises to my team 
even though we’ve upheld our side of the deal. (R) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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D. MOTIVATION ITEMS 
 
Team Potency (Collins, G., Catherine, Parker, K., Sharon, 2010 based on Guzzo et al 1993)  
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
 
1. My team believes it can become unusually good at producing 
high-quality work.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. This team expects to be known as a high performing team.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My team feels it can solve any problem it encounters  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My team has confidence in itself.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My team believes it will get a lot done when it works hard.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. No task is too tough for this team.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. My team believes it can be very productive.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. My team expects to have a lot of influence in the 
organization.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Self Efficacy (Modified from above) 
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
 
1. I believe I can become unusually good at producing high-
quality work.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I expect to be known as a high performing worker.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel I can solve any problem I encounter.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I have confidence in myself.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I believe I will get a lot done when I work hard.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. No task is too tough for me.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I believe I can be very productive.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I expect to have a lot of influence in the organization.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Team Affective Climate (Gamero et al 2008, also Bartel and Saaveddra 2000)  
Please, indicate to what degree your job has made you feel like each of the adjectives listed 
below in the past few weeks.  
1. Tense,  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Jittery,  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Anxious,  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Calm (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Tranquil (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Relaxed(R)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Cheerful,  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Enthusiastic, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Optimistic,  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Pessimistic (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Gloomy (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Discouraged (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Collective DA Fit (Kristoff-Brown et al., 2014, based on Cable & DeRue, 2002)   
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
1. Our team members’ knowledge, skill, and abilities are a good 
fit with the requirement of our team’s task. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Our team members’ abilities and training provide a good 
match with the demands that our team’s task places on them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The match is very good between the demands of our team’s 
task and our skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
P-O Fit (Cable & DeRue, 2002) 
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
1. The match is very good between the demands of my job and 
my personal skills 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My abilities and training are a good fit with the requirements 
of my job 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My personal abilities and education provide a good match 
with the demands that my job places on me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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E. OUTCOMES 
 
Work Engagement (Job Engagement Scale JES, Rich et al 2010, recommended by Byrne et 
al ., 2016)  
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
 
1. I work with intensity on my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I exert my full effort to my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I devote a lot of energy to my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I try my hardest to perform well on 
my job  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I am enthusiastic in my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I feel energetic at my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I feel positive about my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I am excited about my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. At work, my mind is focused on my 
job 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. At work, I focus a great deal of 
attention on my job  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. At work, I am absorbed by my job 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. At work, I concentrate on my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Turnover Intention (From Cammeman et al., 1983)  
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
 
1. I will probably look for a new job in 
the next year. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I often seriously think about quitting. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Contextual Performance (Used by Mohammend et al., 2002) 
While performing my job, how likely is it that I would  
1. Volunteer to help out when others 
were busy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Follow proper procedures and avoid 
unauthorized shortcuts. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Support and encourage team 
members with problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Cooperate well with others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Voluntarily doing more than the job 
required in order to help others or 
contribute to team effectiveness. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Take the initiative to solve work 
problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Exercise personal discipline and self-
control. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Tackle difficult work assignments 
enthusiastically. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Defend the management team’s 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
SUPERVISOR - OCB (Modified from Lee and Allen,2002,JAP, also used by Matta et 
al,2015,AMJ).  
Please indicate how strongly you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement using the scale: 
People in the team I lead… 
 
1. Help others who have been absent.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Willingly give their time to help others 
who have work-related problems.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Adjust their work schedules to 
accommodate other employees’ requests for time 
off.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Go out of the way to make newer 
employees feel welcome in the work group.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Show genuine concern and courtesy 
toward coworkers, even under the most trying 
business or personal situations.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Give up time to help others who have 
work or nonwork problems.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Assist others with their duties.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Share personal property with others to 
help their work.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Attend functions that are not required but 
that help the organizational image.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Keep up with developments in the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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organization.  
11. Defend the organization when other 
employees criticize it.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Show pride when representing the 
organization in public.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Offer ideas to improve the functioning of 
the organization.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Express loyalty toward the organization.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Take action to protect the organization 
from potential problems.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Demonstrate concern about the image of 
the organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
SUPERVISOR - Team performance (Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006).)  
Please indicate how accurate are the following items regarding the performance of the team you 
lead (1 = "very inaccurate," and 7 = "very accurate").  
 
1. This team achieves its goals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. This team accomplishes its objectives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. This team meets the requirements set for it  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. This team fulfills its mission 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. This team serves the purpose it is intended to 
serve 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
SUPERVISOR - Individual Task Performance (In Mero, Neal, P., Guidice, Rebecca, M., & 
Werner, Steve, 2014)  
Rate the effectiveness of each employee you supervise on every performance item listed below.  
 
 
1. Performing technical aspects of the job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Performing job-related tasks  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Performing complex tasks  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Maintaining a proficiency in job-specific tasks  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Keeping up with new work methods  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Advising others on task procedures  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Explaining job-related processes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Despite the fact that the literature on psychological contracts has flourished in the last 20 
years (Rousseau, 2011; Zhao et al., 2007), prior research provides limited insight about what 
psychological contract fulfillment (PCF) represents at higher levels of analysis.  A growing line 
of research has started to empirically assess the existence of PCF at the team level of analysis 
(e.g. De Vos & Tekleab, 2014) and new theoretical developments have been recently published 
(e.g., Laulié & Tekleab, 2016). However, several questions remain unanswered as the literature 
is still in a fledging state.  In this dissertation, I develop and test a model of shared PCFs at the 
team level.   
Hypotheses were examined in an organization in Chile using data from multiple teams, 
multiple times, and multiple sources. The results show that employees of the same team tend to 
share their opinions about how the organization fulfills the promises to all the team members and 
to the team as a whole, creating a shared, emergent team-level phenomenon. The results also 
support that justice climate and perceived organizational support climate were significant 
antecedents of shared PCFs. Shared PCFs were significant predictors of team organizational 
citizenship behaviors (OCBs), average turnover intentions, and team engagement. Moreover, the 
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results support that the effects of shared PCFs on different team outcomes are generally stronger 
than the effects of individual PCF on individual-level outcomes. In addition, team affective tone 
was found to be an important mediator between shared PCFs and team outcomes. Shared PCFs 
were also significant moderators of the relationship between individual PCF and some specific 
individual-level outcomes (contextual performance, turnover intentions). Implications for theory 
and practice are also discussed. 
Keywords:  Psychological contract fulfillment, social exchange, team effectiveness. 
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